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This thesis has described six studies to investigate the factors influencing great ape 
cultural behaviours. The data presented were collected from all extant species of non-human 
great apes (apes). Chapters 2, 3 and 4 test the assumption of the Zone of Latent Solutions (ZLS) 
hypothesis that ape cultures are the product of socially-mediated reinnovations rather than 
culture dependent traits. Chapters 2 and 3 generally find support for the ZLS hypothesis, 
concluding that social learning, whilst important, is not necessary to explain patterns of ape 
cultural behaviours. Chapter 4 presents a potential caveat to the ZLS hypothesis, where a wild-
type behaviour was not expressed in a captive population. However, Chapter 5 supports another 
assumption of the ZLS hypothesis: imitation is beyond the capacity of other extant members 
of our clade. Finally, Chapter 6 considers the ecological factors that might influence the 
expression of material culture in bonobos, a species not known for their prowess in this. Overall, 
this thesis acts to test the claims of the ZLS hypothesis, in doing so the individual, social and 
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 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 Overview 
From the strange pieces of material covering our feet to the shape of the hair on our 
head, culture pervades every aspect of the modern human condition. Our culture has changed 
more in the brief time in which our species, as we recognise it today, has existed than perhaps 
any of the flora or fauna that co-inhabit this planet of ours. However, the cultures of non-
human animals (hereafter: animals) are, arguably, mostly stationary, the mechanisms 
underlying them and influencing the expression of them are highly debated in the 
comparative psychology, anthropology, biology and cultural evolutionary literature. This 
thesis sits at the intersection of these literatures and asks and attempts to answer some 
questions about the cultures of our closest extant relatives, the non-human great apes 
(henceforth: apes). For example, can ape cultures emerge without the inclusion of special 
variants of social learning? What are the social learning capacities of apes (do apes "ape")? 
Overall, what are the factors influencing ape cultures, and how do these compare to what we 
know of our own culture. In this thesis, I will build on already existing methodologies, e.g., 
the Latent Solutions methodology (Tennie & Hedwig, 2009), and apply them in novel ways. 
In doing so I will target some of the more controversial issues in the aforementioned fields 
and attempt, using controlled and consistent testing procedures, to add new understanding of 




Before embarking on the empirical chapters, I will review the current state of the 
relevant literature. Within this introduction, I will discuss social learning and break this down 
into its constituent mechanisms. I will then go on to discuss culture, in its various guises and 
specifically outline the key debates around ape culture, which have arisen in the last decade. 
Finally, I will discuss tool use in apes and how this relates to the debates of culture in the 
literature today.  
 Theoretical background 
 Social Learning 
In its simplest form, social learning is the act of one individual acting on information 
derived, in some way, from or via another, the result may then alter the observable behaviour 
of the first individual. Social learning pervades virtually every aspect of human life and it has 
been assumed (perhaps rightly so) that it similarly pervades the lives of other animals, 
especially apes. Here I qualify exactly what we refer to as social learning in the literature and 
in splitting it into its variants I attempt to provide a framework from which it is possible to 
separate resultant cultures (Galef, 1976). Notwithstanding the recent debates around even 
making such a choice (Stout, Rogers, Jaeggi, & Semaw, 2019) as it is necessary to divide 
social learning to empirically devise which of its variants are necessary for the emergence of 




 Definitions of Social Learning Mechanisms 
Michael Tomasello and colleagues (1993, p. 496) conceptualised social learning, in its 
broadest sense, as “individual learning that is influenced in some way by the social 
environment” citing Bandura (1986). Within this seminal piece, Tomasello et al. 
conceptualised a key difference between the more basic variants of social learning, e.g., local 
and stimulus enhancement, and the variants of social learning that they term "cultural 
learning". The distinction between these being that cultural learning is where the learner 
acquires information "through another", as opposed to "from another", suggesting a more 
understanding and considered learning process. The distinction between these pathways of 
acquisition is that, in “cultural learning”, through another, the learner attempts to take the 
perspective of the demonstrator/model. These “cultural learning” variants are common in 
humans, by contrast, Tomasello et al suggest that even these more basic variants of social 
learning are “instrumental” in the development of some aspects of chimpanzee (Pan 
troglodytes sp.) tool use, a suggestion that has been heavily debated (see Section 1.2.4.2). 
Since then several attempts to introduce a finer-grained classification of social 
learning variants have been made. This thesis will use that of Whiten et al (2004), who 
collected and provided comprehensive definitions of the main social learning variants (see 
Table 1), which are widely cited (a Google Scholar search on 24/06/2019, for articles citing 
Whiten et al. 2004, resulted in 354 articles). Each mechanism will be discussed below in 
reference to ape social learning but here we will refer to physical cognition only (sensu 




cultures, particularly tool use. The debate surrounding social cognition (including vocal 
learning; e.g., Janik, 2014; Janik & Slater, 2000) is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Table 1.1. Social learning mechanisms as described by Whiten et al (2004, p. 39). Descriptions listed here are 
those used throughout this thesis unless otherwise stated. 
Group Mechanism Description Resultant ‘cultural’ variant 
Copying 





“Copying the form of a 
caused object movement” 
– can be imitative or 
emulative according to 
Whiten et al. 
End-State 
Emulation 
Copying only the end or 




Properties Learning about operating 






Learning the positive or 
negative value of an object 
or event 
Enhancement 
Local** Focusing attention on part 
of the environment Stimulus  
Notes: 
*Observational conditioning is considered by Whiten et al. (2004, p. 39) as its own group, thus 
no group entry. 
** Whiten et al. (2004, p. 39) use “locale”, however throughout this thesis this mechanism will 
be referred to as “local” enhancement as this is the more accepted spelling in the literature (e.g., 
Heyes & Galef, 1996).  
 
The social learning variants described by Whiten et al (2004) can be divided into 
copying and non-copying variants; non-copying variants include affordance learning, 
observational conditioning and enhancement. Enhancement was described by Thorpe (1963) 
as the learning that occurs when the attention of the learner is drawn to an aspect resulting 




chimpanzee mother and offspring interacting around a nut-cracking station (Boesch & 
Boesch, 1983). Both enhancement mechanisms could be at play here, the presence of the 
mother around a fixed anvil and holding a hammer stone/log would cause enhancement, to 
both the location (local enhancement) and the tools (stimulus enhancement), in the offspring. 
This, perhaps most basic, variant of social learning is common to many species (Whiten & 
Ham, 1992) and has previously been misinterpreted as other so-called “high-fidelity” 
(otherwise termed copying) variants of social learning, through the use of confounded 
methodologies (i.e., the two-target task; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2012). This said, it is 
possible to control for this by ensuring the target is in the same location but can be moved 
one way or another (i.e., a bi-directional lever or door); even then, the two-target 
methodology cannot distinguish between the variants of copying (Table 1.1). Observational 
conditioning is best exemplified in terms of fear response (though positive observational 
conditioning is possible too); this is where the learner acquires the fear response of others 
through observing the interactions of others with a given stimuli, e.g., macaques socially 
learn a snake based fear response in this way (Mineka & Cook, 1988).  
When only non-copying social learning variants merely mediate/catalyse the process 
of the individual learning the behavioural form, this is termed a socially mediated 
reinnovation (Bandini & Tennie, 2017). A reinnovation, in this context, is a behaviour that is 
being innovated for the first time within a population, but has already been identified in the 
species as a whole (i.e., in at least one other population); hence reinnovation (previously 
termed re-invention by Tennie et al. 2009; the distinction between these terms – and the 




Bandini & Tennie, 2017 and will not be repeated here). The process of socially mediating an 
individual reinnovation can be considered similar to a chemical reaction using a catalyst. By 
being socially mediated towards specifics of an individual’s environment (e.g., towards 
certain locations or stimuli) this merely increases the likelihood that the individual will 
reinnovate a behaviour themselves, but without the need for copying (compare Bandini & 
Tennie, 2017).   
Non-copying variants of social learning are present in many species from insects to 
humans and the existence of these outside the human genus is beyond debate (Tomasello, 
1996; Whiten et al., 2004). However, the presence or absence of copying variants of social 
learning, in other apes, is often debated (e.g., Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). Broadly, 
copying variants can be divided into emulative processes and imitative processes. The 
difference is that the actions of the demonstrator are not copied in purely emulative processes, 
but the results of those actions are. Within emulative learning it is possible to further 
subdivide social learning mechanisms into those involving “sensitivity to observed 
outcomes” and those involving “sensitivity to object movements” (Huang & Charman, 2005, 
p. 278 citing Whiten & Custance, 1996). The former consists of end-state emulation and goal 
emulation, whilst the latter consists of object movement re-enactment and affordance learning 
(Custance, Whiten, & Fredman, 1999). The emulative variants most pertinent to this thesis, 
owing to the specific methodologies and research questions, are end-state and goal emulation; 
only these will be discussed further. 
End-state emulation can be achieved by attending to and copying the outcome of 




to envisage example of this social learning mechanism is the spaghetti tower experiment, 
often applied by developmental and comparative psychologists to assess the ability of 
children to copy the designs of previous “generations” (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Reindl, 
Apperly, Beck, & Tennie, 2017). This task requires participants to build the tallest tower 
possible from dry spaghetti and modelling clay within a set time, each participant’s final 
design is shown to the next generation of participant to inform their tower. In such 
experiments, a generation is considered as the individual that came before the current 
participant. The importance of this task is, by showing a child the product of another’s 
actions it is possible to impart socially produced information that allows subsequent 
replications of those actions; even improving on them. Thereby the ‘learner’ takes on 
information about the ‘demonstrators’ results and reverse-engineers them to inform their 
actions. Crucially, the learner should not consider the action in relation to the demonstrator’s 
goal (Huang & Charman, 2005), i.e., in its purest form end-state emulation should be goal 
independent. 
Should the demonstrator’s goal be copied instead, the mechanism would be 
considered goal emulation (Huang & Charman, 2005). It may be that the spaghetti tower task 
uses a combination of both variants of emulation, however, for this example, the reader 
should set this aside and assume it is possible to parse these variants using this task. Goal 
emulation is not simply a graduation from end-state emulation; in goal emulation, whilst the 
goal (or even intention see Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005 for further 
discussion on the distinctions) of the model is copied, the method by which the goal is 




human child, engaging in private speech during solitary play (Krafft & Berk, 1998), i.e., 
audibly labelling their goal to build a tower from spaghetti pieces. An observer would be 
engaging in goal emulation if they then copied this goal to build the tower but came up with 
their own design for the tower, regardless of whether or not the result was successfully 
copied. However, it should be noted that Tomasello (1998a) argued that the notion of goal 
emulation “twisted” the concept of emulative learning as he described it (because the original 
description was intended to cover environmental results) and therefore should be considered 
with caution. 
The identification of imitation has been considered of paramount importance as it has 
been argued to be the social learning mechanism at the heart of human culture (Tomasello, 
1999a). It is considered important that imitation is only attributed when “insightful imitation” 
occurs (Carpenter & Call, 2002) as this is the mechanism underlies the majority of human 
culture. Insightful imitation is where the goal, action and result of the demonstrator’s 
behaviours are copied by the learner (Call & Carpenter, 2002; Carpenter & Call, 2002). If the 
goal is not copied the mechanism should be classified as ‘blind’ imitation or mimicry 
(Tomasello, Kruger, et al., 1993). Imitation is distinct from other copying variants of social 
learning as it involves the learner acquiring and expressing social information about the 
“bodily actions of the tool user” (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2013, p. 755) in 
this sense imitation is perhaps less ambiguously termed “action-copying” (term used sensu 
Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2006). The importance of action copying in classifying imitation 
is a factor shared across other definitions also (e.g., Whiten et al., 2004). In this thesis when 




the label to those cases that combine goal, action and result copying unless otherwise 
specified.  
A common issue when identifying imitation is that it is often unclear whether a 
behaviour is replicated due to chance, simplicity, bias in the task/social group or the learner is 
attending to the bodily actions of the demonstrator. For this reason, one of the best ways to 
identify true imitation is through identifying so-called "over-imitation" (Hoehl et al., 2019) 
where all aspects of a behaviour, even those causally irrelevant ones, are copied by the 
learner. Through over-imitation it is possible to build causally irrelevant actions into 
behavioural demonstrations, which are highly unlikely to occur by chance, or because of a 
causal understanding of the situation by the observer. They would only occur if imitation was 
responsible.  
 Evidence of imitation in non-humans  
There is no doubt that humans imitate one another (Tomasello, 1999a). Despite the 
somewhat ubiquitous nature of imitation in our species, evidence for imitation in other apes is 
far from conclusive. Despite claims of imitation in various species (Akins & Zentall, 1996; 
Kis, Huber, & Wilkinson, 2015), this thesis will focus on primates in the interest of brevity. 
Whiten and Ham (1992) discuss a "century of research" into social learning, with a 
particular focus on imitation. The findings of this review were that cases of monkey imitation 
can be largely dismissed, owing to a lack of experimental controls meaning imitation cannot 
be distinguished from other social learning mechanisms. However, apes, particularly 
chimpanzees, provide several examples of apparent imitation. Based on a review of the 




Ham conclude that ape imitation is likely. However, it should be noted that the cases provided 
as evidence of imitation were from "enculturated" subjects and should, therefore, be treated 
with extreme caution or even disregarded when the goal is to determine natural capabilities 
(Henrich & Tennie, 2017). This thesis is not concerned with the capacity of enculturated 
individuals, their relation to our cultural evolution is questionable, therefore henceforth, I will 
follow Henrich and Tennie in dismissing these data from the imitation debate. 
Data from unenculturated individuals is much less clear. Dean, Vale and Whiten 
(2018) capture the difficulty of successfully identifying imitation, in general, by presenting a 
three-fold "enigma". As expressed in Section 1.2.1.2, one needs to assess the intentionality of 
behaviour to distinguish imitation from mimicry. Next, it is important to consider the novelty 
of the response; if a response is not novel then one cannot be sure that its form was learned 
from the demonstrator (Tennie et al., 2012).  Finally, Dean et al. (2018) express the 
importance of utility; just because a species has been ‘shown’ to be capable of imitation, this 
would not imply that imitation is at the heart of their culture or that they would naturally 
utilise it.  
This said debate continues as to whether imitation is present in apes. Researchers on 
one side of this ‘fence’ suggest that spontaneous ape imitation is present and claim that this 
has been shown experimentally (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). 
However, Section 1.2.1.2 dismisses the results of two-target tasks as unable to distinguish 
imitation from emulation as only the results need to be copied to ‘pass’ the task. Accordingly, 
others maintain that spontaneous imitation is not present in apes. In one of the most recent 




in performing a novel gesture (Tennie et al., 2012). Tennie et al. suggest that apes cannot 
copy actions, as they failed to meet the aforementioned criteria for imitation. Therefore 
suggesting that spontaneous imitation is outside chimpanzees’ capacity; this conclusion is 
further supported by two similar studies with negative results (in bonobos; Pan paniscus; 
Clay & Tennie, 2018 and chimpanzees; Tomasello et al., 1997). The data presented by Tennie 
et al. do not totally exclude chimpanzees, and by extension all ape species, from being 
capable of imitation. However, when combined with the data presented by Clay and Tennie, 
these data present a picture of ape copying that is clearly distinct from human copying. 
Despite proponents of both sides of this debate demonstrating, what they consider to 
be, clear evidence of the presence/absence of imitation in apes the debate continues. 
Throughout this section I have outlined social learning mechanisms, these mechanisms are at 
the heart of culture, regardless of the species expressing that culture. However, what exactly 
constitutes this, highly provocative, word "culture" is a subject of a potentially even more 
fervent debate, going so far as being described as a "war" (Kendal, 2008; McGrew, 2002). 
The debate continues to this day. 
 Culture 
In this section, I will define and describe some of the types of culture and explain the 
contention between them, before concluding why the study of material culture is important. 
As before, my discussion will revolve around material culture unless otherwise stated; that is, 
behaviours that may be deemed cultural (in some sense) that result in a change in the physical 




 Types of culture 
Culture and social learning are inseparable, regardless of which definition (or "type" 
of culture) one subscribes to or considers, social learning is implicated. However, the ‘slider’ 
of culture ebbs and flows based on the degree to which social learning is required for that 
type of culture to emerge; equally, which of the social learning variants, described in Section 
1.2.1.1, are necessary for that culture to emerge. 
 Culture or tradition? 
Galef (1976) introduced the concept of a “tradition”, these were behaviours influenced 
by social learning. In a later publication, Galef (1992) made clear the distinction between 
culture and tradition and classified researchers into ‘splitters’ and ‘lumpers’. Simply, splitters 
are those who divide culture into various ‘levels’ and attribute these levels to species as they 
find evidence for them (as will I). Contrastingly, for lumpers if a species fulfils any of the 
cultural criteria they can be considered a “cultural species”, the idea being that these must 
rely on similar social learning mechanisms (sensu Wilson, 1975).  
Galef (1992, p. 159) is a splitter himself and so he describes culture as a sub-
component of traditions that differ on the "behavioural processes that support" them; in 
Galef’s terms, "behavioural processes" refer to social learning variants. To be considered as 
cultural, the acquisition of behaviours should be supported by imitation or teaching. Here I 
will retain my focus on imitation, but a few words on teaching first. Teaching is simply an 
active variant of social learning (Hoppitt et al., 2008), which, for some authors, may also 




2012). The presence or absence of teaching in apes has been debated (see Boesch, 
Bombjaková, Meier, & Mundry, 2019 but also see Moore & Tennie, 2015); however, the 
concept of teaching is tangential to the topic of this thesis as here I consider only less active 
demonstrations of social learning. These variants, as described by Whiten et al. (2004) relate 
directly to the empirical work making up the bulk of this piece; therefore, teaching will not be 
addressed in any detail.  
Galef claimed that many, if not all, supposed cases of animal culture could be 
explained through enhancement (see Section 1.2.1.1) and he, therefore, calls for a splitting 
approach, instead he classifies these ‘cultures’ as traditions (culture, to Galef, would require 
imitation or teaching). This topic will be revisited in Chapter 2 within my empirical work. 
However, Galef’s insights allow us to draw a very clear line between modern human culture, 
which relies on imitation/teaching, and that of apes. 
 Culture dependent traits 
In 2016, Reindl, Beck, Apperly and Tennie introduced the term Culture Dependent 
Trait (CDT). A CDT is a behaviour or an artefact that requires copying variants of social 
learning for its emergence. A behaviour that can instead be individually reinnovated from 
scratch cannot be considered a CDT. Galef would consider the latter a tradition, and the 
former true culture (Galef, 1992). In the next section, we turn to the general process that 




 Cumulative culture 
1.2.3.3.1 Standing on the shoulders of ever-smaller hobbits 
The exact definition of cumulative culture can be debated, however, common to 
many, if not all, of the definitions, is the ratchet mechanism described by Tomasello et al. 
(1993). The ratchet mechanism describes how across several generations the cultural 
knowledge of a species or population builds up in a stepwise manner where one generation 
improves upon the knowledge of the last one. The crux of the ratchet metaphor is the 
prevention (or reduction) of slippage; this requires variants of social learning that can make 
faithful copies (copying variants of social learning; Tennie, Hopper, & van Schaik, in press). 
A widely spread (though not ubiquitous, see Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018 for debate) 
definition of cumulative culture (in this case human culture) is that put forward in a seminal 
paper by Boyd and Richerson (1996, p. 80):  
“Human cultures do accumulate changes over many generations, resulting 
in culturally transmitted behaviours that no single human individual could 
invent on their own”. 
What can be seen here is that cumulative culture refers to both the process (copying 
variants social learning) and the product (“behaviours that no single human individual could 
invent on their own”, i.e., CDTs). Note that, in the literature, authors use two terms in relation 
to this process, cumulative culture and cumulative cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 




describe the process of cumulative culture (the ratchet; Tomasello et al., 1993). Henceforth, I 
will use the umbrella term of cumulative culture to describe both process and product. 
The possible mechanisms underpinning cumulative culture include emulation and 
imitation; both are copying social learning mechanisms (see above), and both have been 
empirically shown to be able to transmit cumulative culture (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; 
Reindl et al., 2017). However, the variants of cumulative culture that have been identified in 
the lab have been a source of recent contention. Some argue that ‘laboratory cumulative 
culture’ is a diluted form and should not be considered equal to modern human culture 
(Miton & Charbonneau, 2018). Despite these objections, I shall err on the side of caution by 
assuming that the cumulative culture expressed in the lab is representative of cumulative 
culture ‘in the wild’. Thus, accepting the evidence of Caldwell and Millen (2009) and Reindl 
et al. (2017) as evidence of cumulative culture resulting from emulation alone. This is 
important as it re-opens the possibility of cumulative culture in apes, because, even though 
they appear incapable of spontaneous imitation (Section 1.2.1.2; Tennie et al., 2012; 
Tomasello et al., 1997), they do have capability of spontaneous emulation (e.g., Hopper, 
Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 2008), though a seemingly limited one (Tennie et al., in 
press). 
1.2.3.3.2 Uniquely human? 
This section will focus on the claims of animal cumulative material culture. Some of 
the most convincing cases of animal cumulative culture reside outside of the material, for 
example, in bird (e.g., Fehér, Wang, Saar, Mitra, & Tchernichovski, 2009) and whale (Allen, 




cases of vocal cultures and are thus not relevant to the question of tool use. Three of the best-
proposed examples of animal cumulative culture to date will follow, however, each of these is 
not without doubt and the reasons for this trepidation will also be outlined. Claims of 
cumulative material culture are principally in birds and primates. In the interest of space, 
within this thesis, a single example will be selected each from birds, monkeys and hominids, 
each case is included because there is a claim or possible inference that the behavioural form 
may be a CDT. However, as we will see, actually all of these cases are unlikely to be outside 
an individual’s capacity within their lifetime, i.e., individuals may still be able to "reinvent 
the wheel" (Schofield et al., 2017 citing Tomasello, 1999b). If so, these cases would be better 
classified as latent solutions (Tennie et al. 2009). 
The first, avian, example is the New Caledonian crow (Corvus moneduloides), which 
has been widely noted to use tools in extractive foraging, even manufacturing and modifying 
these tools (Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2002). The use of pandanus tools (made from the 
leaves of the Pandanus spp. plant) has been claimed to be evidence of cultural evolution, 
based on the seemingly progressive shapes of tools (Hunt & Gray, 2003). The so-called 
"multi-step tool" design is supposedly an evolution of the standard "wide" design; in a three-
stage process where the tools went from "wide" to "narrow" or "one-step", cumulating in the 
"multi-step" design. This tool is a piece of pandanus leaf, wide at the base, ‘stepping’ up into 
narrower sections; it is used by the crows to extract invertebrates from holes in trees and 
fallen branches. To date there is no evidence of a naïve individual reinnovating this tool, 
however, a long-term test of naïve birds (especially from within the genetic sub-population of 




A recent claim for cumulative culture in non-human primates is in monkeys, 
specifically in Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata; Schofield et al., 2017). These monkeys 
take human provisioned, sweet potatoes and wash them in a body of water, supposedly to 
remove contaminants (Hirata, Watanabe, & Kawai, 2001). This has been closely documented, 
from its first innovation, by “Imo” (Kawai, 1965), to the behaviour today. The cumulative 
culture claim is that the behaviour has altered, over nearly 60 years, from ‘dunking’ in 
freshwater to in saltwater, advancing to contact washing (where the subject rubs the 
contaminants from the tuber as it is submerged) and finally to water wash-hole digging 
(where a personal hole is dug by the washer, with the express purpose of washing tubers; 
Schofield et al., 2017). This may be a form of cumulative culture, however, given the speed 
of ratcheting and relative simplicity of the final behavioural form (which is likely not outside 
the capacity of a single individual, a claim which should be tested), this should not be 
considered the equal of human cumulative culture. 
A third example of potential cumulative culture comes from one of our closest extant 
relatives, chimpanzees. Whiten, Horner and Marshall-Pescini (2003) discuss two potential 
cases of cumulative traits in chimpanzees: firstly, the use of a longer ant-dipping wand to 
transfer ants from hand to mouth at Gombe and Bossou, which is claimed to be ‘ratcheted up’ 
from the shorter sticks where ants are consumed directly from the stick. The former 
behaviour is claimed to be as much as four times more efficient (Whiten et al., 2003). Given 
the only variation in the behavioural form is the shift in consumption medium from stick to 
hand and an increase in stick length it seems unlikely that this represents a true case of 




Whiten et al’s (2003) second example is perhaps more convincing but still fails to 
meet the standards of cumulative culture as defined by Boyd and Richerson (1996). Whiten et 
al. (2003) claim that the use of smaller stones to stabilise anvils whilst using stone hammers 
to crack nuts (Matsuzawa, 1994) represents a cumulative build-up from nut-cracking without 
these stabilising stones. It is plausible that this is true, and that this technique represents one 
of the few cases of true cumulative material culture outside our lineage, however, there is no 
evidence (for or against) that speaks to the question of whether this lies outside the individual 
capacity of a single chimpanzee. As would be predicted if this were true, Whiten et al. (2003) 
acknowledge that this behaviour has failed to take hold in any communities. It is, therefore, 
more likely that this behaviour does represent a cumulative technique learned by an 
individual through trial and error which then fails to be passed on to the next generation; 
clearly distinguishing it from a case of socially transmitted cumulative culture. 
From the limited examples described here, it can be seen that animals may well 
display traits that increase in complexity across their lifetime (ontogenetically). Indeed, such 
cases may blur the lines between common or garden culture and the special case of 
cumulative culture (Dean, Vale, Laland, Flynn, & Kendal, 2014) creating a ‘grey-zone’ 
(Tennie et al., in press), such cases require more investigation before definitive claims are 
made. However, such uncertainty should not be considered as evidence of cumulative culture 
by default, given the mounting evidence that many cases of ape culture are explicable 
through non-copying social learning mechanisms (see Section 1.2.4.2.3; Tennie et al., in 




 Non-human material culture 
Chimpanzees have the largest material cultural repertoire in the animal kingdom 
(except our species). It is probably owing to this fact that the animal culture literature has a 
disproportionate focus on apes, particularly chimpanzees, a so-called “chimpocentrism” 
(Beck, 1982). Fortunately, this thesis is concerning ape cultural behaviours, therefore the 
remainder of this section will be dedicated to discussing ape culture.  
 Geographical patterns in ape cultural traits 
Commonly used to support the claim of culture in apes is the “method of exclusion”, 
also termed the ethnographic method (Krützen, van Schaik, & Whiten, 2007). The method of 
exclusion consists of a systematic survey about the behavioural phenotypes of the individuals 
within their respective field sites. This survey was provided to several field sites and is based 
on a literature review and the experiences of the researchers. This methodology was chosen 
as the authors highlight the impact that publication biases would have on a simple meta-
analysis or literature review (Whiten et al., 2001). The first and potentially largest of these 
endeavours is Whiten et al.’s (2001, 1999) with data from nine chimpanzee field sites. 
Responses are classified on a continuum see Table 1.2. Responses are collated and behaviours 
are broadly grouped into putative cultural traits and those failing to meet the criteria (i.e., 
species “universals” or very rare behaviours). Putative cultural traits are those identified as 
customary or habitual (see Table 1.2) in at least one site, whilst being absent in at least one 
other. The results of these efforts revealed 39 putative cultural traits in chimpanzees (Whiten 




resulting in even more putative cultural traits (bonobos: Hohmann & Fruth, 2003; gorillas 
(Gorilla gorilla sp.): Robbins et al., 2016; orangutans (Pongo sp.): van Schaik et al., 2003).  
Table 1.2. Classifications from the method of exclusion, note that these definitions are all direct quotes from 
Whiten et al. (2001, p. 1488) to avoid author ambiguity. 
Classification Description 
Customary 
Pattern occurs in all or most able-bodied members of at least one age-sex 
class (e.g. adult males). 
Habitual 
Pattern is not customary but has been seen repeatedly in several 
individuals, consistent with some degree of social transmission. 
Present Pattern is clearly identified but neither customary nor habitual. 
Absent 




Absence of pattern is explicable because of a local environmental or 
ecological constraint. 
Unknown 
Pattern is not recorded, but we cannot be sure of absence because of 
inadequacy of relevant observational opportunities. 
 
The method of exclusion provides a useful ‘broad brush’ approach to identifying 
putative cases for culture. However, Laland and Janik (2006) highlighted some of the key 
limitations to the method of exclusion. They argue that this method, in attempting to control 
for the influence of genetics, fails to account for the fact that genes and culture are likely 
interdependent and therefore may miss cases of true culture. This is because genetics and 
culture are likely to coevolve (Feldman & Laland, 1996), given that they are both adaptive 
processes, therefore any attempt to exclude genetic influences would mask many cases of 
genuine culture. Laland and Janik also argue that the importance of the interaction between 
genes, culture and ecology is missed by this method, because of the inherent lack of cause 




collected using the method of exclusion have been interpreted. Despite these critiques, this 
method can be considered a useful starting point for further research (Krützen et al., 2007; 
Neadle, Allritz, & Tennie, 2017).  A more detailed discussion of the method of exclusion is 
outlined in Chapter 2, the study on which this is based was a response to a method of 
exclusion paper in gorillas (Robbins et al., 2016).  
 Hypotheses surrounding animal culture 
There are two primary hypotheses to explain the emergence, presence and 
maintenance of animal cultures, in particular, they attempt to explain the patterns identified 
through the method of exclusion. In this section, I will discuss each of these hypotheses in 
turn. 
1.2.4.2.1 Culture Dependent Trait hypothesis 
This is often the default hypothesis within the animal culture literature. This 
hypothesis is championed by many researchers (e.g., Boesch et al., 2019; Dean et al., 2014; 
Whiten et al., 1999) and is often portrayed more generally through documentaries (e.g., the 
recent BBC Planet Earth documentary). The culture dependent trait (CDT) hypothesis 
assumes that social learning is required to explain some or all ape cultural trait forms, that is, 
without social learning, these behavioural forms and artefacts could not exist (i.e., be 
transmitted and maintained).   
The term “CDT hypothesis” is not yet commonplace within the literature, however, it 
assumes that copying variants of social learning are necessary to establish and maintain ape 




will term what others have called the "social learning hypothesis" (van Schaik et al., 2003), 
the CDT hypothesis. This is primarily in the interest of clarity, as is explained in Section 
1.2.4.2.2, the principal competing hypothesis (Zone of Latent Solutions; Tennie et al., 2009) 
also recognises the importance of social learning in animal cultures without assuming a 
‘dependence’. Thus, to attempt to divide the two based on the presence of social learning 
alone would be a ‘straw-man’ arguement and should be avoided.  
Early proponents of the CDT hypothesis even suggested that “[i]t is difficult to see 
how such behaviour patterns could be perpetuated by social learning processes simpler than 
imitation” (Whiten et al., 1999, p. 685). This demonstrates that, at least some, advocates of 
the CDT hypothesis consider apes capable copiers and assume that copying variants of social 
learning underly ape culture. The veracity of this claim will be tested empirically in Chapters 
4 and 5, the latter of which (along with Section 1.2.1.2) contains more detailed discussion 
about imitation outside our lineage. 
1.2.4.2.2 Zone of Latent Solutions hypothesis  
The Zone of Latent Solutions (ZLS) hypothesis was initially outlined by Tennie, Call 
and Tomasello (2009). The underlying assumption of the ZLS is that non-copying social 
learning mediates frequencies of cultural variants; i.e., increases the frequencies of 
behavioural or artefact forms. Contrary to the CDT hypothesis, the ZLS hypothesis does not 
assume that copying variants of social learning must transmit behaviour or artefact forms for 
a trait to be classified as cultural (see also Chapter 2). Instead, the ZLS assumes that 
behaviour and artefact forms are explained biologically, i.e., by an interplay between 




cognition (Tennie et al., in press). The role of social learning according to the ZLS, in species 
that are restricted to their ZLS (e.g., apes; Reindl, Bandini, & Tennie, 2018) is in influencing 
the frequencies of these forms. 
The ZLS hypothesis predicts that behaviours within a species’ ZLS can be 
reinnovated (Tennie et al., 2009). Therefore, an infant chimpanzee placed on an island 
(assuming that they had some way of acquiring the necessary nutrition) could theoretically, 
within the course of their lifetime, reinnovate all of the behaviours expressed by any wild 
conspecifics without the need to copy. I introduce the qualifier "theoretically" here because 
Tennie et al. (2009), suggested that some behaviours may require specific 
ecological/individual circumstances/experiences to be reinnovated. For example, nut-
cracking may require that a chimpanzee first learns, individually, that pieces of stone or wood 
can be used as natural hammers. This could occur by chance and therefore would not require 
copying; e.g., a piece of wood could fall from a tree and break a seed pod below or it may 
occur through trial and error. If more individuals were introduced to the metaphorical island 
the relative probability of those individual reinnovating the behaviours expressed by the first 
chimpanzee would be increased, i.e., they would become socially mediated reinnovations 
(Bandini & Tennie, 2017). 
The ZLS hypothesis accepts that processes such as local enhancement (or even 
emulation) increase the frequencies of behavioural and artefact forms in affected populations 
and help maintain the patterns identified by the method of exclusion (Whiten et al., 1999). 
The ZLS hypothesis, therefore, shares the prediction of the CDT hypothesis regarding the 




depend to varying degrees on environmental and genetic differences, but also on chance 
events such as the order of innovations and subsequent social effects on the frequency of 
these forms being reinnovated (Tennie et al., in press).  
However, the ZLS hypothesis is incompatible with action copying/imitation; this is 
because this form of copying, by way of copying error alone, can lead to CDTs beyond the 
species’ ZLS (Kempe, Lycett, & Mesoudi, 2014). The ZLS hypothesis, therefore, claims that 
unenculturated apes cannot and do not spontaneously imitate (Tennie et al., 2012; but see 
Call, 2001 for evidence of imitation in enculturated apes). This is in stark contrast to the 
proponents of the CDT hypothesis (see Section 1.2.4.2.1 and Whiten et al., 1999, 2009). 
Furthermore, in the newest iteration of the ZLS hypothesis, Tennie et al. (in press) suggest 
that even results copying/emulation might not be as prevalent in ape cultures as previously 
assumed. From this, they assume that spontaneous emulation in apes should be of such poor 
fidelity or so rare that is likely to produce CDTs, by copying error alone, and may yet be 
excluded by a ZLS account.  
Moreover, the ZLS hypothesis is one of capacity, a key assumption of the ZLS is that 
no individual member of a species is ‘special’. Instead, the ZLS assumes that if one 
individual can reinnovate a given behaviour so too (theoretically) will all typically 
developing members of the species, given the same/similar ecological conditions and 
ontogenetic histories (Tennie et al., 2009). Therefore, every individual within a species (or 
sub-species) has the potential to individually reinnovate their entire species repertoire, though 




ZLS to explain how certain populations only express select parts of the entire species 
repertoire, e.g., the patterns described by the method of exclusion. 
As with the CDT hypothesis, the ZLS hypothesis has come under substantial scrutiny, 
however, unlike the CDT hypothesis, it is the assumptions underlying the ZLS theory that 
constitute the main source of contention. The primary nature of these contentions is around 
the assumption for the ZLS hypothesis that modern human and animal cultures differ 
markedly, in that human culture is reliant on imitation (Tomasello, 1999a) and perhaps other 
copying variants (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Reindl et al., 2017). Whereas, animal culture is 
simply the product of the aforementioned socially mediated serial reinnovations utilising non-
copying social learning variants (Tennie et al., 2009). Though, some contest this notion (Stout 
et al., 2019) more data are needed before a conclusion is drawn.  
1.2.4.2.3 Diverging evidence 
The methodology used for testing the ZLS hypothesis is known as the Latent 
Solutions (LS) methodology (Bandini & Tennie, 2018; Tennie & Hedwig, 2009). Evidence 
for the ZLS hypothesis is primarily from captive studies (e.g., Tennie et al., 2008), though 
some ‘natural’ ZLS type studies exist (e.g., Sherry & Galef, 1984). In these ‘natural’ 
experiments, behavioural/artefact forms are observed in culturally unconnected (Neadle et al., 
2017) wild populations; therefore (if the assumptions of the ZLS hypothesis are correct), 
these behaviours/artefacts must have been reinnovated within the population. Whichever 
method used to collect it, the resulting data (if affirmative) is difficult to explain from a CDT 
hypothesis framework. The LS methodology effectively excludes all social learning variants 




within a CDT framework, one would need to assume that a "rare innovator" (Hopper et al., 
2007) had been identified, or accept that the behaviour cannot constitute a CDT. Given the 
mounting evidence of ‘positive’ LS tests, even with multiple independent innovators (e.g., 
Bandini & Tennie, 2017), the parsimony of the "rare innovator" argument is waning. LS tests 
are applied, and methodological considerations outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. 
In its first iteration, the LS methodology was considered appropriate to provide 
evidence for a whole species, based on the findings in just one subject (Tennie & Hedwig, 
2009) – this follows the logical thought exercise that it takes one black swan to prove not all 
swans are white. Whilst logically acceptable, this application of the LS method does not 
allow researchers to reduce the likelihood of a ‘rare innovator’ being tested, this means that 
by chance alone the researcher might have happened upon an individual that would be 
included under a CDT explanation. Based on such critiques and to further reduce the 
likelihood of a ‘rare innovator’ being identified, Bandini and Tennie (2017) introduced the 
"double-case standard". Behaviours with a high relative probability of occurrence, i.e., 
simpler behaviours, require evidence of the behaviour in two unconnected populations 
(meaning, at a minimum in two culturally unconnected individuals) before behaviours can be 
confirmed to be within the species’ ZLS. Those behaviours with a lower relative probability 
of occurrence, continue to require only one reinnovation. 
Behaviours expressed during LS tests are most parsimoniously explained as products 
of individual learning; therefore, are within a species ZLS. LS testing requires that subjects 
are first and foremost naïve to the target behaviour. Without this, it is difficult to be sure 




expressed, or seen others expressing a target behaviour; ergo, subjects can be naïve to one 
behaviour and not naïve to another. Subjects must also be placed exposed to an ecological 
situation wherein the target behaviour can be reinnovated, e.g., if leaf sponging, subjects 
would require an environment containing leaves suitable for sponging. Finally, subjects 
should be unenculturated and ‘undeprived’ (Henrich & Tennie, 2017), to increase the 
likelihood that the resultant data are generalisable to conspecifics. Unenculturated individuals 
are those that are not reared by humans, trained to perform the target behaviour by humans or 
otherwise habituated to the extent that their behavioural phenotype is no longer species-
typical. This presents a challenge in many captive studies as, in the past, zoo 
rearing/husbandry has left many captive apes enculturated. For an individual to be considered 
undeprived it should have never been subjected to substantive or prolonged mistreatment, 
e.g., a chimpanzee kept on a leash outside. The results of LS tests with enculturated or 
deprived individuals should be treated with caution as they lack ecological validity.  
In this sense the ‘perfect’ subject has been reared in wild or at least wild-type 
conditions, by their mother, with as little contact with humans as possible. This subject 
should be at a stage appropriate to express the behaviour being investigated (see Chapter 4) 
and be sufficiently motivated to engage with the task. However, the ‘perfect’ subject does not 
necessarily exist without the required conditions, this is what they LS methodology aims to 
provide. 
 Open questions and issues 
One issue that plagues the literature relevant to this thesis is that of terminology. 




semantics than discussing large scale conclusions that their results lead to. Of particular 
relevance to this thesis is the term ‘culture’, discussion of whether a behaviour is ‘cultural’ 
and what this means often leads to heated debate (Kendal, 2008; McGrew, 2002). Thus, the 
field requires a term, similar to ‘tradition’ (Galef, 1976), that does not remove the status of a 
‘cultural species’ from those restricted to it.  
An open question is that of the CDT vs. ZLS hypotheses. Which of these most 
effectively describes the patterns observed in ape behaviour? The LS testing methodology 
provides an ‘acid test’ between the two hypotheses, therefore more research is required to 
lend support to one or the other hypothesis. Moreover, the basic assumptions of the two 
hypotheses need further clarification. It becomes necessary, as the ZLS approaches 10 years 
from first publication, to determine whether spontaneous action copying in apes is indeed 
impossible or whether it remains a possible explanation for ape cultural behaviours. Also, the 
influence of social and ecological influences on individuals, the so-called "right" conditions 
(Tennie et al., 2009), must be quantified. 
 This thesis 
The remainder of this thesis will attempt to contribute some evidence towards these 
open questions. In the first three Chapters, I will use the variants of the LS methodology to 
assess the validity of the ZLS claim; in so doing I will address the concept of culture in apes 
and set a new proposed standard for its terminology; also considering to what extent 
cognitive cladistics can be included within the ZLS. Chapter 2 will address the question of a 




place within the ZLS of gorillas through an adaptation of an LS test. Chapter 3 will examine 
the influence of cognitive cladistics within the ZLS hypothesis, that is, to what degree 
species’ ZLS overlap. Completing the traditional ZLS methodology studies; the first 
condition of Chapter 4 will consider whether nut-cracking, potentially the most complex of 
ape tool use behaviours, belongs within the ZLS of chimpanzees or whether this behaviour is 
the exception to the ZLS rule to date. 
Next, Chapter 4 will also assess the capacity for apes to acquire nut-cracking through 
social facilitation through the ‘improved’ ZLS methodology proposed by Bandini and Tennie 
(2018). This chapter will directly test the claims of both the CDT hypothesis and the ZLS 
hypothesis, whilst also touching on other more specific hypotheses (captivity effect and 
sensitive learning periods). Chapter 5 will test the capacity of apes to imitate in a social 
learning task. By removing the possibility of success via emulation, I attempt to coax apes 
into demonstrating “true” imitation, facilitated by social learning biases (Laland, 2004), thus 
creating a social environment that removes potential barriers to ape imitation.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, the question of ecological influences on the expression of 
material culture in apes will be addressed. This chapter utilises data from semi-wild, 
sanctuary reared, bonobos in a naturalistic setting, stripped of many survival pressures and 
compares these data to that of wild conspecifics. This is in the hope of demonstrating that the 
ecology of apes is as important, if not more so than their genetic predispositions in explaining 
many putative cases of culture. These data are also analysed to assess the influences of 




I have undertaken this research to seek answers to the question: what are the factors 
that influence the expression of material culture in apes? This thesis will explore the genetic 
predispositions, social learning capacities and ecological sensitivities of apes with a focus on 
material culture and tool use. Chapter 7 will summarise these findings, relate them to the 
relevant literature and finally provide some recommendations for future research, some of 







 FOOD CLEANING IN GORILLAS: SOCIAL LEARNING IS A 
POSSIBILITY BUT NOT A NECESSITY 
This chapter, largely in its current form, is published as: 
Neadle, D., Allritz, M., & Tennie, C. (2017). Food cleaning in gorillas: Social learning is a 
possibility but not a necessity. PloS One, 12(12), e0188866. 
 
The changes that I have made to the 2017 paper are largely reflective of changes in 
terminologies since the publication of the manuscript; e.g., the term "low-fidelity" has been 
removed. This is because, since this paper was accepted in its final form, other research from 
our group, questioned the utility of this terminology (Bandini & Tennie, 2017; Reindl et al., 
2017; Tennie et al., in press). Furthermore, phrasing has been changed throughout the chapter 
as my writing style has developed since this initial publication. There have been no 
substantive changes to the aims, method of analysis, data, figures, or the conclusions drawn. 
The author contribution statement as presented to PLoS One at the time of publication 
was: 
 
I was first author, responsible for the conceptualisation of the study, i.e., the idea for 
reanalysing the data using the final code scheme. I coded the data, obtained second coder 
reliability, conducted all analyses, wrote the original draft, and was responsible for organising 
Conceptualization: DN 
Data curation: MA 
Investigation: DN, MA 
Methodology: DN, MA, CT 
Formal analysis: DN 
 
Project administration: DN 
Resources: MA 
Supervision: CT 
Writing – original draft: DN 





the day-to-day running of the project, i.e., passing the manuscript between co-authors, and 
also completed later drafts and edits, including actioning reviewer comments. MA was 
responsible for collecting the data for the first study, which was then recoded for this study. 
MA was also a liaison with the MPI EVA, Leipzig, Germany and provided comments and 
edited drafts. Finally, CT acted as a supervisor throughout the project, he was involved in the 








There is evidence of the general behaviour of removing contaminants from food in 
many animal species, including: wild boars (Sus scrofa; Sommer, Lowe, & Dietrich, 2016), 
Japanese macaques (Hirata et al., 2001; Nakamichi, Kato, Kojima, & Itoigawa, 1998; 
Sarabian & Macintosh, 2015), vervet monkeys (Chlorocebus aethiops; van de Waal, Krützen, 
Hula, Goudet, & Bshary, 2012) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella; Visalberghi, Savage-
Rumbaugh, & Fragaszy, 1995), along with all species of great ape (Allritz, Tennie, & Call, 
2013). The removal of unpleasant contaminants from food is likely adaptive; the repeated 
consumption of dirt, sand or grit can wear down and/or damage the teeth (Fraser & Theodor, 
2011), whilst also reducing the risk of parasite infection (Sarabian & Macintosh, 2015). This 
said, it is possible that the consumption of some of these ‘contaminants’ might actually 
improve digestion, as has been identified in some species of birds (Gionfriddo & Best, 1995, 
1996). 
In the most recent incarnation of the method of exclusion (see Section 1.2.4.1, 
exploring the wild behavioural repertoire of mountain (Gorilla gorilla beringei) and Western 
(Gorilla gorilla gorilla) gorillas, Robbins et al. (2016) identify food cleaning as “customary” 
in Western lowland gorillas. Robbins et al. apply the method of exclusion across five gorilla 
field sites: three Western lowland sites (Moukabala-Doudou National Park, Gabon; Bai 
Hokou, Central African Republic & Mondika, Republic of Congo) and two mountain sites 
(Karisoke Research Center, Rwanda & Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda). Data 




groups of western lowland gorillas and 12 groups of mountain gorillas). These observations 
of gorilla behaviours were used to generate a list of 41 behaviours.  
From these 41 behaviours, Robbins et al. (2016) identified 23 “potentially cultural 
traits”: 12 within species variants (variation between sites of one sub-species of gorilla) and 
11 between species variants (variation only observed between mountain and western lowland 
gorillas). Also highlighted were: three “universal” traits, 10 “rare behaviours” and five traits 
with ecological explanations (see Section 1.2.4.1, Table 1.2).   
Amongst the putative cultural traits only one food processing behaviour was noted, 
namely fruit cleaning. This behaviour will be the focus of this chapter. Robbins et al. (2016, 
p. 8) describe fruit cleaning as: "Rubbing fruit against [the] arm or body, presumably to 
remove dirt; for some fruit, it may be to remove spines". Based on this definition it can be 
assumed that the form of the behaviour (sensu Reindl, Beck, Apperly, & Tennie, 2016) is the 
rubbing of food (fruit) on the body to remove an unwanted substance/part. In this context, 
behavioural form refers to the actions required to attribute behavioural patterns to an 
individual. The action required to remove parts or substances is the same regardless of food 
being cleaned or contaminant; namely, to rub the food against a body part or substrate. Thus, 
the form of the behaviour is independent of the food type and the substrate to be removed. 
Hereafter, I will refer to the behavioural form of rubbing any food against the body (including 
extremities) as ‘food cleaning’.  
Food cleaning was observed at all western lowland gorilla research sites; however, it 
was never observed at mountain gorilla research sites. This pattern led the authors to 




western gorillas” (Robbins et al., 2016, p. 8). For this chapter a more general definition of 
culture will be used, where a behaviour’s facilitation through social learning is sufficient to 
attribute cultural status (sensu Kendal, Kendal, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2009); closer to Galef’s 
(1976) concept of tradition. This definition will be revisited in the discussion of this chapter. 
As discussed in Section 1.2.4.1, the method of exclusion attempts to identify cultural 
traits through geographical variations in behaviour, assuming that innovations and copying 
variants of social learning are responsible for these patterns (Whiten et al., 1999). 
Practitioners of the method of exclusion have attempted to control for ecological confounds 
by identifying when behaviours are ecologically not possible, i.e., when a required artefact or 
situation necessary for a given behaviour is not present (for example, fruit availability being 
permanently limited in a particular ecology would be an ecological explanation for fruit 
cleaning being absent; Robbins et al., 2016). Applications of the method of exclusion 
typically use ecological explanations as a simple dichotomous category, i.e., the behaviour is 
ecologically possible or not possible (e.g., Hohmann & Fruth, 2003; van Schaik et al., 2003; 
Whiten et al., 1999). 
Besides ecology, genetic differences may also play a confounding role when applying 
the method of exclusion. Generally, the most convincing reports, to date, that suggest cultural 
(rather than environmentally and/or genetically induced or mediated) differences between 
great ape field sites are when populations of the same subspecies live close to each other. 
That is, in very similar environments, with a high likelihood of genetic mixing, i.e., without 
physical barriers (Langergraber et al., 2010). The fact that differences can and do still exist in 




conclusion that these behaviours are ‘cultural’ plausible. These are among the best-supported 
cases for culture in (wild) apes. 
However, even in these most convincing cases, there is always the possibility that 
subtle differences at the genetic and/or environmental level are ultimately responsible for the 
observed differences. Thus, even the best applications of the method of exclusion (e.g., 
Langergraber et al., 2010) are a broad-brush approach, yielding conclusions which should be 
verified through captive studies. Despite its utility, the method of exclusion cannot detect the 
social learning variants underlying the trait and its frequency nor whether social learning is 
necessary to explain the form of the behaviour. Determining the underlying mechanisms, and 
their necessity, requires controlled experimentation in captive environments (see Bandini & 
Tennie, 2018 and Chapter 4) 
This study aims to test the veracity of the assumption that food cleaning is culture 
dependent by testing a group of captive western lowland gorillas for reinnovation of the form 
of this behaviour. This chapter uses an adaptation of the LS methodology (see 1.2.4.2.3) that 
does not assume that subjects are naïve to food cleaning. Given the likely high prevalence of 
somewhat dirty food in both captive and wild populations it is implausible to think to 
discover dirty-food naïve subjects. Instead, here we test for evidence of a culturally 
unconnected population-level instance of food cleaning to add to the cases reported by 
Robbins et al. (2016). ‘Culturally unconnected’, refers to the status of individuals that have 
not had contact with a member of a population previously shown to perform the target 
behaviour. Accordingly, our sample of western lowland gorillas has not been in contact with 




As the populations are unconnected, the behaviour cannot have been socially learned 
from conspecifics, therefore passing from the aforementioned wild populations and the 
captive population tested here. It is possible, though unconfirmed, that at least two of the 
three wild populations (Moukalaba-Doudou national park and Mondika, Dzanga-Sangha 
national park) reported by Robbins et al. (2016) were culturally unconnected (given the 
substantial geographic distance; approx. 890km between them). If this assumption is correct, 
our captive sample would constitute a third, independent, population observed for food 
cleaning.  
In this study, we provided captive Western lowland gorillas with affordances that may 
encourage food cleaning (i.e., by provisioning them with peeled apples that were covered in 
sand); therefore, we fulfilled the ecological requirement of the LS test methodology. We 
recorded instances of food cleaning behaviours and categorised the specific methods of 
cleaning. The results are discussed in light of the data presented by Robbins et al. (2016). 
 Method 
The recordings used in this study are taken from a larger set containing data for all 
genera of great apes; here we only re-coded the western lowland gorilla recordings (data 
collected by Allritz et al., 2013). Forty-eight recordings of gorillas being exposed to dirty 
(sand-covered) peeled apples (1 hour 50 minutes = 24 recordings) and clean peeled apples (1 
hour 1 minute = 24 recordings; total across both apple types = 2 hours 51 minutes) were re-
coded and reanalysed for this study; this was done with the goal to code for food cleaning, 




evidence of food washing (i.e., cleaning by using water; Allritz et al., 2013) in any trial 
despite there always being an open basin of freshwater available.   
 Subjects 
The subjects in the selection of videos were five Western lowland gorillas (1M/4F; 
mean age at time of testing: M age=16.60, SD=12.58; both years) located and housed 
together at the time at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Centre in Leipzig Zoo, 
Germany (see Table 2.1 for details of apes along with familial relations; these gorillas 
comprised the entire group of gorillas at WKPRC at the time data was collected). One 
subject, Zola, a three-year-old female juvenile was also tested, however, her data were 
excluded from further analyse because Zola was always tested with her mother, who 
monopolised virtually all food. 
All individuals in the sample were captive-born, apart from one female, "Bebe", who 
was wild-born. "Bebe" was captured in Cameroon (rather than from the Republic of Congo or 
Gabon, as the populations in Robbins et al.’s study; 2016). Given that there is no reported 
claim, to our knowledge, for wild gorillas in Cameroon displaying food cleaning it is unlikely 
that the subject "Bebe" socially learned this behaviour from wild conspecifics. However, it 
must be noted that we know of no studies directly observing food cleaning in this population. 
Even so, with the information available to date, we assume that even if we did not capture the 
very first reinnovation of this behaviour, any noted reinnovation would be the result of 





Table 2.1. Subject rearing information, italicised mother/father indicates that parents were not involved in this 
study. 
Subject Sex Year of birth Place of birth 
Bebe Female       ~1979 Wild, Cameroon 
Gorgo Male 1981 Krefeld, Germany 
Viringika Female 1995 Zurich, Switzerland 
Kibara Female 2004 Leipzig, Germany 
Louna Female 2006 Leipzig, Germany 
Zola Female 2008 Leipzig, Germany 
 
Per the recommendations of the Weatherall report "The use of non-human primates in 
research" all the gorillas were housed in semi-natural indoor and outdoor enclosures 
containing climbing structures, such as ropes and platforms; and natural features, such as 
vegetation, trees and streams. They received regular feedings, primarily consisting of 
vegetables, had access to enrichment devices including shaking boxes and poking bins, and 
water ad-lib. Subjects voluntarily participated in the study and were never food or water-
deprived. The research was conducted in the observation rooms. 
No medical, toxicological or neurobiological research of any kind is conducted at the 
Wolfgang Koehler Primate Research Center. The research was non-invasive and strictly 
adhered to the legal requirements of Germany. The study was ethically approved by an 
internal committee at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (members of 
the committee are Dr J. Call, Dr D. Hanus, veterinarian Herr Nötzold, head keeper F. 
Schellhardt and assistant head keeper M. Lohse). Animal husbandry and research comply 
with the "European Associations of Zoos and Aquaria Minimum Standards for the 
Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria”, the “World Association of Zoos 
and Aquariums Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and 




Teaching” of the Association for the Study of Animal Behavior. IRB approval was not 
necessary because no special permission for the use of animals in purely behavioural or 
observational studies is required in Germany.  
 Experimental conditions 
All trials were conducted between 08:00 and 12:30 (by MA), and subjects completed 
one trial per testing day. Subjects were tested in a separate testing room (2.52 x 2.61m). They 
were video recorded from the time that they entered the room; recording ceased once all three 
apples had been consumed or after 10 minutes. Each individual was tested four times in each 
condition. In both conditions, three peeled apples were placed in the centre of the testing 
room. In the dirty condition, the peeled apples were rolled in play-sand (Redsun branded; 
fine-grained quartz sand) designed for children and deemed free of harmful substances by 
TUV Nord, Germany, in testing. The sand was dried in an oven for approx. 20 minutes at 
200C before rolling the apples in it. The trials were counterbalanced with three gorillas 
being exposed to clean apples first and two being exposed to dirty apples first.  
 Data Coding 
DN coded all recordings using the categories in Table 2.2. To assess the interrater 
reliability of the coding, a randomly selected 25% of these sequences were further analysed 
by another independent coder (HH). This random sample was stratified to ensure that 
reliability was attained for at least one video for each gorilla in each condition. The chosen 
videos were randomly selected by assigning numbers 1- 4 for each trial in each condition and 




reliability analysis. Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient (Cohen, 1960) was computed based on the 
agreement between both coders. The results are reported below. Reliability was assessed 
based on whether the coders agreed on the method of cleaning employed (as described in 
Table 2.2). Instances of food cleaning were coded into bouts for ease of reliability analysis. A 
new cleaning bout was coded if the individual:  
A. set the apple on the floor for more than 5 seconds  
B. swapped method of cleaning  
C. swapped hand used for cleaning 
D. moved from one apple to another (because of eating the apple or abandoning 
it) 
E. Ceased cleaning for more than 30 seconds 
F. Took a bite from the apple 
Table 2.2. Methods of cleaning fruit coded, along with a description, as provided to independent coders. 
Method Description 
Palm Rubbing the apple with, on or between the palm(s) of the hands 
Back of hand Rubbing the apple with the back of the hand (this does not include 
rubbing ON the back of the hand) 
Forearm Rubbing the apple on the hair of the forearm or the back of the hand, 
this is distinct from ‘back of hand’ in that the apple is being moved in 
this case whereas, in the former, the hand is moving. 
Finger Rubbing the apple with one finger. 






 Frequency of food cleaning 
The results of a Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient test show that both coders achieved a 
satisfactory level of agreement (κ = 0.71, SE = 0.07, p<.001) in the method (i.e., which 
technique) of cleaning used (see Table 2); an example of a typical food cleaning sequence is 
shown in Figure 2.1. Both coders agreed fully in their classifications of forearm (our 
equivalent of the behaviour described by Robbins et al., 2016) and also that no cleaning 
behaviour occurred in any of the clean apple trials. 
 
Figure 2.1. Food cleaning sequence in an adult female Western lowland gorilla ("Kibara") cleaning and eating 
a peeled sand-covered apple using the method described by Robbins et al. (2016). 
 
The results showed food cleaning behaviour occurred in 95% of dirty apple trials and 
in 0% of clean apple trials. Only in a single trial were all the apples eaten whilst still dirty, 




gorillas expressed food cleaning at least once in at least 75% dirty apple trials. Not all 
subjects attempted to clean all dirty apples; from a total of 60 dirty apples, 8 were eaten 
uncleaned (Bebe: 1 apple in 1 trial; 8.3% of total dirty apples and Louna: 7 apples in 4 trials; 
58.3% of total dirty apples), see Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2. Percentage of dirty apples cleaned before first bite was taken, separated by individual. 
 
The mean latency (time passed since entering the test room) to first clean an apple 
was 19 seconds (SD=27 seconds). Average individual latency to clean apples differed 






Figure 2.3. Mean individual latency to begin cleaning. Showing variation between subjects, error bars indicate 
± 1 standard error of the mean. 
 Methods of food cleaning. 
The methods of cleaning the fruits used in these data, listed in order of frequency of 
bouts, were finger (41%), back of hand (20%) palm (20%), forearm (18%) and finally 
substrate (1%); see Figure 2.4. For examples of the cleaning methods used, see Figure 2.5. 
The more frequent expression of the finger technique is owing to the way that bouts were 
coded, meaning that if an individual swapped hand, a new bout began. This meant that the 
finger cleaning method (which frequently swapped from using the left index finger to the 
right) often resulted in a high number of bouts. The palm and back of hand methods were 
coded more frequently for a similar reason; Viringika often used these techniques in quick 




hand and vice versa. As a result, this inflated the values. The frequency data serves to 
highlight individual differences, see Table 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.4. Methods of cleaning used in this study.  Bars indicate average % of times that a method was used to 






Figure 2.5. Five methods of food cleaning used by Western lowland gorillas in this study: A) Finger B) Palm C) 
Back of Hand D) Forearm E) Substrate. 
Table 2.3. Number of bouts using each method, divided by individual.  
 Bebe Gorgo Kibara Louna Viringika Total 
Palm 2 0 3 1 38 44 
Back of Hand 5 0 3 0 37 45 
Forearm 8 0 22 2 8 40 
Finger 1 82 4 4 1 92 
Substrate 0 0 3 0 0 3 
Total 16 82 35 7 84 224 
Note. Figures in bold show the most commonly used method by each individual. 
 Discussion 
We report here a behaviour markedly similar to that reported by Robbins et al. (2016). 
Our results show that food cleaning was present in a culturally unconnected sample of captive 
western lowland gorillas. We also show a degree of individual variation in methods used to 




together, this would imply that some degree of individual learning is present in the 
reinnovation of the behavioural goal and form.  
These data show another populational instance of food cleaning occurring in western 
lowland gorillas, specifically in a culturally unconnected, captive, population. Access to some 
dirty food can be assumed to be a common feature of most wild and captive populations; 
therefore, it is implausible to expect to test a truly dirty-food naïve subject. Instead, we argue 
that being culturally unconnected to any populations in which the behaviour is reported is 
sufficient to assume that the studied group would have had to reinnovate target behaviour. As 
such, we conclude that food cleaning cannot be considered a CDT. If it had been a CDT, the 
behaviour should not reappear in culturally unconnected populations. 
This said, it possible that this study did not capture the original first reinnovation(s) of 
food cleaning (this could have happened before the study, given ubiquitous access to dirty 
food). However, this population is culturally unconnected, meaning at least one naïve 
individual must have reinnovated food cleaning. Therefore, the timing is inconsequential to 
the present argument, i.e., of whether a reinnovation of the behaviour can occur in the 
absence of social learning. Our findings show that food cleaning can be individually 
reinnovated by naïve western lowland gorillas. Therefore, the form of the behaviour cannot 
be reliant on social learning. Instead, these findings are consistent with food cleaning being 
an example of a socially mediated reinnovation (Bandini & Tennie, 2017), where individual 
learning is sufficient to explain its emergence. That is, food cleaning can be considered a 




presented here and data presented by Robbins et al. (2016). To date, all Western lowland 
gorilla groups, observed for it, show food cleaning. 
Robbins et al. (2016) applied the method of exclusion to identify putative cultural 
traits, the interpretation of their results is complicated by differences between the groups of 
gorillas for whom they collected data, with regard to genetic variation (Garner & Ryder, 
1996) and with regard to ecology (Nkurunungi, Ganas, Robbins, & Stanford, 2004). The 
failure of mountain gorillas to express food cleaning may result from a combination of 
genetic variation and ecological differences. It is possible that the genetic differences between 
these two subspecies of gorillas (Garner & Ryder, 1996; Ruvolo et al., 1994) have led to 
distinct behavioural phenotypes. This would not imply a "direct genetic code" for food 
cleaning, rather, the cognitive abilities that lead to an individual cleaning food might have 
become advantageous at some point and thus were selected for. This may have happened in 
conjunction with the frequency increasing effects of non-copying social learning variants. 
Given the abundance of food cleaning in primates (Allritz et al., 2013; Hirata et al., 
2001; Nakamichi et al., 1998; Sarabian & Macintosh, 2015; van de Waal et al., 2012; 
Visalberghi et al., 1995), a more plausible argument is that differences between mountain and 
Western lowland gorilla ecology are the primary cause of this difference. It is possible that 
wild mountain gorillas do not show food cleaning because their relevant ecology differs from 
that of Western lowland gorillas (Nkurunungi et al., 2004). Therefore, if wild mountain 
gorillas were to share the ecology of Western lowland gorillas, and thus were forced to 
consume foods that would benefit from cleaning; then they may also independently innovate 




The feeding ecology of mountain gorillas and Western lowland gorillas differs 
quantitatively, i.e., the relative presence of dirty fruit (an item that is associated with food 
cleaning; Robbins et al., 2016). The mountain gorilla data presented by Robbins et al. (2016), 
is taken from Karisoke Research Centre, Virunga Volcanoes Rwanda and Bwindi 
Impenetrable National Park, Uganda. At Karisoke, there are no large fruiting trees within the 
mountain gorillas range (Robbins et al., 2016). Fruit foraging accounts for a small proportion 
of the total time spent foraging in some groups of mountain gorillas: <1% at Karisoke (Watts, 
1984) and 11% at Bwindi (Robbins & McNeilage, 2003). Contrastingly, Western lowland 
gorillas have been reported to spend as much as 70% of foraging time in search of fruit 
(Doran-Sheehy, Mongo, Lodwick, & Conklin-Brittain, 2009); accordingly, 98% of faecal 
samples contained evidence of fruit consumption (Doran et al., 2002). Therefore, lowland 
gorillas have more opportunity to encounter dirty fruit; especially as mountain gorillas, being 
primarily folivores (Watts, 1984), are more likely to consume growing plants (Byrne & 
Byrne, 1993). If food cleaning had been identified in either of these samples we would have 
expected it to be in the Bwindi group, which consume more fruit. In spite of this, mountain 
gorillas may be able to reinnovate food cleaning; however, their ecology neither provides 
sufficient opportunities (van Schaik, Deaner, & Merrill, 1999) nor necessity (Koops, 
McGrew, & Matsuzawa, 2013) for them to do so. Mountain gorillas are substantially less 
common in captivitiy, and so an experimental study like ours, to address this question, is less 
practical; though, such an endeavour would be decisive in this debate. 
To date, there is no evidence that food cleaning in Western lowland gorillas 




may exist. All candidate cases (identified through the method of exclusion) require testing in 
populations that are, at least, culturally unconnected; to determine whether they do require 
social learning. Therefore, testing captive, unconnected individuals under controlled 
conditions and exposing them to the material used in/for the target behaviour, without 
demonstrations of behavioural form, makes an important contribution to our understanding of 
how and why these behaviours emerge and are maintained.  
It is established that some primates have culture, i.e., they employ several of the social 
learning variants (outlined in Section 1.2.1.1). Culture, defined in this way is not unique to 
our lineage, or even primates; it is common in the animal kingdom. Such minimal cultural 
forms range from insects (Alem et al., 2016) to birds (Lefebvre, 1995) and from reptiles (Kis 
et al., 2015) to cetaceans (Sargent & Mann, 2009); along with other mammals, e.g., rodents 
(Terkel, 1996) including primates (Whiten, 2000). 
The question of whether non-human apes have culture, which resembles human, i.e., 
cumulative, culture (Tomasello, Kruger, et al., 1993) remains open. Some believe this is 
“uniquely human” (Tomasello, 1998b); meanwhile others suggest that there is evidence for 
limited forms of cumulative material culture in other species (Schofield et al., 2018). This 
seeming uniqueness may be related to the need for copying variants of social learning, which 
allow exact behavioural and artefact forms to be transmitted successfully (Boyd & Richerson, 
1996; Lewis & Laland, 2012; Tennie et al., 2009, in press; Tomasello, 1999a).  
While food cleaning is not a case of cumulative culture, we may turn next to the 
question of whether it fulfils the less demanding criterion of culture, more generally. Rather 




results presented here. The, often implicit, assumption that social learning is essential in all 
forms of culture comes from the working assumption that individual learning is not at the 
heart of many of the behaviours observed in wild primate populations. There exists mounting 
evidence that this alternative is a very real possibility (Bandini & Tennie, 2017; Motes-
Rodrigo et al., 2019; Reindl et al., 2016; Tennie et al., 2009, 2008). A more general, i.e., 
conservative, definition, therefore, becomes more suitable, we term this ‘minimal culture’: a 
behaviour can be considered cultural, if social learning (of any variant, including learning 
from artefacts) plays any role at all in the form and/or the frequency of the behaviour (and/or 
any produced artefacts, compare also “tradition”; see Galef, 1976).  
This definition similar to others, e.g. Kendal et al. (2009, p. 1), define culture (in its 
broadest form) as “any instance of social transmission of behaviour regardless of the 
underlying social learning processes”. However, this definition refers to the transmission of 
behavioural forms. We hesitate to restrict cultural status to those behaviours that require 
social learning, thereby restricting culture those species that are capable of displaying CDTs. 
Behaviours that do necessitate social learning should be explicitly named as CDTs (Reindl et 
al., 2017), once this is confirmed experimentally. Minimal culture allows for increases in the 
frequency of the behavioural form to qualify as culture, without the need to have the form 
copied. Given the plethora of claims for culture in various species (with no evidence of 
behavioural form copying; e.g., Alem et al., 2016; Kis et al., 2015; Lefebvre, 1995; Sargent & 
Mann, 2009) we believe this, soft, definition better reflects the current state of knowledge of 




Though our minimal definition may appear to widen, rather than simply move, the 
proverbial goalposts it is important to attribute accurate terms to behaviours as they are 
identified. The term "tradition" (Galef, 1976) seemingly did not take root in the literature, 
with many authors tending towards culture; therefore, defining culture minimally may bridge 
the gap between the two camps and provide some common ground between the two opposing 
sides of the “culture war”. This said, given that this definition requires only that a species can 
act on social information, this definition present a very low bar for attributing culture. 
Therefore, researchers should consider how low this bar is when making claims from it, here 
I propose that a more useful definition is that of a CDT (see Section 1.2.3.2). However the 
minimal culture definition does provide some recognition that species restricted to it are 
capable of social learning and that this might reflect something approaching culture; hence 
the use of the word minimal. 
Whiten et al. (2001, p. 1494) defined “behaviours recorded as absent at no sites 
studied” as “species universals”. Given that food cleaning has been shown to occur in each 
sample of western lowland gorillas that have been tested/observed for it to date (Robbins et 
al., 2016 and this study), it fulfils the definition of a species universal at present, though, 
further data are required before this should be considered as concrete. Even species universals 
can be affected by social learning (Laland & Galef, 2009, p. 84). The currently available data 
on food cleaning in gorillas (as described here and in; Robbins et al., 2016) do not show a 
clear signature of any social learning. Therefore, food cleaning remains theoretically 
explicable purely via individual learning (except in mountain gorillas). In principle, food 




frequency of expression. In this case, the behaviour would not count as cultural even in the 
minimal sense; however, in the wild, non-copying social learning variants are likely to have 
acted as a catalyst in the past, increasing the behavioural frequency within populations. If so, 
when we apply our minimal definition of culture, food cleaning would still represent a 
cultural trait.  
In sum, we have demonstrated that individual learning, in reacting to ecological 
settings, likely plays a key role in the emergence of food cleaning behaviours in gorillas. We 
acknowledge that non-copying social learning variants may play a role in facilitating the 
spread of food cleaning behaviours within populations. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that 
food cleaning can be considered in any way analogous to human cultures, due to a lack of 
reliance on any copying social learning variant, hence our use of a new definition of culture. 
This status is consistent with food cleaning being considered as a socially mediated 







 A PARTIALLY SHARED ZONE OF LATENT SOLUTIONS 
 
 Introduction 
Tool use is far from unique in the animal kingdom, it is shared between some species 
of birds, cetaceans and primates (Shumaker, Walkup, & Beck, 2011). A definition of tool use 
that has become common in the academic literature is:  
“[T]he external employment of an unattached or manipulatable attached 
environmental object to alter more efficiently the form, position, or 
condition of another object, another organism, or the user itself, when the 
user holds and directly manipulates the tool during or prior to use and is 
responsible for the proper and effective orientation of the tool” (Shumaker 
et al., 2011, p. 5). 
A clade that stands out for their tool-using abilities are the great apes (Shumaker et al., 
2011). Tool use behaviours have been argued to be among those behaviours within a species 
Zone of Latent Solutions (ZLS; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). A species’ ZLS is a 
repertoire of behaviours, which can be observed in that species provided the “right” 
environment, without the need for social learning; though, social learning may mediate the 
expression/harmonisation of these behaviours within communities (Tennie et al., 2009). 
“Right” is a term used in the initial formulation of the hypothesis (Tennie et al., 2009) to 




example, a hungry chimpanzee in an environment with nuts and material to use as a hammer 
and anvil might be in the "right" environment to reinnovate nut-cracking. 
The ZLS can be related to the classical Vygotskian notions of a Zone of Actual 
Development and Zone of Proximal Development, which alter ontogenetically (Reindl, 2017; 
Vygotsky, 1978). The ZLS is thought to be simply a baseline for humans where copying 
social learning variants (including teaching) leading to cumulative culture acts as a 
springboard allowing our species to go beyond our ZLS. Meanwhile, a species’ ZLS remains 
an upper limit for non-humans, which have hitherto failed to show evidence for the social 
learning mechanisms (copying) or resulting behavioural traits of human type cumulative 
culture (Tennie et al., 2018). The size/reach of this supposed upper limit has been proposed to 
vary by species (see below).  
Closely related to the ZLS, the cultural intelligence (CI) hypothesis offers an 
explanation for how human culture came to differ from that of our ape cousins. There are two 
forms of CI (Tennie & Over, 2012); ontogenetic (Herrmann, Call, Hernàndez-Lloreda, Hare, 
& Tomasello, 2007) and phylogenetic (van Schaik & Pradhan, 2003). The former can 
partially explain how human culture came to differ from apes; the ontogenetic CI hypothesis 
assumes that ‘culture makes us smarter’. That is, an individual growing up in a society 
saturated in culture, e.g., human society, would be able to go beyond the capacity which they 
otherwise might be restricted to through individual learning alone (Tennie & Over, 2012); this 
is a notion echoed recently by Heyes (2018), who suggests that humans ‘self-enculturated’ 




Over many years and generations, the ontogenetic CI of a species may feed into that 
species overall (phylogenetic) CI, meaning that the species is then able to go beyond their 
baseline (i.e., ZLS). However, this is only a possibility in those species which are able to 
copy (van Schaik & Pradhan, 2003)(van Schaik & Pradhan, 2003)(van Schaik & Pradhan, 
2003)(van Schaik & Pradhan, 2003)(van Schaik & Pradhan, 2003)(van Schaik & Pradhan, 
2003)(van Schaik & Pradhan, 2003)with sufficient ‘fidelity’ to maintain the cultural ratchet 
effect, i.e., able to imitate. Tennie et al. (2009, 2012, in press) propose that humans are the 
only ape species capable of this. Therefore, the ability to effectively utilise copying allows a 
species to begin to canalise their cultural niche. This is a process known as niche construction 
(Olding-Smee, 2003; also termed the “behavioural drive hypothesis”). 
The ZLS of some species may be ‘wider’ than others, i.e., they contain more 
behaviours. Tennie et al., (2009) supposed that chimpanzees would have the widest ZLS of 
all, extant, ape species, though, this could the product of a disproportionate focus on 
chimpanzees in the culture literature, a so-called ‘chimpocentrism’ (Beck, 1982). Regardless, 
it is certain that chimpanzees have the largest repertoire of known wild ape tool use 
behaviours (compare Gruber & Clay, 2016; Robbins et al., 2016; van Schaik et al., 2003; 
Whiten et al., 1999).  
Given the genetic proximity between all species of apes and the similarity of their 
habitats, it is plausible to assume that the ZLS’ of these species would overlap somewhat. 
Chimpanzees shared their last common ancestor with bonobos as little as 1.45MYA 
(Langergraber et al., 2012); it is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the selection pressures 




both species’ potential for tool use/object manipulation may remain somewhat similar after 
the split partly due to phylogenetic similarity (Gruber, Clay, & Zuberbühler, 2010). As the 
great ape clade only began to diversity from the lesser apes approximately 17MYA (Byrne, 
1995) it is highly likely that some degree of behavioural overlap exists between all modern 
species of great ape. By examining this behavioural overlap, and therefore the extent of the 
(phylogenetically) “shared ZLS”, it is possible to determine/estimate the latent innovative 
capacity of that species (or the breadth of their ZLS). 
Reindl et al. (2016) undertook a similar project with human children, where human 
children were exposed to the, most likely for them, novel feat of spontaneously expressing 
chimpanzee and orangutan tool use behaviours, through problem-solving tasks based on wild 
type behaviours. This was done to identify behaviours that were common between humans 
and the two ape species that display the most prolific wild tool use, i.e. chimpanzees and 
orangutans (van Schaik et al., 2003; Whiten et al., 1999). It was found that in all but the most 
complex task (nut-cracking) human children, aged 2.5-3 years, spontaneously matched the 
behavioural form of their ape cousins. This finding led the authors to conclude that the last 
common ancestor of humans and great apes was likely capable of using similar tools in 
similar ways without an absolute need for social learning; i.e., that the ZLS of humans and 
apes (including the last common ancestor) overlaps. 
This chapter aims to test, using two LS tests, the existence of a partially shared ZLS 
across all extant species of apes. In particular picking and scooping, modelled on wild 
behaviours of marrow picking and algae scooping (Whiten et al., 2001, 1999). These tasks 




behavioural actions, unlike scooping (Humle, Yamakoshi, & Matsuzawa, 2011). Accordingly, 
we would expect picking to be expressed more readily across species, whereas scooping may 
only be shared between some species. These studies, when combined with others from the 
“Tools and Culture Among Early Hominins” research group (e.g., Bandini, 2018; Bandini & 
Tennie, 2017; Reindl et al., 2016), represent the first complete clade LS testing of potential 
ZLS behaviours, therefore they present the first opportunity to empirically test the notion of a 
shared ZLS in all extant species of great ape. 
 Behaviours 
 Picking 
Chimpanzees hunt other primates (relevant here are Western red Colobus monkeys, 
Colobus badius, but other species of mammals are also hunted; Boesch & Boesch, 1989). At 
Taï National Park, Ivory Coast, after the prey has been captured and the meat consumed, the 
long bones (e.g., femurs) are bitten in half exposing soft marrow. Small sticks are then used 
to extract the marrow, which is subsequently licked from the stick (Boesch & Boesch, 1989). 
At the time of the initial publication, this behaviour had only been reported at Taï Forest, 
Côte d’Ivoire (Whiten et al., 1999). However, this behaviour has since been reported at 
another field site, approximately 2600km away; Goualougo Triangle, Republic of Congo 
(Sanz & Morgan, 2007). Here, the technique was used to access marrow from the bones of a 
duiker (Cephalophinae; exact genus and species unknown).  
The behavioural form of picking involves inserting a stick into a substance contained 




consumed from the stick directly. It is inconsequential whether bone marrow or another 
similar substance is consumed, the behavioural forms are the same. As in the case of food 
cleaning (Chapter 2); accordingly, we refer to this behaviour as "picking" rather than 
"marrow picking" (Sanz & Morgan, 2007; Whiten et al., 1999). The behaviour is seemingly 
unique to wild chimpanzees, at least amongst apes (Gruber & Clay, 2016; Robbins et al., 
2016; van Schaik et al., 2003; Whiten et al., 1999). 
 Scooping 
Similar to picking, scooping is referred to, more generally as “algae scooping” 
(Humle et al., 2011; Whiten et al., 1999). Here we follow Bandini & Tennie (2017) in 
removing the substrate “algae” from the term, as the target object again is unimportant to the 
form of the behaviour.  
Scooping is identified as "customary" at Bossou, Guinea (Whiten et al., 1999), 
however, the ecological conditions at other field sites did not allow for the behaviour, 
meaning it was not possible to truly ascertain the cultural status. The behaviour involves 
using a long stick (or “wand”), held in the hand, to “scoop” algae floating on the surface of 
standing water (using a swivelling motion of the wrist; Humle et al., 2011). Again, the 
substrate has little consequence, the behavioural form, in this case, is the swivelling motion 
of the wrist, whilst using a long stick to extract an out of reach substrate floating on water. 
This behaviour has not been noted in any wild ape species other than chimpanzees (Gruber & 
Clay, 2016; Robbins et al., 2016; van Schaik et al., 2003); indeed, ecological restrictions 





Picking has been demonstrated in two groups of captive chimpanzees (Bandini, 2018) 
and one group of human children aged 24-36 months old (Reindl et al., 2016). Scooping has 
also been demonstrated in two groups of captive chimpanzees (Bandini & Tennie, 2017) and 
the same group of children (Reindl et al., 2016).  
 General ethics statement 
Subjects were never deprived of water or food and continued to receive their regular 
diet throughout the duration of either of these studies. All participation was voluntary. This 
research project was granted ethical approval by The University of Birmingham AWERB 
committee (reference UOB 31213), STEM committee (ERN_17-1729) and by the host zoo 
following SSSMZP, EAZA, BIAZA and WAZA protocols on animal research and welfare.  
 Study 1 – Picking 
 Method 
 Subjects 
Data was collected, between February and May 2017, from five bonobos (female n = 
4, male n = 1) aged between 5 and 39 years (M=18.20, SD=13.95), 5 western lowland 
gorillas (female n = 3, male n = 2) aged between 4 and 43 years (M=24.80, SD, 14.24) and 4 
Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus; female n = 3, male n = 1) aged between 6 and 40 
years (M=23.75, SD=14.06); see Table 3.1 for rearing histories. All ages correct as of the first 




A larger sample of bonobos was present at the host zoo at the time when this study 
took place. However, during the first trial, a keeper handed the subjects the sticks and tubes 
through the mesh simultaneously, thus contravening the methodology used in this and related 
studies. In doing so, this keeper drew particular attention to the sticks and their relation to the 
tubes. Following this, the group showed evidence of picking, however, owing to the potential 
for non-copying variants of social learning (e.g., stimulus enhancement) these results are 
confounded and are not considered in the present study.   
All species have similar enclosures with private management areas and enrichment 
devices, with both indoor and outdoor facilities containing climbing structures. Other 
enrichment devices were provided throughout the study period, the only enrichment item 
present at the same time as the apparatus was "browse"; a selection of tree branches with 




Table 3.1. Demographic information about all subjects in both studies from chapter 3, S1 age refers to picking, 
S2 age refers to scooping. 
ID  Species S1 Age S2 Age Sex Rearing Born 
DU  Bonobo 39 38 Female Hand Captive 
BY  Bonobo 27 25 Female Parent Captive 
KK  Bonobo 23 21 Male Parent Captive 
MG  Bonobo 18 17 Female Parent Captive 
ML  Bonobo 6 5 Female Parent Captive 
LP  Bonobo 5 3 Female Hand Captive 
MZ  Bonobo 3 2 Male Parent Captive 
MK  Orangutan 22 21 Female Parent Captive 
KB  Orangutan 40 38 Female Hand Captive 
MY  Orangutan 6 4 Female Parent Captive 
BT  Orangutan 27 26 Male Parent Captive 
BD  Gorilla 43 41 Female - Wild 
LZ  Gorilla 31 30 Female Hand Captive 
UM  Gorilla 24 23 Male Parent Captive 
OZ  Gorilla 22 21 Female Parent Captive 
LO  Gorilla 4 2 Male Parent Captive 
 
 Pre-test questionnaires and interviews 
A larger, multi-faceted questionnaire was given by another researcher (EB) from the 
University of Birmingham in September 2015 (Bandini, 2018). The data from this 
questionnaire indicated that none of the subjects had ever engaged in a behaviour similar to 
picking. 
As the questionnaire data was approaching two years old, interviews were conducted, 




per Humle et al.’s (2011) description) and asked keepers whether they had witnessed the 
behaviour in the animals concerned. During informal conversations with keepers, after testing 
had been completed with bonobos, it transpired that all species had been given similar 
apparatus in the past for enrichment. These objects were much larger tubes (length~60cm, 
diameter ~5cm) not sealed at either end, containing oats & dried fruit mixed with peanut 
butter. Keepers did not provide the apes with sticks in these cases, however, keepers reported 
that the subjects had used sticks, already present in the enclosure, to perform behaviours 
analogous with picking. Although these had been given to the subjects for an extended period 
this was not reported in the questionnaire (given in 2015; Bandini, 2018). However, keepers 
reported that the apes were not shown how to access the food (using tools or otherwise). 
Therefore picking, if it occurred previously, would have still been individually reinnovated in 
the first ape to show it, as a product of individual learning, and did not require social 
learning; social learning cannot be excluded as a catalysing mechanism after the initial 
reinnovation. This follows the logic of the ‘natural’ LS tests described in Section 1.2.4.2.3 
and Chapter 2 (see also Neadle et al., 2017).  
In the case of the tested species, it is implausible that the target behaviour could have 
been transmitted from the wild (picking has never been reported in any wild conspecifics; 
Gruber, Clay, & Zuberbühler, 2010; Robbins et al., 2016; van Schaik et al., 2003). Thus, we 
would consider these individuals to be “culturally unconnected” (sensu Neadle, Allritz, & 
Tennie, 2017). This implies, should the group express the behaviour during testing, individual 




 Experimental procedure 
In optimal conditions, an LS test would take place with the subject in isolation 
(Tennie & Hedwig, 2009) to maximise the effective, i.e., naïve, sample size and exclude 
enhancement. This was not possible at the host zoo, and therefore group tests were used.   
3.3.1.3.1 Stimuli 
Constraints at the host zoo meant actual bones could not be used, due to resultant 
animal health risks. Therefore, “simulated” bones were used. These were a white non-toxic 
PEX barrier pipe, cut to length (Diameter=15mm, Length=15cm). The resulting tube was 
sealed at one end using a white non-toxic push-fit stop-end (Diameter= 30mm, 
Length=32mm), which fitted 27mm over the end of the tube and was secured with an epoxy 
adhesive (see Figure 3.1; adhesive became non-toxic when cured for 24hrs). The tube was 
then filled with 10g of smooth peanut butter (warmed for 60 seconds; 800w microwave), 
using a long syringe to ensure peanut butter was placed directly at the bottom of the tube; 
reducing the chances that subjects could lick or extract it with their tongue or fingers. 
The tube’s diameter was designed that none of the adult apes could fit their fingers 
inside; infants that could fit their fingers inside were not able to reach the peanut butter due to 
their fingers not being long enough to reach the base of the tube. As with bones, it was 
possible that the apes could sufficiently damage the tubes with their teeth to avoid having to 
use a tool. However, due to the malleable characteristic of the tubes, this would have taken 
considerable time. Thus, a tool was required to complete the task most efficiently; sticks were 




diameter was ~5mm, with a maximum of 7.5mm (see Figure 3.1), sizes were modelled from 
reports of wild chimpanzee marrow picking tools (Boesch & Boesch, 1990). Filled tubes 
were refrigerated for at least 24 hours before testing to set the peanut butter at the base of the 
tube. 
 
Figure 3.1. Photograph of tubes (“simulated bones”; left) and sticks (right) as provided to all species 
3.3.1.3.1 Procedure 
Before subjects entered the testing areas, three tubes and three sticks were placed 
throughout the indoor enclosure by keepers. Sticks were never placed within 1m of the tubes 
to avoid the potential for enhancement influencing the speed of reinnovation. The use of 1m 
was simply to standardise proximity across tests and to provide keepers with a guide of where 
to place the sticks.This occurred between 8 am and 10 am (species dependent) when a ‘scatter 
feed’ was usually provided to the subjects. As per the Weatherall report, subjects were not 
denied their usual food routine, other foods were present at the time of testing. This was 
unavoidable, as it was required that the stimuli were placed inside the enclosure without the 




All trials were video recorded using a Sony HandyCam HDR-CX240E from the time 
when the subjects were allowed into the testing area to the point at which the trial ended. 
Every attempt was made to document all interactions with the tubes; however, in some cases, 
simultaneous interactions took place. These interactions were not added to the data set as no 
video evidence existed and could not be accurately assessed through inter-rater reliability 
checks. Trials lasted an initial 10 minutes if after 5 minutes a subject was still in contact with 
the tube another 5 minutes were added; this continued once more for a total of 20 minutes. 
Each species took part in three trials.  
3.3.1.3.2 Coding 
The data were coded in ‘bouts’; where a bout is defined when an individual attempts 
to access the peanut butter inside the tubes. A bout lasted from the time that initial contact 
with the tube was made, to the point at which the subject relinquished contact for more than 
one minute; if another individual took possession of the tube a new bout began. A new bout 
was also started if a new behaviour (see Table 3.2) began, e.g., the subject switched from 




Table 3.2. Ethogram used during coding, this ethogram was informed by a prior study by Bandini (2018), DN’s 
study notes of which behaviours occurred and finally, new behaviours were added as required during coding. 
This, completed, version of the ethogram was provided to the second coder. 
Method Description 
Picking A stick is inserted into the tube using the hand(s), it then contacts the 
peanut butter and the individual removes the now peanut butter coated 
stick and consumes the peanut butter.  
Picking (Mouth) Same as "Picking" but the mouth is used to assist or take the place of the 
hand(s) when manipulating the stick, the stick can then be turned in the 
mouth or taken out of the mouth by hand, the individual must consume 
the peanut butter. 
Picking (other) The subject used an object other than the sticks provided to dip into the 
tube and consume the peanut butter. 
Push-Through The subject will have removed the end stop from the tube; the subject 
then inserts an object into one end of the tube and pushes the object 
through to the other side of the tube, thus removing peanut butter in the 
process. The subject must consume the peanut butter. 
Finger The subject will have torn the tube along its length to leave a long wide 
opening. The subject will then use its finger to consume the peanut 
butter from the now destroyed tube.   
Hand The subject uses their fingers to try to access the peanut butter from 
inside the tube (without having destroyed it first), by inserting the tip of 
a finger into the tube and consuming peanut butter from the finger. 
Mouth The subject places the tube directly in the mouth and tried to consume 
the peanut butter by either sucking the tube, chewing the end or using 
the tongue to consume any residue of peanut butter near the tip of the 
tube. 
Hand/Mouth The subject uses first their finger and then their mouth to suck and 
consume the peanut butter from the top of the tube. 
Mouth/Hand The subject individual first attempted to use their mouth or tongue to 




This code was used when the coder did not witness any attempt to 
consume the peanut butter from the tube. This was used for reliability 
coding "dummy clips" only. 
 
To assess the reliability and accuracy of the coding, a second, hypothesis naïve, coder 




behaviours were isolated from the full videos and sent to the second coder with a randomly 
assigned (arbitrary) file name. Also, an equal number of "dummy" clips, that contained a 
subject in the frame, when this subject was not performing a behaviour from the ethogram, 
were included. 
Cohen’s Kappa was then used to assess the level of agreement between the coders, a 
level of κ = 0.6, was required before analyses were completed (Cohen, 1960; McHugh, 
2012). An acceptable level of agreement (κ = 0.75, p<.001; Cohen, 1960; McHugh, 2012) 
was attained between the second (JC) and primary (DN) coders. 
 Results 
One individual from each species reinnovated the picking behaviour (see Figures 3.2 
& 3.3). The first reinnovation in the: bonobo sample was 2 minutes 20 seconds into the 
second trial (MG; female; 19), gorilla sample was 18 minutes 47 seconds into the third trial 
(OB; male; 25) and orangutan sample was 10 minutes 3 seconds into the first trial (BT; male; 
28). Overall, two bonobos, one gorilla and all four orangutans successfully reinnovated the 
picking behaviour. The orangutan sample spent the largest proportion of time (43%) picking, 
as opposed to other methods, followed by bonobos (16%) and gorillas (10%). Whilst 
interesting, it must be noted that these values are confounded by the fact that only one gorilla 
and two bonobos reinnovated the picking behaviour. The inflated value in the orangutan 






Figure 3.2. Sequence of picking behaviour in an immature female orangutan (ML).  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Stills of a member of each species expressing the picking behaviour, note that in these images only 
the bonobo (panel B) is using a stick that was provided.  
All species also expressed other behaviours from the ethogram: bonobo and gorilla 




expressing the picking behaviour; whereas, the orangutan sample only expressed two (mouth 
& hand). See Figure 3.4 for details of methods expressed by each species.  
 
Figure 3.4. Number of bouts each species engaged with each behaviour, note that not all species expressed all 
methods of manipulation.  
 Study 2 – Scooping 
 Method 
 Subjects 
Data was collected, between December 2015 and June 2017, from seven bonobos 




















































lowland gorillas (female = 3, male = 1) aged between 21 and 41 years (M=28.75, SD=9.03) 
and 4 Bornean orangutans (female = 3, male = 1) aged between 4 and 38 years (M=22.25, 
SD=14.10); see Table 3.1 for rearing histories, all ages correct as of first day of testing. All 
species remained in the same enclosure as in Study 1, however, this experiment took place in 
the management areas. Browse was again present in the gorilla management area; bedding 
materials were present in all species. 
This group is the same group that took part in Study 1, however, two individuals BY 
& MZ were transferred from one group to another between the picking and scooping tests. 
These transfers were related to the breeding programme at the host zoo and thus beyond the 
control of this study. See Section 3.5.1.3.1 for an explanation of why the second group did 
not participate in Study 2. The gorilla sample was tested in 2015, at which point LP was 2 
years old. Gorillas were tested individually and at this point, he was not eligible to take part 
in this study as only adults and subadults were considered. 
 Pre-test questionnaires and interviews 
As in Study 1, pre-test questionnaires were distributed to keepers prior to the task 
taking place (see Bandini & Tennie, 2017); similarly to Study 1, there were no reports of the 
use of sticks to access out of reach, floating, objects, certainly not whilst displaying the key 
behavioural wrist swivelling form integral to scooping. The questionnaires were, again, 
followed up by interviews, which revealed no behaviours analogous to scooping and 




 Experimental procedure 
As this study took place solely within the management areas it was possible, in the 
gorilla sample, to test subjects in isolation; visual contact was limited between subjects; 
subjects were tested at a rate of one subject per test day. It was possible for a gorilla in the 
neighbouring sleeping areas to see the individual immediately to their left/right. However, 
subjects could not see past an obstruction, therefore, we can consider this sample as two 
smaller groups (Group 1: AS & BD; Group 2: UM & OZ). See Appendix A. Isolated testing 
was not possible in the bonobo or orangutan samples; therefore, as in Bandini and Tennie 
(2017) and Study 1, only the first reinnovation of a behaviour would qualify as a spontaneous 
reinnovation as a product of individual learning. 
3.5.1.3.1 Species-specific modifications 
During the first trial (see below, for details) in the first bonobo group (n=5; M 
age=8.67, SD = 7.19), subjects proved able to reach with their arms through the standard 
mesh (5.08x5.08cm) and so retrieve the floating bread by hand. Thus, the experiment was 
modified for the remaining group of bonobos, this was achieved by reducing the size of the 
mesh openings (2.54x2.54cm; Figure 3.5). As the first group were able to reach the bread by 
hand their data were excluded and treated as pilot data, with only the second group’s data 
being analysed further. Reaching through the standard mesh of the zoo we tested in was not 
possible in the other species tested, owing to the other species’ anatomically greater size at 





Figure 3.5. A & B show the size of the mesh in the bonobo enclosure prior to modification. C & D show the 
modifications made to the bonobo enclosure in order to prevent bonobos from being able to reach the bread by 
hand; note, the opening size is reduced by approximately half. Photograph curtesy of Twycross Zoo, UK.  
3.5.1.3.2 Stimuli 
In the wild, chimpanzees perform the scooping behaviour when they encounter 
Spirogyra sp. floating atop bodies of standing water. However, it was not logistically viable 
to import this plant to the UK; therefore, an alternative food reward was required. In a related 
study by Bandini and Tennie (2017), dried bread was deemed an appropriate substitute for 




white centre (see Figure 3.6). In this state the bread was able to emulate the key properties of 
algae; i.e., an elongated, floating object, which can be scooped onto a stick.  
 
Figure 3.6. A model piece of dried bread to be used in the study; the section cut out of the middle was done 
prior to drying, thus the square dried distorted. 
A rectangular, transparent, plastic container (16 cm × 66 cm × 20 cm) was positioned 
outside the mesh of each of the enclosures (the orientation of the container altered between 
species owing to local restrictions, see below). The container was ¾ filled, approximately 16 
litres of water. Three bamboo sticks, 80cm long and 1-3cm diameter (see Figure 3.7) were 
placed inside the enclosure. Sticks were not placed directly next to the container. However, as 
the gorillas had to be tested within their sleeping areas, the gorilla sample were present whilst 





Figure 3.7. A model of the sticks used in this study, the actual sticks were selected based on this stick and so 
reflected a similar size and shape. 
3.5.1.3.3 Procedure 
Testing took place between 8am and 10am in the subjects’ sleeping/management 
areas. Bamboo sticks were placed into the enclosure and the filled container was placed 
against the mesh. Once the subjects had access to all the required materials three pieces of 
cut, dried, bread were placed into the water. This study followed the same “result dependent” 
design outlined in Study 1 resulting in a maximum total testing time of 20 minutes per trial. A 
single camera (Sony HDR-CX330 Handycam) was focussed on the container with as much of 
the subject in the frame as possible. Each group (or subject, in the case of the gorilla sample) 





The data were coded in bouts, where a bout was defined as the time from which a 
subject began contact with a stick to the point at which they relinquished contact; a new bout 
began if the subject did not re-establish contact within one minute. Additionally, if a new 
individual contacted the stick a new bout began, similarly if a subject changed behaviour (see 
table 3.3) a new bout began.  
Owing to the difficulty of this task, specifically keeping the bread on the stick, 
approximations at the behaviour were also considered, termed ‘attempts’. Attempts are 
defined as when the motor requirements of the behaviour were met, e.g., a swivelling wrist 
motion was used when scooping, however, the subject was unsuccessful in acquiring the 
bread. Therefore, each successful behavioural code had a corresponding ‘attempted’ code.  
3.5.1.4.1 Interrater reliability 
Reliability was assessed in the same way as in Study 1 behaviours were isolated from 
the main data and combined with “dummy clips” before a second, hypothesis naïve, coder 
(JC) coded 50% of the behaviours from the gorilla data set and 33% of the behaviours from 
the orangutan data set. No behaviours were identified through coding of the bonobo data set, 
as a result, no interrater reliability could be calculated. An acceptable level of agreement (κ = 





Table 3.3. Ethogram used during coding in Study 2. This ethogram was previously informed by the behaviours 
noted in a prior study with chimpanzees into the same behaviour (Bandini & Tennie, 2017), behaviours were 
added to the ethogram during live coding by DN; the ethogram, as presented below, was provided to JC for 
reliability coding.  
Method Description 
Scooping Inserting a stick (or other appropriate tool) into the 
water and, with a swivelling of the wrist, scooping the 
bread anywhere onto the stick. The subject must retrieve 
the bread. 
Attempted Scooping As above, however the subject was not successful in 
retrieving bread.  
Lifting Inserting a stick (or other appropriate tool) into the 
water and, with no noticeable wrist movement, lifts 
bread, from underneath, partly or fully out the water. 
The subject must retrieve the bread. 
Attempted Lifting As above, however the subject was not successful in 
retrieving bread. 
Mouth Scooping Using the mouth, the subject places the stick into the 
water and, still with the stick in the mouth, lifts the 




As above, however the subject was not successful in 
retrieving bread 
Side Technique  The subject pushes the bread against the side of the 
container to force it onto the stick; here, the bread must 
touch the side of the container, between the edge of the 
container and the stick for this to apply. The subject 
must retrieve the bread 
Attempted Side Technique As above, however the subject was not successful in 
retrieving bread 
No relevant behaviour 
seen 
This code was used when the coders did not witness any 
interaction between the subject and the apparatus that 
was directed towards the goal, i.e., the bread. This was 






 Results  
 Attempted scooping 
In total there were 31 unsuccessful attempts at scooping, across the gorilla and 
orangutan samples; bonobos never attempted the scooping technique. 
 Gorilla 
There were 20 attempts at scooping in the gorilla group. Eight of these attempts were 
by AS (female; 30) in her third trial. The remaining 12 attempts at scooping were by UM 
(male; 23), all these events were recorded in his first trial. UM could not have seen AS 
showing the swivelling behaviour required for scooping, prior to his reinnovation of the 
technique, which proved unsuccessful. Therefore, each attempt was independent, thus can be 
considered separate reinnovations.  
 Orangutan 
There were 11 attempts at scooping in the orangutan group. Two of these events were 
by BT (male; 26). BT was the first in the orangutan group to successfully show the swivelling 
behaviour required for scooping; despite this attempt being unsuccessful. Given that BT was 
first to display the swivelling behaviour it is possible that MK (female; 21) had witnessed the 
technique prior to her own implementation of the scooping technique, which began later 
during trial one. The remaining events of failed attempted scooping were all involving; she 




and one in trial three. There were eight failed attempted scooping attempts in total before a 
successful reinnovation. 
 Bonobo 
There were no recorded instances of bonobos ever attempting the scooping behaviour. 
However, worthy of note is that the relevant bonobo sample (i.e. the group that contributed 
data, see above) had to interact with a smaller sized mesh than the other species, which may 
have impeded the application of any scooping. This is evidenced by the fact that when the 
bonobos ML (female; 7) did interact with the apparatus, the stick became stuck between the 
mesh (she even seemingly had to put in much effort to remove the stick); this kind of 
technical problem was never noted in any of the other two species we tested here, nor did it 
occur in the chimpanzee sample tested by Bandini and Tennie (2017; personal 
communication). Two out of the nine bonobos (MG, female; 17 and ML, female; 5) 
attempted to use the stick as a tool; these individuals, combined, contributed three attempts, 
none of which involved any action from the ethogram, and only once did the stick touch the 
water.  
 Successful scooping 
Only one individual fully reinnovated the scooping behaviour, i.e., with success, MK 
(orangutan; female; 21). The first successful application of scooping was after one minute 
and 11 seconds of the second trial and resulted in the successful extraction of one piece of 




seconds) trial and twice more during her third trial (once after one minute and 46 seconds and 
again at three minutes and 47 seconds). 
 
Figure 3.8. Sequence of events during first successful reinnovation of the scooping technique by MK, note the 
difference in wrist position between A and B showing the swivelling described in other studies. 
In three out of the four successful scooping events, MK consumed the bread directly 
from the stick, after withdrawing the stick through the opening in the mesh. In the other 
attempt she used her hand to first remove the bread from the stick and then pull the bread 
against the mesh before consuming it directly from her hand through the mesh.  
 Other techniques 
Scooping was not the only technique used to access the bread, subjects also attempted 
to use lifting, a side technique and mouth scooping (see Figure 3.9). Success in the lifting 
technique was limited to the orangutan sample, where MK (female; 21) was able to utilise the 
technique to obtain a part of a bread shape. Successful implementation of the side technique 




was restricted to the gorilla sample, where AS (female; 30) was able to obtain a small part of 
the bread. The mouth scooping technique was unique to the orangutan sample (BT; male; and 
MK), and was never successful in retrieving the bread.  
 
Figure 3.9. Number of bouts of each behaviour in the scooping ethogram expressed during the second study.  
 General discussion 
The results of the above studies show that at least some aspects of the chimpanzee 
(Bandini, 2018; Bandini & Tennie, 2017; Motes-Rodrigo et al., 2019) and human (Reindl et 
al., 2016) stick tool use ZLS are shared with other species of ape. These findings, taken 





































































individual learning, in closely related species, suggesting a ZLS shared between 
phylogenetically related species.  
These studies represent two interesting, but different, cases of the shared ZLS. The 
picking behaviour described here is similar, in behavioural form, to many other techniques of 
extractive foraging, where a stick is used to extend the individual’s reach where limbs and 
digits are unsuitable. The only ‘technique’ required is to insert a stick into an opening 
containing a food source. As extractive foraging is a fairly common form of enrichment for 
captive apes, it is highly unlikely that naïve individuals could be found. Of those individuals 
naïve to extractive foraging (our subjects are not included in this) concerns could be raised 
about how deprived (Henrich & Tennie, 2017) their existence has been and the resultant 
effect on their behavioural phenotype (van Schaik & Burkart, 2011).  
It is highly unlikely that there is a specific cognitive module for ‘picking’ or indeed 
any specific behaviour. It is instead more likely that this resultant shared ZLS is the product 
of a shared general cognitive capacity that allows apes to use tools in extractive foraging. 
This is likely to be a remnant of shared behaviours from the last common ancestor of all 
extant ape species; all extant species show evidence of picking. However, it is also plausible 
that this finding and therefore the general ability of extractive foraging is the product of 
convergent evolution. This becomes likely when one considers that the subjects here used a 
stick to extract a reward from where their bodies could not reach, an ability shared with some 
corvids (Hunt, 1996; Rutz et al., 2016). A combination of these two explanations is also 




Scooping, however, has been noted to be an uncommon behaviour in the wild, given 
the apparent rarity of the algae species within chimpanzee habitats (Whiten et al., 1999). 
When exposed to the materials required and motivation to perform naïve chimpanzees 
(Bandini & Tennie, 2017), humans (Reindl et al., 2016), orangutans and potentially gorillas 
are capable of reinnovating the very specific required motor patterns: the swivelling motion 
of the wrist (Humle et al., 2011). Though, the substrate used here (bread) often broke up 
when saturated in water for extended periods, it is possible that by using a more stable 
substrate more individual, trial and error, learning could have resulted in a full reinnovation 
of successful scooping.  
Similar to picking, it is possible that that scooping is a latent solution in all species of 
great ape, though bonobos should be excluded from this until evidence is found contrary to 
this study. Bonobo’s failure to reinnovate scooping could simply be a result of lower 
motivation to engage with tool use (Koops, Furuichi, & Hashimoto, 2015) or simply that the 
size of the mesh made the task more challenging or even impossible in this sample. However, 
this behaviour may also not be a latent solution in bonobos but given the capacity for bonobo 
tool use in the right conditions (Gruber & Clay, 2016), this seems unlikely. Thus, further 
samples of bonobos should be tested for this behaviour. 
From the evidence presented here and in previous studies (e.g., Bandini & Tennie, 
2017, 2019; Motes-Rodrigo et al., 2019), it is possible that the last common ancestor of all 
modern great apes was likely capable of, at least some, stick tool use; that is, it was within 
the species ZLS. However, it is also possible that this behavioural capacity did not manifest 




(Furuichi et al., 2015), where tool use is clearly within the species capacity (Gruber & Clay, 
2016) but is not utilised. This may have been due to a lack of ecological need (Fox, Sitompul, 
& van Schaik, 1999) or other selection pressures.  
The results, and discussions, above clearly speak to a partially shared ZLS most 
parsimoniously explaining the similar patterns of behaviour found amongst the great apes. 
Even the most distantly related species of great apes (Pan and Pongo) share aspects of their 
behavioural capacity. Individual learning here is the mechanism responsible for the 
emergence of these behaviours, whereas, social learning may simply act as a catalyst, 
harmonising them within (and between) communities. Simply providing apes with the 
materials and motivation results in the spontaneous reinnovation of behaviours previously 
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Amongst animals, chimpanzees are, for now, the ‘most cultural’ species, at least in 
terms of known numbers of cultural traits (Whiten et al., 1999). An increase in the number of 
cultural traits a population shows is known as accumulation (Dean et al., 2014). However, 
accumulation should not be confused with cumulation; i.e., the cultural change of the traits 
themselves along with the transmission, thus cumulative culture (Dean et al., 2014). Only the 
latter is the result of the ‘ratchet effect’ (Tomasello, Kruger, et al., 1993), which underlies 
cumulative culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1996).   
Whilst chimpanzees’ accumulation of cultural traits is impressive, for those concerned 
with human cultural evolution, the presence or absence of CDTs in chimpanzees is of more 
interest. CDTs are not always more complex than other cultural traits (though they may be; 
Reindl et al., 2017). This said, trait complexity can serve as a starting point to identify at least 
candidate CDTs; specifically, those that have ‘ratcheted up’ in complexity via cultural 
transmission (Tennie et al., 2018). Complexity is hard to define and measure. Complexity can 
be depicted using stepwise flow-diagrams (sensu Byrne, Corp, & Byrne, 2001) or 
“cognigrams” (Haidle, 2012). It can refer to the number of parts within a final 
artefact/behaviour (techno-units; Oswalt, 1976), the goals and sub-goals of an action (Read & 
Andersson, 2019), the manual dexterity of an action (Foucart et al., 2005) and the number of 
“rules” necessary to describe the behaviour (Sirianni, Mundry, & Boesch, 2015), amongst 
other metrics (see Vaesen & Houkes, 2017 for further discussion of complexity). Indeed, even 




For example, naïve bower birds can make their nests without requiring any cultural 
transmission of knowledge (Collias & Collias, 1984). 
Nut-cracking is regarded as one of the most complex behaviours expressed by any 
wild ape, as it requires a high level of dexterity (Foucart et al., 2005) and involves several 
objects, to be used in several steps following a specific sequential order to produce the 
desired effect (Biro et al., 2003; Boesch et al., 2019; Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa, 1997; 
Read & Andersson, 2019). Perhaps unsurprisingly given its relative complexity, nut-cracking 
is rare across wild communities only being documented in two geographically separate and 
culturally unconnected populations to date: two geographically similar communities in West 
Africa (Bossou, Guinea and Taï Forest, Côte d’Ivoire Whiten et al., 2001) and another in Ebo 
Forest, Cameroon (Morgan & Abwe, 2006).  
The number of steps, alongside the manual dexterity and use of multiple objects in 
conjunction required for this behaviour, suggests that nut-cracking is most likely a complex 
behaviour for chimpanzees. When distilled down to the basics, the behavioural form of nut-
cracking consists of the following four sequential steps: 
1. Place nut on an anvil 
2. Pick up a hammer (unless already picked up) 
3. Lift the hammer 
4. Drop/push the hammer onto a nut (all may be repeated). 
Perhaps due to this apparent complexity, nut-cracking is often assumed to be 
culturally transmitted (Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000; Lycett, Collard, & McGrew, 




mechanism responsible for its acquisition. For example, Boesch (1996) claimed that 
chimpanzees learn how to crack nuts “by individual and social learning, including imitation” 
(Boesch, 1996, p. 418). Similarly, Biro et al. (2003, p. 220) argue that when nut-cracking 
“infant chimpanzees are driven not by a motivation for food but to produce a copy of the 
mother’s actions”. Others agree, claiming that nut-cracking (amongst other chimpanzee traits) 
are difficult to explain “by social learning processes simpler than imitation” (Whiten et al., 
1999, p. 685). More recently, it has been argued that chimpanzees rely on mother to infant 
“teaching” to acquire the skills required to crack nuts, at a rate consistent with that of others 
within their community (Boesch et al., 2019). Overall, the behaviours underpinning nut-
cracking have been argued to require social learning (in particular action copying and/or 
unspecified variants of teaching). It, therefore, follows that nut-cracking is assumed to be 
outside of chimpanzees’ ZLS, making nut-cracking a CDT. If true, it can be expected that, 
given a demonstration of the behaviour, chimpanzees should be capable of learning nut-
cracking. This would provide evidence that social learning is sufficient for nut-cracking to 
occur. However, to determine whether social learning is necessary, whether nut-cracking can 
occur even in the absence of social learning, needs to be ascertained through a baseline test.   
In its purest form, the ZLS hypothesis (Tennie et al., 2009) posits that all non-human 
great ape cultural behaviours can be reinnovated by naïve apes. Similarly, Hayashi, Mizuno 
and Matsuzawa (2005) suggested that nut-cracking could be individually reinnovated by 
chimpanzees. This is supported by some wild case studies, e.g., a report of nut-cracking in 
Cameroon (Morgan & Abwe, 2006) passes the ‘information barrier’ of the N’Zo-Sassandra 




cracking was reinnovated in two, culturally separate, wild communities (Tennie et al., 2009, 
p. 2406). If nut-cracking were reinnovated by a naïve, captive, chimpanzee in a culturally 
separate “island” of individuals (Tennie, Braun, Premo, & McPherron, 2016; Tomasello, 
1999a) then the behaviour would cease to be a putative example of an ape CDT. Such data 
would support the ZLS hypothesis and would determine that chimpanzees are capable of 
individually learning all four of the steps underpinning nut-cracking; suggesting that social 
learning is not required for the behavioural form (these steps in succession) to emerge. This 
would mean that similar to other chimpanzee behaviours, a combination of individual 
learning and non-copying variants of social learning would suffice to explain the geographic 
patterns of nut-cracking in the wild. 
This chapter compares the relative efficacy of the CDT hypothesis (Section 1.2.4.2.1), 
assuming that nut-cracking is a CDT (Boesch et al., 2019; Whiten et al., 1999) and the ZLS 
hypothesis (Section 1.2.4.2.2) positing that nut-cracking can be reinnovated, but may 
nevertheless be mediated by non-copying variants of social learning. Raw material selection 
is likely influenced by non-copying variants of social learning. For example, wooden or stone 
anvils are used in the wild to keep the nut in place and wooden or stone hammers are used to 
crack it (Sirianni et al., 2015). Whether stone or wood is used, the form of the behaviour is 
the same (see above), and only material selection has changed. Accordingly, this chapter 
focusses on the behavioural form, which is the aspect of the behaviour pertinent to the 






The subjects were 13 chimpanzees (Mage = 31.08; SD = 1; female = 9, male = 4; Table 
4.1). All subjects lived within a single group, except for one individual (HO), that, due to 
group transfers within the zoological institution throughout the duration of this study, was 
introduced into the group before the start of the second condition (thus, HO did not 
participate in the baseline condition). The subjects were housed in two different enclosures 
throughout the course of the study. Between June 2017 and April 2018 subjects were housed 
in the “conversion” enclosure, from April 2018 until the end of the study subjects were 
housed in the “Eden” enclosure. Both enclosures consisted of two indoor areas and an 
outdoor area, with separate management areas. Subjects could be observed through glass 
panes in all public areas and mesh in management areas. Within the main enclosures, subjects 
had access to enrichment devices, such as climbing frames/ropes, hanging feeders and nesting 




Table 4.1. Details of subjects included in the study. Subject HO is displayed in italics as she was only included 
in the study after the baseline condition.  
ID DoB Sex Rearing Location of birth 
RO 30/04/1976 Female Hand Twycross, UK 
JM 09/06/1982 Male Hand Twycross, UK 
FY 25/10/1986 Male Hand Twycross, UK 
VC 18/08/1990 Female Hand Twycross, UK 
JO 28/12/1990 Male Hand Twycross, UK 
TU 10/08/2007 Female Parent Twycross, UK 
GE 25/05/1995 Female Hand Twycross, UK 
TJ 17/06/1977 Female Undetermined Wild 
JS 20/02/1988 Female Hand Dudley Zoo, UK 
CO 01/01/1965 Female Undetermined Wild 
ND 14/12/1971 Female Undetermined Wild 
KB 05/12/2003 Male Parent Bremerhaven, Germany 
HO 27/12/1982 Female Parent Twycross, UK 
 
 Prior experience questionnaire 
As in Chapter 3, the data set from the questionnaire distributed by EB was initially 
consulted to assess naivety. However, given the fact that the questionnaire was over 2 years 
old at the start of this study follow up interviews were carried out with keepers. The relevant 
aspect of the questionnaire was the question of the presence of the following behaviour:  
“Using one object to bang on, or hit, another: usually, this means the use of a hard 
object to bang on or hit another, often hard, object. This may be with the aim to crack or 
break open the latter object, or to remove a substrate. Here, we are interested in any hammer-




 This definition encompasses nut-cracking and similar actions, such as hammering 
behaviours. No instances of nut-cracking were reported in the questionnaire; however, in the 
questionnaire, a keeper described how one individual (TU; F; age 9 at the time of the 
questionnaire) used a stone to tap on the glass of the outdoor enclosure; given that the results 
presented here are ‘negative’ this behaviour did not influence the findings. However, should 
TU have expressed nut-cracking it would be possible that this tapping behaviour could be 
considered an antecedent behaviour. All but one keeper reported that the chimpanzees were 
frequently witnessed using their teeth to crack nuts such as walnuts or peanuts. These 
findings were confirmed by later follow up interviews. 
 Ethical statement  
All participation in this study was voluntary, and subjects were allowed to leave the 
testing area at any point throughout the session. Subjects’ usual feeding and cleaning routines 
were followed, minimising disruption to the apes. The experimental phase of this study was 
ethically reviewed and approved by the University of Birmingham AWERB committee (UOB 
31213) and by an internal committee at the testing location, following guidelines provided by 
SSSMZP, EAZA, BIAZA, WAZA on animal welfare and research in zoological institutions; 
this study also received a letter of support from BIAZA. This study adhered to legal 
requirements of the UK, where the research was carried out, and adhered to the ASP 




 Motivation tests 
This phase took place between 13th June and 27th September 2017. Before starting 
experimental testing, it was important to ensure that the subjects were sufficiently interested 
and motivated to access the novel food reward (macadamia nuts) used in this study. To 
motivate the chimpanzees to try the nut kernels when first presented, the first stage involved a 
trusted individual (KW; head ape keeper, who had worked with the subjects for more than 
five years) first eating a portion of familiar food in front of the subjects (here we used dried 
raisins and berries). Throughout motivation testing, subjects were in their normal groups. KW 
attracted the subject’s attention by calling their name, and then ate a single item of the 
familiar food (i.e., one raisin) in view of them. This process was repeated until each 
individual had observed the demonstration. The subjects were then provided with the same 
food and were required to eat it before moving onto the next step, every individual ate the 
familiar food.  
The next stage was to introduce the novel food (macadamia nut kernels without their 
shells). Again, KW ate a single macadamia kernel in the same way as with the familiar foods. 
Each individual was first given a demonstration, within the group context. Once each 
individual had observed the consumption of the nuts at least once, they were provided with 
their macadamia kernel.  This process was designed to increase the likelihood that the 
subjects would eat the novel food (Visalberghi, Yamakoshi, Hirata, & Matsuzawa, 2002) as 
the trusted keeper ate and introduced edible and safe food. Thus, increasing the likelihood 
that the chimpanzees would be motivated to eat the kernels. We required at least half of the 




preference testing did not go on for too long, as these tests were carried out within a group 
context, it was likely that lower-ranking individuals would never be allowed access to the nut 
kernels. 
 Test conditions 
Each trial was video recorded, this began when the subjects were given access to the 
testing apparatus. Trial times were the period between the first morning feed and the 
afternoon feed; this was chosen to compliment the daily routine of the keepers and apes 
whilst providing the maximum testing time possible. The timings changed once the 
chimpanzees moved enclosure as the keepers were able to provide the afternoon feed without 
needing to move the subjects outside the testing area. Average trial length in “conversion” 
was 3 hours (n = 8) and in “Eden” was 5 hours 41 minutes (n = 12). Overall, there was a total 
of 92 hours and 18 minutes of observation time (Mtrial length = 4 hours 37 minutes). The 
experimenter (DN) was present throughout each trial.  
This study used a result dependent design, where each condition (see Figure 4.1) was 
followed by the next, if the behaviour was not expressed in the previous condition, after five 
trials. For example, the "End state" condition was only implemented if the behaviour was not 
reinnovated in the "Baseline" condition. The study ended once the subjects had participated 





Figure 4.1. Decision tree depiction of the result dependent conditions. If, at any stage, evidence of nut-cracking 
was encountered then testing would have ceased. Each condition was continued for five trials before moving 
onto the next condition. 
In all of the conditions, behaviours were first live coded using the ethogram in Table 
4.2. Video recordings were focused on the experimental hammer and anvil set up, described 
below, however, DN was present at all times to observe any behaviours which might have 




Table 4.2. Coding ethogram used during the live coding procedure; this was added to throughout live coding as 
behaviours of interest were observed. This ethogram was provided to the second coder for reliability coding.  
Behaviour Description 
Place nut The subject places one/several nuts on the surface of the anvil. This is 
also coded if the subject drops the nut onto the anvil. The nut may roll off 
the anvil after being “placed” this is acceptable as it is likely due to the 
nut’s shape and the angle of the anvil’s surface.  
Hold hammer The subject picks up the hammer – with the nut on the anvil, by holding 
the wood itself or the securing attachment. 
Raise hammer The subject lifts the hammer above the nut – this may be at/below/above 
head height for the subject. 
Drop hammer The subject brings the hammer down onto the nut, which must be resting 
on the anvil. The hammer can be dropped or held in the hand the entire 
time. This behaviour can be repeated until the nut is cracked. The 
behaviour is coded each time the behaviour occurs – i.e., each time the 
nut is struck. 
Eat nut The subject takes the kernel of the, now broken nut and eats it. Note, this 
must have followed cracking of the nut by the subject. 
Stamp The subject uses their foot to stand on the nut, which has been placed on 
the anvil. 
Throw The subject, whilst sitting on the anvil, throws the nut in any direction.  
 
 Materials 
The same apparatus set up was used in all conditions, and any changes to these 
conditions are noted in the relevant section. To set up the apparatus, DN entered the enclosure 
and secured a large wooden log (50cm tall x 40cm diameter), that would serve as an “anvil”, 
to an upright portion of the climbing frame (which had a horizontal crossbeam, to ensure that 
the anvil could not be removed; see Figure 4.2). The anvil was secured to the upright 
climbing frame using two 1m long, 8mm thick, PVC coated, steel rope passed through two 




Both ends of the rope had a loop (secured by five ‘clips’ at each point, ‘clips’ used two, 8mm, 
nuts and bolts (tightened using an electric drill), which was too large to pass through the hole 
in the anvil, and a steel padlock attached the two ends. Two of these securing attachments 
were used as a failsafe measure (see Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.2. Hammer and anvil set up within subjects’ enclosure. Note, the two securing attachments are passed 
through separate holes within the anvil and the hammer is less than 1m from the anvil (this was ensured by the 
length of the securing attachment of the hammer to the anvil).  
A wooden “hammer” was also attached to this structure (wooden, rather than stone, 
hammers were chosen as they were more secure in their attachment to the rope). The hammer 




drilled through half way along (see Figure 4.3). The hammer was attached to the anvil’s own 
securing attachment by creating another looped end in another (1.5m) length of the same steel 
rope; the loop was passed onto the top securing attachment (of the anvil) and the loose end 
was secured to the hammer (by passing the loose end through the drilled hole and then 
securing with another five clips). The hammer was then moved less than 1m from the anvil 
(see Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.3. Securing attachment of the hammer.  
Keepers then scattered three macadamia nuts (in their shell) per individual (i.e., 3 nuts 
x 13 individuals = 39 nuts) throughout the enclosure, avoiding a 2m radius around the 
hammer and anvil set-up. The macadamia nuts were distributed at the same time as a regular 
scatter feed (mainly consisting of vegetables with some fruit), just prior to the subjects being 
released into the outdoor enclosure. The unshelled weight of the nuts (around 1g average 
across 10 measurements) was taken from the chimpanzees’ usual allowance of nuts for the 
week (this was to maintain the dietary health of the subjects, at the testing institution’s 




exited the enclosure and the chimpanzees were allowed in the enclosure. Just prior to the 
chimpanzees being allowed access, video cameras (SONY HDR-CX330e), set at two points 
framing the apparatus (to better capture various angles), on tripods, were set to record. DN 
was also present to live code relevant behaviours (see above). 
 Conditions 
 Baseline condition 
This test condition took place between 15th October 2017 and 30th November 2017. 
 
Figure 4.4. Experimental set up for baseline condition in “conversion”; note, the same set up was used for the 
first two trials of the “end-state” condition, prior to the enclosure move (see below). 
In order to examine whether the subjects would individually reinnovate the target nut-
cracking behaviour, it was necessary to test subjects without providing any social information 
beforehand. All sessions began between 10 am and 12 noon, when keepers provided the 
chimpanzees’ scatter feed. All sessions were conducted in the “Outdoor 1” section of the 





 End state condition 
This phase of the study was completed between 15th January 2018 and 18th May 2018. 
However, after the first two trials (15th January 2018 and 17th January 2018) the weather 
conditions at the testing institution became so harsh that the subjects would often refuse to 
leave the indoor enclosure. Thus, testing was paused until 14th May 2018, after which the 
final three trials were completed on the 14th, 16th & 18th May. Between testing in January and 
May subjects were moved from “Conversion” (their previous enclosure) to a new enclosure: 
“Eden” (see Figure 4.5); subjects were therefore given one month after moving to the new 
enclosure before testing resumed.  
 
Figure 4.5. Experimental set up for “end-state” condition in “Eden”. Note, subjects had access to the entirety 
of this enclosure throughout these trials, however, the outdoor section of the enclosure was still under 
construction. 
In this condition, we placed three macadamia nuts, shells and kernels, which had been 
split in half (see Figure 4.6) on top of the anvil (in the “Conversion” enclosure this was in 
“Outdoor 1” and in “Eden” this was in “Habitat 1”). This condition represents a partial 
emulation condition, where the subjects are presented with the ‘end state’ of the object after 




scenario where a prior individual has cracked nuts at the location and left some broken nuts 











Figure 4.6. Left panel: Macadamia nuts, sawn in half (with kernels left whole) for the end-state emulation 
condition. Right panel: Nuts placed atop the anvil as described in text. 
This condition was carried-out as the chimpanzees failed to individually reinnovate 
the nut-cracking behaviour in the baseline. During the design process the study originally 
included an extra condition between the “Baseline” and “End state” conditions, called “Local 
Enhancement”. In this condition it would have been made clear to the subjects that a kernel is 
inside the macadamia nut and therefore that it constitutes a food source by shaving half of the 
nut shell away to reveal the kernel inside (see Bandini and Tennie, 2018). However, some of 




subsequently consumed the kernels (see Figure 4.7), rendering this condition unnecessary as 
the contents of the nuts were clear.  
 
Figure 4.7. Adult male chimpanzee (JO) cracking a macadamia nut with his teeth, then eating the kernel. 
 Ghost condition 
This phase of the study was completed between 19th July 2018 and 10th August 2018 
and involved a significant increase in the level of social information provided to the subjects. 
In this condition, the hammer and anvil set-up were still present inside the enclosure, along 
with three macadamia nuts per individual (scattered throughout “Habitat 2”; Figure 4.8) and a 
further three nuts (this time whole, uncracked nuts, inside the shell was provided) placed on 
top of the anvil. Additionally, a replica of the equipment inside the enclosure (i.e., a hammer 
and anvil set up) was placed outside the enclosure, visible through the mesh near the subjects’ 





Figure 4.8. Experimental set up for “Ghost” condition in “Eden”. Note, subjects had access to the entirety of 
this enclosure throughout these trials including the outdoor enclosure. 
A reel of clear fishing line (0.65mm diameter; 18.14kg break strain) was attached to 
the hammer and passed through a section of mesh, allowing the hammer to be raised 
(between 80 and 50cm) above the anvil, via a pulley-like system. Once the subject was 
clearly attending the apparatus (the subjects’ attention was gained by calling their names), the 
hammer was dropped onto a nut (which was placed in a groove in the centre of the anvil), 
cracking the nut open. A keeper then approached the anvil and gave the subject (which 
watched the demonstration) the cracked nut. The device was then rebaited with a new nut in 
the centre of the anvil. This procedure was repeated for a further 29 nuts (equalling a total of 
30 demonstrations; with the exception of trial 4; where an equipment malfunction (the fishing 
line broke) – forced the trial to end after 17 nuts had been cracked.). Subjects had access to 
the testing apparatus during the course of the ghost trials. One camera was used to record the 
subjects’ interactions with the test apparatus, whilst the other was used to record subject’s 
observing the ghost demonstrations. In both this condition and the Full Action Demonstration 




front of the demonstration area (far left sleeping area in Figure 4.8) oriented towards the 
apparatus/demonstrator (i.e., not with their back turned).  
 
Figure 4.9. Experimental set up of “Ghost Condition” apparatus. Note the hammer is suspended by fishing line, 
and a single nut is in the centre of the anvil. 
This ghost condition (inspired by Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 2008) fulfils 
the primary stipulation of learning by emulation (Tomasello, Kruger, et al., 1993); i.e., the 
learner should not copy the motor patterns of the demonstrator (see Section 1.2.1.1). In this 
condition, the motor patterns required for nut-cracking were not demonstrated, making it 




 Full action demonstration condition 
This phase of the study was completed between 16th August 2018 and 6th September 
2018. The full action demonstration condition was the first condition that for the first time 
allowed for the possibility of action copying. In this condition DN was positioned outside the 
enclosure (in the same location as the ghost condition). An anvil was placed in the same 
location as in the ghost condition (see Figure 8), with a hammer placed 1m from the anvil 
(both pieces of wood were identical to those in the subject’s enclosure). The researcher then 
attracted a subjects’ attention by calling their name and proceeded to crack a nut, on top of 
the anvil, using the hammer. Note, it was not possible to exclude the fact that multiple 
subjects may attend to the call of one individual – subjects attending to a demonstration were 
coded from videos. The experimenter used the hammer in a vertical manner, thus matching 
the hammer orientation from the ghost condition (see Figure 4.10), raising it to eye level and 
then hitting down onto the nut, resulting in the nut breaking open. The kernel was then 
provided to the subject by a keeper (see Figure 4.10D) and the device rebaited with another 
nut. A total of 30 nuts were cracked using this procedure in each trial; a nut was not cracked 
until DN considered that the target subject was attending to the demonstration. A maximum 
of 30 nuts were used based on advice from keepers that not all subjects would attend to, or 
even approach, the demonstrations; therefore, trials could have continued indefinitely and 





Figure 4.10. DN performing demonstrations. Panel A: subjects’ attention is gained by calling their given name; 
panel B: hammer is raised to eye-level and brought down on the nut as many times as required until it cracks 
(panel C); panel D: cracked nut (both shell and kernel) are provided to the target subject by a keeper. The 
keeper rolled the nut to JS in panel D (hand feeding, even by keepers, is not permitted at the testing institution). 
 Coding/analysis of behaviours 
 Coding procedure 
Trials were live coded using the ethogram in Table 4.2. Following live coding, a 
formal coding procedure from the videos was followed. DN coded each trial in turn and a 
second coder (MT), naïve to the hypothesis of this study, second coded 100% of the 
behaviours identified (N=31) along with an equal number of "dummy" clips where a subject 
was in the frame but DN did not identify a behaviour occurring. To assess inter-rater 
reliability (acceptable Kappa would be 0.6; Cohen, 1968; calculated using R package "irr" 
v.0.84.1; Gamer, Lemon, Fellows, & Singh, 2019). Note that the behaviours in Table 4.2 rely 




without first placing a nut on the anvil then the hammer behaviour would not be coded. This 
was to attempt to parse hammer centred play/exploration from attempts at nut-cracking. 
 Analyses 
After a single reinnovation of the behaviour, social facilitation cannot be excluded as 
a potential reason for the behaviour’s continued emergence (Bandini & Tennie, 2018; Tennie 
& Hedwig, 2009). Given an N of 1, it is not possible to perform inferential statistics on 
acquisition times or rates between individuals. Instead, descriptive statistics were used, all 
descriptive statistics were produced using R v.3.5.2 (R Core Team, 2013). 
 Results 
 Motivation test 
During the motivation test, seven subjects (54% of sample; FY, GE, JS, TJ, JO, KB & 
HO) consumed at least one macadamia nut provided by the keeper, leading to the conclusion 
that macadamia nuts were a) palatable and b) desirable to most of subjects included in this 
study (although note that dominance hierarchies/individual personality characteristics may 
have interfered with certain individual’s ability/motivation to access the nuts). 
 Reliability analysis 
The results of Cohen’s Kappa analysis revealed a strong level of agreement between 




 Attempts at nut-cracking 
None of the individuals in this study attempted to crack open the nuts using a tool in 
any of the conditions described above; as there was never any evidence of nut-cracking or 
approximations of it, all conditions were completed (as explained in Section 4.3.3). 
 Attempts recorded within the ethogram 
The coding procedure identified the following behaviours from the ethogram: place (n 
= 26; first occurring during baseline condition trial 2 but distributed across baseline (n = 7), 
end state (n = 15) and ghost (n = 4) conditions), hold (n = 1; occurring during baseline 
condition trial 2), stamp (n = 2; occurring during baseline condition trial 2) and throw (n = 2; 
occurring during baseline condition trial 2). Recordings of “place” were identified in C5 (n = 
7), C6 (n = 18) and C7 (n = 1) across all conditions apart from full demonstration. In only one 
instance did a “hold” event follow “place”, this concerned C6 during baseline condition trial 
2; who was also the only individual to “stamp” on or “throw” the nuts. It is unclear whether 
throwing was an active effort to break the nut or simply an act of frustration/play as it did not 
appear that the throws were aimed at any hard surface, nor were there ever attempts to 
retrieve the nuts afterwards by the throwers. 
 Alternative techniques 
Anecdotally, the majority of subjects (if not all) were witnessed, at least once, 
attempting to crack the nuts with their teeth (with some individuals succeeding; see Figure 
4.7). Male chimpanzees (n = 4) were the only individuals observed (by DN) successfully 




the baseline condition and persisted throughout the study. These behaviours were not 
captured on the main videos as the cameras were facing the apparatus throughout the trial (to 
ensure that any attempts at using the apparatus to crack the nuts were captured), also some 
subjects were not visible throughout; therefore, any attempt to quantify these behaviours 
would be inaccurate as it would likely present only part of the actual series of events.  
 Observers: Ghost and Full Action Demonstration Conditions 
Occasionally the identity of the observer could not be ascertained from video footage; 
in these cases, the individuals were not included in the calculations below. Furthermore, as 
participation in the study was voluntary, and subjects were free to approach and interact with 
the testing apparatus whenever they chose, not all subjects observed all the demonstrations 
provided. Some subjects (n = 2; JO & ND) never observed the demonstrations in either 
condition; whilst other subjects never observed demonstrations in the ghost (n = 3; JO, HO & 
ND) or full demonstration conditions (n = 4; JO, ND, RO, CO). However, 77% of subjects 
(n=13) were coded as observers in the ghost condition and 69% (n=13) were coded as 
observers the full demonstration condition; there was an average of 2.48 observers per ghost 
demonstration and 2.99 observers per full demonstration.  
 Discussion 
We found no evidence of nut-cracking with a tool, or any approximation at this, at any 
point during the course of this study. Thus, our sample of 13 naïve chimpanzees failed to 
reinnovate or socially learn the behavioural form of nut-cracking. At first, it would seem our 




our initial baseline condition. However, our study also consisted of various social learning 
test conditions – including one that demonstrated the necessary action patterns for nut-
cracking to the chimpanzees. This condition allowed for the possibility of action copying 
being a requirement of the behaviour, as has recently been claimed (Estienne, Cohen, Wittig, 
& Boesch, 2019). Even so, nut-cracking was not acquired by the subjects. Therefore, our 
study does not provide conclusive evidence for either the CDT or the ZLS hypothesis. Below 
we discuss three possible explanations for our null result and the general disparity in studies 
of chimpanzee nut-cracking.  
 Conspecific models  
The findings of this study raise the question as to why some chimpanzee populations 
in the wild regularly crack nuts (on average 270 nuts per day for as long as 2 hours 15 
minutes in Taï Forest; Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000) whereas captive chimpanzees (in 
this sample and others; Funk, 1985) seem to rather consistently fail to acquire the behaviour, 
even after demonstrations. A first possibility for the disparity between wild and captive data 
is that nut-cracking is indeed a CDT and requires the learner to imitate a conspecific 
demonstrator (Boesch, 1996). In this study we used human demonstrators, which may not 
have been considered ‘good’ enough models for the chimpanzees. Indeed, some research has 
shown that chimpanzees are more proficient social learners from conspecific models as 
compared to videos or human models (Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 2015). 
However, in contrast, others have instead claimed that it is possible for chimpanzees to 
“learn” nut-cracking from human demonstrators (see findings of Ross, Milstein, Calcutt, & 




Concurrently, other studies have found that, even with conspecific demonstrators, sometimes 
captive chimpanzees fail to acquire complex behaviours such as nut-cracking (Funk, 1985) or 
behaviours which strictly require imitation (Clay & Tennie, 2018; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 
2012; Tomasello et al., 1997). Although it might have been interesting to observe the 
chimpanzees’ reaction to a conspecific demonstrator in this study, we did not have the 
resources to train a chimpanzee to act as a demonstrator, but we encourage interested 
researchers who do have the resources to replicate this study, and include a conspecific 
demonstrator to observe whether this affects the findings presented here.  
 Behavioural flexibility  
An alternative explanation for the fact that nut-cracking did not emerge in this study is 
that the chimpanzees were hindered by their lack of behavioural flexibility, a commonly 
recorded phenomenon in chimpanzees (e.g., Harrison & Whiten, 2018). The chimpanzees in 
the current study seemed to become fixated on one solution to open the nuts: i.e., the use of 
their teeth. The chimpanzees may have relied on this technique due to their pre-existing 
knowledge on how to crack softer-shelled nuts (such as peanuts and walnuts), which they are 
often provided during their feeds at the testing institution. These nuts are easily cracked open 
by apes using teeth (DN; personal observation, keeper reports and see also Visalberghi et al., 
2008 for measurements on the required force for different types of nuts). The heuristic 
(Marsh, 2002) in this case may be that nuts (in general) can be opened with teeth – and 
indeed our macadamia nuts were no exception. Chimpanzees have been shown to be reluctant 
to display behavioural flexibility in abandoning a previously successful solution (see 




Völter, & Call, 2013). Thus, it is possible that the first individual to successfully crack a nut 
with the use of teeth (see Figure 7), facilitated this behaviour within the group and/or that 
other individuals independently converged on this method. Following this, the subjects were 
inhibited in their ability to innovate a new method, even if cracking the nuts with a tool 
would have been mechanistically easier/more efficient (this possibility is also in line with 
cultural founder effects; Tennie et al., 2009).  
 Sensitive learning period 
Based on the literature, the most likely explanation for the findings in this study is that 
the chimpanzees may have simply been outside of their sensitive learning period for nut-
cracking. Previous studies on nut-cracking in wild chimpanzees have reported that before 3.5 
years, juvenile chimpanzees are unable to express the full nut-cracking behavioural form 
(Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa, 1997; Matsuzawa, 1994). However, juvenile chimpanzees 
(as young as 1.5 years old) that had been exposed to the materials required for nut-cracking at 
various ages/developmental stages were able to perform the basic actions of the behaviour 
(put, hold, hit and eat), but not combine them in the required order to perform the full nut-
cracking behaviour (Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa, 1997). Indeed, recent research in wild 
chimpanzees shows an exponential increase in nut-cracking between 5 and 6 years of age, 
though the first signs were observed in 3-4-year-old individuals (Estienne et al., 2019) in line 
with the concept of maturation (Corp & Byrne, 2002). This finding suggests a certain level of 
developmental prowess required to express nut-cracking, perhaps somewhere between 




In addition to this lower age limit for the acquisition of nut-cracking, there also 
appears to be an upper limit (more relevant for the current study). A 13 year longitudinal 
study by Biro et al., (2003) found that wild chimpanzees who did not learn the basic nut-
cracking skills before five years old seemed unable to acquire the behaviour later on in 
adulthood (a similar case has been documented recently for stone tool-use in long-tailed 
macaques; Tan, 2017). The subjects tested in the current study were all outside of the 
hypothesised sensitive learning period for nut-cracking, as the youngest subject in our sample 
was already 10 years old at the time of testing. The youngest individual however was the only 
subject to display the “hold” behaviour (stage two of four) in the behavioural form of nut-
cracking. Our findings, coupled with those described here suggest that a sensitive learning 
period may be a decisive factor for whether a chimpanzee will start to crack nuts or not 
(leaving open the question how this is learned, i.e. whether it is a CDT or a latent solution).  
Given the fact that wild chimpanzees engage in an extended process of acquisition 
before expressing nut-cracking (Matsuzawa et al., 2008), we suggest that future work 
considers applying an even longer study time than the one employed here. It is possible that 
chimpanzees may then individually, or socially, learn the behaviour. The social learning 
opportunities that we present here were fewer compared to the wild; in wild populations that 
express the behaviour, individuals have more and longer (and perhaps also more varied) 
opportunities to observe nut- cracking. Equally, given the potential importance of a sensitive 
learning period in explaining the emergence patterns of chimpanzee nut-cracking (discussed 
in this section) we suggest that the next logical test of this behaviour should aim to test 




ages 3-7); either way, these individuals should once again be selected from populations that 
have not been observed previously to crack nuts.  
Though we used a within-subject design throughout our result-dependent design, we 
would reccomend that (wherever feasible) a between-subject design be used in future tests 
(one group for each of the conditions). By doing the latter, it is possible to control for and 
measure the time of exposure required for chimpanzees to express nut-cracking, and it would 
exclude potential carry-over effects. However, this project would likely be an overly large 
undertaking for any one research group, so therefore may be better suited to large scale 
colaborative projects (e.g., the ManyPrimates project).  
 Conclusions 
Although no chimpanzees in this study demonstrated nut-cracking using tools, two 
geographically separate populations in the wild have seemingly converged on the same 
method for cracking nuts using tools (West Africa; Whiten et al., 2001 and Cameroon; 
Morgan & Abwe, 2006). As these populations do not have access to each other, logically they 
must have independently reinnovated nut-cracking (Byrne, 2007). However, the data from 
Cameroon is based on procured nut cracking tools and auditory assumptions and so are an 
inference rather than direct observations. It is possible that these tools were actually from 
modern human nut-crackers and may not be considered evidence of chimpanzee nut-cracking 
in multiple populations. Thus, to date, there is only concrete evidence of one culturally 
independent wild population expressing nut-cracking. As the data from this study and wild 





In addition to the wild data and that presented here, one chimpanzee in an 
experimental study spontaneously reinnovated nut-cracking when provided with all the 
materials (Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). The individual (Mawa) acquired the nut-
cracking behaviour seemingly without requiring any copying variants of social learning 
(Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). However, Marshall-Pescini & Whiten (2008) fail to note 
the importance of these findings, by assuming, based on the speed of acquisition, that 
“Mawa” had prior experience of nut-cracking. It is worthy of note however that unlike this 
study and that of Funk (1985), no claim was made about the naivety of the subjects. Indeed, 
Mawa was kept as a pet prior to residing at the sanctuary where Marshall-Pescini and Whiten 
(2008) carried-out their study. Mawa arrived at the sanctuary when he was approx. three 
years old with wounds from a rope where he was tied up (Ferdowsian et al., 2011). As a result 
of this potential enculturation, or at the very least deprivation, these data should be treated 
with caution; indeed, the generalisability of such individuals to wild chimpanzees is 
questionable (Henrich & Tennie, 2017).  
 Excavations of chimpanzee nut-cracking sites suggest that the basic behavioural form 
has remained constant for at least 4,000 years, and likely even longer (Mercader et al., 2007). 
Similarly, excavations of capuchin nut-cracking sites have demonstrated that their nut-
cracking form has remained the same for 3,000 years, with only the tools (hammerstones) 
changing in shape over time (Falótico, Proffitt, Ottoni, Staff, & Haslam, 2019). Indeed, if the 
behavioural form of nut-cracking were being copied between individuals, we would expect to 
see some changes to its form over time due to copying error alone (see Eerkens & Lipo, 




cracking in chimpanzees (especially given the results of the current study, in which the 
chimpanzees did not acquire the behaviour even after full demonstrations were provided). We 
acknowledge that the chimpanzees in this study were captive and therefore are not subject to 
the same ecological pressures as their wild conspecifics; that is, they would have less 
‘necessity’ to reinnovate the behaviour (Fox, Sitompul & van Schaik, 1999). Therefore, (parts 
of) this study could perhaps be replicated in a wild sample, naïve to nut-cracking.   
Therefore, the results of this study do not support nut-cracking as the first evidence of 
a CDT in chimpanzees (see also Byrne, 2007), yet they also do not fully support nut-cracking 
as a latent solution in chimpanzees. Instead, we conclude that the behaviour may not have 
emerged here due to interplay of factors, including a certain level of behavioural 
conservatism and, crucially, the fact that all the subjects were already out of their sensitive 
learning periods for nut-cracking. We believe it is unlikely that our use of human 
demonstrators was the reason for the failure of all our subjects to express nut-cracking, given 
the results of previous studies, discussed above. Accordingly, we propose that future studies 
should adopt the methodology presented here, but test unenculturated infant/juvenile 
chimpanzees, naïve to nut-cracking and to opening nuts with their teeth, to remove the 
confounds of the sensitive learning periods and conservatism (ideally tested in isolation in 
order to increase effective sample size). Under these conditions, it is plausible that some 
naïve chimpanzees will reinnovate nut-cracking. Yet, on the other hand, given the extended 
trial-and-error learning process that young wild chimpanzees engage in (Matsuzawa et al., 




cracking may still fail to emerge spontaneously, although some of the pre-requisite steps to 
the behaviours may still develop.  
So far, the current state of knowledge does not support the view that nut-cracking has 
to be reliant on social learning as it has potentially been reinnovated in two culturally distinct 
populations, therefore, it seems unlikely that it is a CDT. However, it is also possible that 
even chimpanzees within their sensitive learning period would continue to fail to individually 
acquire the skills required to crack nuts and therefore could be considered a CDT. The data at 
hand suggest that the behavioural form of nut-cracking may only be acquired through an 
interplay of ecological and developmental factors, i.e., chimpanzees must be in a location 
with appropriate nuts and tool materials, during or before, their sensitive learning period. 
Therefore, it remains possible that nut-cracking is within the species level ZLS of 
chimpanzees. Despite this, not all individuals may realise this potential within their lifetime if 
they were not exposed to the required ecological conditions or individual prerequisites (note 
that these were termed by Tennie et al. (2009) as the “right” conditions that may be required). 
It is yet to be determined whether nut-cracking’s acquisition is best described as being due to, 
and requiring, social learning (culture-dependent) or is due to socially mediated reinnovation 
(latent solution). Further research should consider the importance of the ecological factors 
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It has been claimed that one of the most important social learning mechanisms 
fuelling cumulative culture is the ability to copy actions (imitation; Galef, 1992; Tennie, Call, 
& Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello, 1996). In other variants of social learning (with the exception 
of action-based teaching and direct moulding) the behavioural form shown by observers is 
instead essentially a reinvention of the wheel (Tennie et al. 2009) rather than a learned 
sequence of behaviours. 
Other variants of copying, in particular copying physical results in the environment 
(emulation), may lead to cumulative culture in the physical domain (Caldwell & Millen, 
2009; Reindl et al., 2017). Though, some argue that such approximations at cumulative 
culture are not all they seem, meaning that the comparatively simple approximations of 
culture, used in a laboratory setting, do not speak to the complexity of cumulative culture in 
reality (Miton & Charbonneau, 2018; Section 1.2.3.3.2). Regardless, action copying is 
necessary for many aspects of human cumulative culture; cultural practices that are largely, or 
entirely, based on actions, with little to no environmental results, such as dances, some 
rituals, and gestural language (Legare & Nielsen, 2015) could not occur or be maintained 
without action copying. As a consequence, it is difficult to over-emphasise the utility of 
action copying in explaining modern human behaviour.  
One way to tackle the question of the evolution of action copying is to look for 
evidence for this ability in our closest extant relatives, apes. The debate around this topic 
have been covered at length already in this thesis (see Section 1.2.1.2). In summary, it has 




Boesch, 1991; Byrne, 2007, 2009; Whiten, 2000; Whiten et al., 1999; Whiten, Horner, & 
Marshall-Pescini, 2003). However, this conclusion is not universally accepted. The ensuing 
debate is known as the “culture war” (Kendal, 2008; McGrew, 2002) and those sceptical 
about the existence of ape copying represent the other side of the debate (e.g., Clay & Tennie, 
2017; Galef, 1976; Tennie et al., 2009; Tomasello, 1996; Tomasello et al., 1993).  
While there are clear population differences in (some) ape behavioural repertoires, 
these differences may merely represent culture in a “minimal” sense; where action 
frequencies, but not the actual action forms, are under social learning control (Neadle, Allritz, 
& Tennie, 2017). This is because these behaviours are not reliant on social learning, 
particularly copying variants of social learning, and therefore should not be considered as 
CDTs (sensu Reindl et al., 2017). Until such a times as these behavioural variations are 
confirmed to be the product of copying variants of social learning, we cannot assume that 
apes are capable of copying in a way comparable to humans. In this sense, the presence of 
minimal culture cannot be seen to identify action copying abilities in a way that has 
previously been inferred in the ape culture literature (e.g., Whiten et al., 1999). Evidence of 
true action copying is necessary before connecting wild ape culture with action copying, i.e., 
succeeding in a task where other social learning variants are rendered useless. 
It is important to note that apes would need to demonstrate the ability to copy actions 
without the assistance of humans. While it is known that apes can copy actions (albeit in a 
crude manner) after intensive human training (Custance, Whiten, & Bard, 1995; Hayes & 
Hayes, 1952), it is also known that such training changes brain structures in the trained apes 




therefore, only data collected from untrained and unenculturated apes can be seen to have 
ecological relevance to questions concerning spontaneous or natural abilities (Henrich & 
Tennie, 2017).  
Thus far only three studies have tested directly for true spontaneous action copying in 
relatively unenculturated and untrained apes. Across these studies, a total of 69 apes have 
been tested, exclusively in Pan species: Tomasello et al. (1997b; Chimpanzee; n=20); Tennie 
et al. (2012; Chimpanzee; n=3); and Clay & Tennie (2017; Bonobo; n=46). The results of 
these studies showed no evidence of spontaneous action copying, outside of the apes’ existing 
behavioural repertoire.  
All contrasting claims for spontaneous action copying in apes are either anecdotal 
(e.g., Russon & Galdikas, 1993), from enculturated subjects (e.g., Call, 2001; Tomasello, 
Savage-Rumbaugh, & Kruger, 1993) or derived from confounded methodologies (such as 
“two-target” tasks, see Tennie et al., 2012 for detailed discussion of the methodological issues 
surrounding these). These tasks allow for the possibility of learning mechanisms other than 
action copying, in particular results copying (emulation; Whiten, Horner, Litchfield, & 
Marshall-Pescini, 2004). Indeed, apes have demonstrated some ability to solve these kinds of 
tasks in the complete absence of action information through so-called ghost conditions 
(Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 2008; but, see also Chapter 4). The results from 
confounded tasks can be dismissed when considering the question of true imitation, as it is 
not clear which social learning variants are driving the observed behaviours. Furthermore, 




apes but are of little use when informing the variants underlying ape culture in its natural 
state.  
Here, we used an unconfounded novel action copying task (previously used  in 
bonobos; Clay & Tennie, 2018) with an addition of applying social learning biases. The 
introduction of these biases was intended to provide the apes with the highest likelihood to 
show (hitherto perhaps unelicited) action copying. Towards this goal, we utilised the power of 
various social learning biases which have been found to be present in apes (see Laland, 2004 
for an overview). It was unclear which of the social learning biases would be most applicable 
to this task. Therefore, this study applied several social learning biases at once in order to 
maximise the likelihood that one or more such biases would elicit the elusive phenomenon of 
spontaneous action copying in apes. Furthermore, for the first time, we tested all four species 
of non-human ape in a single study. 
Social learning biases have been argued to be the mechanisms by which species 
capable of socially learning, ‘attempt’ to avoid learning maladaptive behaviours or traits 
(Laland, 2004). That is, these ‘biases’ may select for behaviours that are likely to benefit the 
individual learner; such a mechanism would be responsible for avoiding the phenomenon of 
so-called ‘blind’ imitation/mimicry , which could be potentially costly for an individual 
(Tomasello, 1998a). Laland (2004) provided one of the most complete reviews of the social 
learning bias literature to date, he divides biases (which he refers to as strategies) into “when” 
and “who”; the former influencing at what point the learner will socially learn and the latter 




Here, we utilised some of the social learning biases also used in previous action 
copying tests in Pan species (Clay & Tennie, 2018; Tennie et al., 2012; Tomasello et al., 
1997). Observers may copy actions because the goal of an action is unclear, that is, the 
behaviour is opaque (Csibra & Gergely, 2009), relating directly to the social learning bias 
described by Laland (2004) of copy-when-uncertain. Specifically, in our study, the actions 
performed during the demonstrations appeared functional in opening our puzzle-box. 
However, owing to the design of the box these behaviours were unsuccessful in subjects, 
therefore were causally opaque to observers (to copy these would be known as over-
imitation; e.g., Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007). In addition, we also applied “copy when 
established behaviour is unproductive” (as the puzzle-box would not open), “copy when 
uncertain” (as the box was new to the apes), “copy successful individuals” (as demonstrators 
had reliable success with the demonstrated actions), “copy if better” (as the typical ape 
approach would fail), “copy if dissatisfied” (as the apes were motivated to get to the bait; see 
Laland, 2004 for a review of these social learning biases) . These were also applicable to the 
other tests of true action copying (Clay & Tennie, 2018; Tennie et al., 2012; Tomasello et al., 
1997).  
In addition to the social learning biases that applied to previous studies, our study 
added two previously unapplied social learning biases to test. The first was a ‘sex-bias’ 
(Coussi-Korbel & Fragaszy, 1995); across the two prior tests of true action copying in 
chimpanzees, both sexes were used as demonstrators (a male in Tennie et al., 2012;  two 
females in Tomasello et al., 1997). However, our study is was the first of the true action 




demonstrators of both sexes to preserve the majority influence in terms of sex. This meant, no 
matter the sex of the (single-tested) subject, the demonstrator’s sex was always a majority, 
covering both potential ‘sex-biases’ (Laland, 2004) in a single study. All of our demonstrators 
identified as ‘cisgender’, meaning that their gender matched their sex at birth, thus excluding 
this potential confound.  
The second bias we applied was ‘copy the majority’ (Laland, 2004). Ours is the first 
true action copying study in apes to use this bias. The majority bias can be subdivided into 
‘copy the demonstrator majority’ and ‘copy the behavioural majority’ (Morgan, Acerbi, & 
van Leeuwen, 2019). ‘Majority influence’ can be considered an umbrella term for various 
social learning biases. The first of these is ‘conformity, where a previously adopted behaviour 
is abandoned in favour of that displayed by the majority (Asch, 1956). A similar phenomenon 
is ‘conformist transmission’, where observers copy a majority of individuals if they do not 
have any preconceived behavioural solution at time of demonstration (Watson, Lambeth, 
Schapiro, & Whiten, 2018).  
Evidence of conformity has been reported in various species, e.g., fruit flies (Danchin 
et al., 2018), sticklebacks (Pike & Laland, 2010) and great tits (Aplin et al., 2015). Of special 
importance here is that these claims extend to primates, namely vervet monkeys (E. van de 
Waal, Borgeaud, & Whiten, 2013), and especially chimpanzees (Luncz & Boesch, 2014; 
Luncz et al., 2012). Given the apparent prevalence of majority influence in the animal 
kingdom and its apparent effect on the social learning in so many species, we supposed that 
the introduction of this social learning bias might elicit novel action copying in apes. In the 




influence; later conditions were planned to tease apart which aspect of majority influence 
facilitated action copying (but these did not occur as action copying was never identified).  
Majority influence can be further divided into two forms: behavioural majority or 
demonstrator majority. The demonstrator majority is the number of demonstrators in relation 
to the number of observers. In order to produce this bias, we used a ratio of 4:1 
(demonstrator: observer) during demonstrations, based on the findings of previous studies 
(Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2014). All demonstrators remained present throughout the trial 
to attempt to present ‘normative pressure’ (Hoehl et al., 2019) in copying the demonstrated 
actions. Normative pressure is the social influence that a demonstrator can have on a learner 
through simply their continued presence; i.e., the pressure of something akin to expectation 
that might be felt by a learner, having just observed a demonstration, to copy said 
demonstration. We also applied the behavioural majority bias in terms of frequency of 
demonstrated actions (sensu Morgan, Acerbi, & van Leeuwen, 2019) by ensuring that the 
demonstrations were carried-out multiple times prior to subjects being given access to their 
box; meaning, the most common action was that which we demonstrated. 
In the non-human literature, there is convincing evidence both from theoretical 
models (Kendal, Giraldeau, & Laland, 2009) and controlled tests in captive populations 
(Kendal et al., 2015) that social learning biases are not restricted to humans. We considered, 
by implementing several social learning biases at once and testing ape species not tested 
previously in true action copying studies, that action copying may be finally elicited 
spontaneously in apes. Such a finding would constitute the first recorded case of spontaneous 




this would provide strong evidence that their respective species’ wild-type cultures may 
indeed be based on action copying. If most, or all, apes of one or all species failed to copy 
actions in our setup, this would indicate that their respective wild ape culture(s) is/are 
unlikely to be based on action copying. 
 Method 
No major methodological deviations from our registered plan (Neadle, Chappell, 
Clay, & Tennie, 2018; Appendix B) were required. Our registered study was designed to 
follow a result-dependent design: the methods included a decision tree, such that the 
particular protocol implemented depended on whether or not evidence of action copying was 
identified (and when). No such evidence was found, therefore only the first of the 
preregistered conditions (i.e., “Conformist Transmission” at the top of Figure 5.1) needed to 
be implemented. All other conditions, as they would have been carried-out, are described in 





Figure 5.1. Taken from Registration. Green arrows represent successful display of the behaviour at that stage, 
and red arrows represent failure to display the behaviour. Note that at each stage the additional subjects are 
still naïve to the behaviour. The pathway through the decision tree that allows for each condition to be 
implemented is displayed in bold. See below for coding. 
 
 Design 
As a part of the result-dependent design, the duration of trials was directly influenced 
by the performance of the subjects in the task. In our study, apes were exposed to 
demonstrators performing causally irrelevant actions before opening a ‘puzzle-box’. 
Demonstrators provisioned the subjects with the reward that was kept in the box. Subjects 
were provided with their version of the box (test box) which was designed to look identical to 
the demonstrator’s box, but in fact, could not be opened. Subjects were observed and 
recorded for a maximum of 5 minutes whilst they interacted with their box. If subjects 
relinquished contact with their box 30 seconds before three, four or five minutes had passed 
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Figure 5.2. Taken from Registration. Decision tree for each stage of testing, green arrows relate to testing 
continuing, red arrows relate to testing ceasing. 
Owing to the result-dependent design of this study participants would only have been 
subjected to the later conditions (see registration; Neadle et al., 2018) if evidence of action 
copying was identified (which did not happen). This decision was made to maximise sample 
sizes, whilst retaining even sample sizes across conditions. 
 Subjects  
Subjects (N=33) were housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center 
(WKPRC), Leipzig, Germany (as part of the Max Plank Institute for Evolutionary 
Anthropology, also in Leipzig). All species at the WKPRC were tested between 11th June and 
9th July 2018; ages correct at time of testing (see Table 5.1 for full details): bonobos (n=6; 




SDage=12.26), western lowland gorillas (n=2; 1:1; Mage=16.5; SDage=3.54) and Sumatran 
orangutans (Pongo abelii; n=6; 2:4; Mage=23.16; SDage=10.65).  
Coupled with this large and varied sample, these populations were chosen as the apes 
had previously been reported as able to copy in the kind of emulation-confounded tasks (two-
target tasks; Tennie, Greve, Gretscher, & Call, 2010), which are frequently claimed to show 
imitation skills. This allowed us to directly test for ‘pure’ action copying in a population that 
have previously been claimed to copy actions, through confounded tasks. Participation in our 
study was voluntary: animal doors were opened; the subjects were called by caretakers to 
enter and either they entered or not (and those who entered were released as soon as they 
showed signs of stress). One orangutan "Dokana" was deemed too unwell to participate in 
one trial, however, recovered sufficiently for the remaining two; another orangutan refused to 
enter the testing room in one of the trials. Owing to exhibiting signs of distress, the trials of 
two gorillas, “Kumili” and “Diara”, were terminated and as a result, no data could be 
collected on these two individuals. One bonobo, “Lexi”, gave birth during the study period. 
As a result, she was excluded from testing for a week following the birth and therefore was 
not present during one of her three trials. Also, one bonobo "Jasongo" was never tested as 




Table 5.1. Demographic details and rearing histories of the subjects in this study. 
Name Species Sex Date of birth Place of birth Breeding 
Bambari Pan troglodytes hybrid F 08/12/2000 Ostrava, CZ Parent 
Corrie Pan troglodytes verus F 12/12/1976 Rijswijk, NL Hand Reared 
Dorien Pan troglodytes verus F 22/10/1980 Rijswijk, NL Hand Reared 
Fraukje Pan troglodytes verus F 06/04/1976 Rijswijk, NL Hand Reared 
Frodo Pan troglodytes verus M 28/11/1993 Rijswijk, NL Parent 
Kisha Pan troglodytes verus F 04/03/2004 Osnabrück, DE Parent 
Lobo Pan troglodytes verus M 21/04/2004 Leipzig, DE Parent 
Lome Pan troglodytes verus M 11/08/2001 Leipzig, DE Parent 
Natascha Pan troglodytes verus F 28/03/1980 Rijswijk, NL Hand Reared 
Riet Pan troglodytes hybrid F 11/11/1977 Rijswijk, NL Hand Reared 
Robert Pan troglodytes verus M 01/12/1975 Rijswijk, NL Hand Reared 
Sandra Pan troglodytes verus F 09/06/1993 Rijswijk, NL Parent 
Swela Pan troglodytes verus F 19/10/1995 Basel, CH Parent 
Tai Pan troglodytes hybrid F 12/08/2002 Leipzig, DE Parent 
Alex Pan troglodytes  M 10/03/2001 Plaisance, FR Hand Reared 
Daza Pan troglodytes verus F 1986 Unknown Unknown 
Frederike Pan troglodytes hybrid F 1974 Unknown Unknown 
Hope Pan troglodytes hybrid F 14/12/1990 Jerusalem, IL Parent 
Jeudi Pan troglodytes hybrid F 1966 Unknown Unknown 
Gemena Pan paniscus F 07/11/2005 Twycross, GB Parent 
Joey Pan paniscus M 13/12/1982 Antwerp, BE Hand Reared 
Kuno Pan paniscus M 26/11/1996 Wilhelma, DE Hand Reared 
Lexi Pan paniscus F 13/09/1999 Jacksonville, FL Hand Reared 
Luiza Pan paniscus F 27/01/2005 Leipzig, DE Parent 
Yasa Pan paniscus F 27/08/1997 Twycross, GB Parent 
Bimbo Pongo abelii M 20/09/1980 Duisburg, DE Hand Reared 
Dokana Pongo abelii F 31/01/1989 Dresden, DE Parent 
Padana Pongo abelii F 18/11/1997 Leipzig, DE Parent 
Pini Pongo abelii F 30/06/1988 Leipzig, DE Parent 
Raja Pongo abelii F 26/09/2003 Leipzig, DE Parent 
Suaq Pongo abelii M 14/05/2009 Leipzig, DE Parent 
Abeeku Gorilla gorilla M 05/05/1999 Rotterdam, NL Parent 





Three trials were attempted with each subject, though due to the voluntary nature of 
this study, sometimes fewer trials were attained as apes refused to participate or were 
excluded for medical/husbandry reasons. Subjects were called into the testing rooms as often 
as possible during the period of the study, however, certain subjects did not choose to 
participate in all three trials (see above). The data for these individuals were omitted from 
subsequent analyses.  Multiple trials were carried out to allow subjects to recall knowledge of 
how to solve the task from previous demonstrations. 
Subjects were tested individually in most cases; where possible, except for mothers 
with dependent offspring and any individuals that were uncomfortable being individually 
separated. Cases where individual separation was not possible were noted, had these apes 
shown evidence of action copying, the data set would have been analysed both with and 
without these cases (but, given the null results, no analysis of copying attempts was not 
necessary). 
Individual separation ensured an effective demonstrator majority to maximise the 
effect of majority influence (in 25 subjects out of 33 this was achieved at least in one trial). 
An effective majority is 3:1 (Bond & Smith, 1996; Haun, Leeuwen, & Edelson, 2013), and 
here we used a 4:1 ratio to also include potential effects of demonstrator sex majority. When 
subjects were tested in dyads an overall ratio of 2:1 was the maximum that could be achieved.  
 Stimuli  
Our study used a ‘puzzle-box’ that shared the same design as previously used in an 
action copying study with bonobos and human children (Figure 5.3). We used two variants of 






Figure 5.3. Photographs of puzzle-box. Left panel contains demonstrator’s box (‘demonstration box’), opened 
to reveal hidden compartment, right panel contains subject’s box (‘test box’), showing the apparent divide 
between the two “halves” of the box, note that this box could not be opened as the divide was simply a line 
scored into the wood.  
To remain consistent with the previous study, the ‘demonstration box’ was made from 
a piece of wood, cut in half, with a small depression cut into the centre of both halves (see 
Figure 5.3). This ‘demonstration box’ was only used by the demonstrators (humans) and was 
never provided to any of the subjects.   
The ‘test box’, provided to the subjects, looked identical to the demonstration box but 
could not be opened, as it only featured horizontally scored lines in place of a true opening 
(see Figure 5.3). The logic behind the test box was that, as the subject would attempt, and 
fail, to open the box directly, by attempting to pull the two halves apart, they should then fall 
back on (copy) the observed actions, helped by the social learning biases we applied.  
 Demonstrations 
Before testing, all human demonstrators were trained on the following procedure to 
ensure consistency across demonstrators; training lasted for approximately 1 hour. Before this 




meaning the demonstrator could watch the video as many times as possible to match the 
actions of DN. Demonstrators were required to copy both the form and speed of the actions, 
using DN’s as a template, which was modelled after the demonstrated actions from Clay and 
Tennie (2018). ZC instructed and commented on the training videos before them being 
provided to demonstrators. DN and CT observed each demonstrator’s performance in person 
before the start of testing, to confirm that their demonstrations were proficient. The 
demonstrator’s production of actions was assessed continually throughout the study, had 
discrepancies occurred additional training would have been provided.   
All demonstrators (N=2 male; N = 2 females) were human adults between the ages of 
23 - 30, none of whom were zoo staff. To reduce possible order effects, subjects were 
randomly allocated to each possible iteration of demonstrator order (see Figure 5.4 and 
Section 5.2.4). The same demonstrators were used throughout the study, and demonstrators 
remained in the room with subjects throughout each trial to attempt to maintain the majority 
influence/normative pressure throughout the course of the trial (similar to Haun et al., 2014). 






Figure 5.4. Table used to define the order of demonstrators before each trial, this was done using a random 
number generator app 
 Target actions to copy 
Similar to Clay & Tennie (2017), demonstrators performed two actions either on, or 
next to, the demonstration box (depending on the action). They did so whilst standing in the 
keeper/researcher side of the subjects’ management area. Demonstrations were visible to the 
subjects through plexiglass and metal mesh. Both actions were preceded by demonstrators 
extending their arms forwards away from their bodies at a roughly 90 angle, whilst holding 




For the ‘Rub’ action, the demonstrator rubbed the back of the right hand in a 
consistent, but slow, circular, clockwise, motion across the top of the demonstrator box, in 
contact with the box, four times (1 second per rotation, 4 seconds total). For the ‘Rotate’ 
action, the demonstrator raised the right hand and rotated it, at the wrist, in a clockwise 
motion – not in contact with the demonstrator box, four times (1 second per rotation, 4 
seconds total). The demonstrator then opened the demonstrator box, showed the contents of 
the box (a grape) to the subject and gave the grape to the subject2.  
 Procedure 
Demonstrators stood in a line, facing the enclosure, out of reach of the subjects (see 
Figure 5.5). Once all demonstrators moved into the testing room and cameras were turned on, 
the demonstration phase of the trial began. Movement of demonstrators before trials 
represents a minor deviation from the registration, as, in the methods registered, they were 
due to be present in the testing room before the subject entering. However, during the first 
trials, it became evident that keepers would sometimes need to be undisturbed when calling 
subjects into the testing room, therefore, in the interest of standardisation this procedure was 
implemented throughout the study; even when not required. 
Subjects had the opportunity to observe at least eight full demonstrations of the 
actions: one per demonstrator (one by one), followed by a simultaneous additional 
demonstration by each of the four demonstrators. Each subject was given up to five 
                                                 




demonstrations of the Rub-Rotate action by each demonstrator and the test box was rebaited 
after each. If the subject did not see at least one iteration of each action (i.e., Rub or Rotate) 
during any demonstration, up to four repeats were given until the subject had either seen both 
Rub and Rotate or five attempts were given by that demonstrator. As a result, as many as 20 
repeats could have occurred for a subject that never attended to the demonstrations (i.e., an 
initial four and 16 repeat demonstrations).  
 
Figure 5.5. Pictorial representation of experimental set up, subjects were unable to observe demonstrators 
using the re-baiting station due to the occlusion screen, the subject’s test box was retrieved from behind the 
occlusion screen as though the demonstration box was being rebaited again. Chimpanzee image by Jose R. 
Cabello from Pixabay and is permitted for use under the “Pixabay licence” agreement.  
Demonstrators performed the actions individually following a predefined, randomly 
selected, order (see Figure 5.4). A random number between 1 and 24 was generated before 
each trial, these numbers related to the pre-defined demonstrator order in Figure 5.4 and 
dictated demonstration order (i.e., the order of A, B, C and D in Figure 5.5). 
Once each demonstrator had individually demonstrated the actions, and these had 
been sufficiently witnessed by the subject, all four demonstrators additionally performed a 




Several measures were put in place to ensure that subjects witnessed the 
demonstrations and that the demonstrators could confirm that the subject had seen the 
demonstration. First, demonstrators faced subjects throughout. Second, each demonstrator 
wore a GoPro Hero Session 5 camera, mounted to their chest. This was used to allow us to 
later verify that the subject was attending to the demonstrator before performing the actions. 
We defined attending as having looked at the box or demonstrator for one second or more. 
Third, all demonstrators were permitted to call the subject’s name to gain their attention as 
often as required before and throughout the demonstration. Once the subject was attending 
(defined as head oriented towards the demonstrator), a demonstration began.   
After observing the subject during the demonstration, all demonstrators reported out 
loud (yes/no for each action, in demonstrator order) whether the subject observed none, part 
of or the whole demonstration. Thus, a subject having seen only one action would be called 
yes/no or no/yes, both would be yes/yes and none no/no. If less than three of the 
demonstrators replied with a yes to either of the actions the respective demonstrator repeated 
their demonstration (up to a maximum of five times; see above). The next demonstrator 
followed the same procedure, and so on until the subject clearly had observed the full 
demonstration of both actions at least four times (across all demonstrators). The number of 
repeat trials required to attain agreement was recorded after the study was completed, by 
reviewing the video footage. It became apparent, upon viewing video footage, that it was 
difficult to reliably code the percentage of the demonstrations observed, as subjects were 
regularly out of line-of-sight of the camera. A more attentive subject, i.e., one that observed 




number of repeat trials needed before an agreement was reached was used as a proxy for 
attention, where higher numbers of repeat trials indicate less attentiveness to the 
demonstrations.   
Each subject was then tested. The final demonstrator then took the demo box behind 
the occlusion screen and swapped it for the test box whilst behind the screen. The subject was 
given the test box by the demonstrator, who placed it into a ‘food chute’ that allowed items to 
be passed between researchers and apes without physical contact. Once the subject was 
allowed access to the box, they had a maximum of five minutes to copy the actions 
demonstrated (Figure 5.2). All trials were video-recorded using two cameras (Panasonic HC-
V777) mounted on tripods at either end of the line of demonstrators, in addition to the 
demonstrator-mounted GoPro cameras.  
 Behavioural Coding & Analysis 
Behaviours were live coded and to ensure reliability, after each trial, each 
demonstrator independently wrote down whether they considered any of the subject’s actions 
during the trial to constitute action copying (i.e., whether these actions, in their opinion, were 
similar to the demonstrated action; see Table 5.2). The paper on which the live coders 
independently wrote their decision was then folded in half and placed into a container. These 
verdicts were counted by DN, after the trial. A positive case of copying would have been 
recorded if more than half (i.e., 3 or 4) of the demonstrators had considered that the subject 
had copied at least one of the demonstrated actions. Demonstrators were instructed to note 
any approximation at action copying (see Table 5.2 and Neadle et al., 2018). For example, 




attempting a Rotate action would be considered as having copied the Rub action for the result 
dependent design (see Figure 5.1). These approximations would have been further analysed 
post hoc. 
Table 5.2. Description of behaviours as provided to demonstrators several days before the first trial, after 
demonstrators had received training on the actions from DN. These instructions were later reiterated, 
immediately before the first testing session. 
Behaviour Description 
Rub The subject places the back of their hand (either hand), on top of 
(or close above) the box and rubs it in a circular motion 
(regardless of direction). 
Rotate The subject raises their hand (either hand) and rotates it – for a 
minimum of 180˚ at the wrist (regardless of direction). 
Rub-Rotate The subjects performs the “Rub” behaviour, and this is followed 
by the “Rotate” behaviour 
Rotate-Rub The subjects performs the “Rotate” behaviour, and this is 
followed by the “Rub” behaviour 
No relevant behaviour The subject performs none of the actions described here 
 
Furthermore, we analysed the attention paid to demonstrations. To do so, we 
used the number of demonstrations required as a proxy for attention to the demonstrations, 
where a higher number of repeats indicates a less attentive subject. We used a one-way 
ANOVA to compare differences in attention across species and rearing history, and a Mann 
Whitney Wilcoxon (also termed Mann Whitney-U) test was used to compare sex.   
Using video analysis, we calculated the mean time an individual spent interacting 
with the test box, which we used as a proxy for motivation to engage with the test box. As 
each subject had either a three, four or five-minute trial (see Figure 5.2); the total number of 
seconds that the subject was in contact with the test box was divided by the total trial time (in 




being percentages, between 0% and 100% so a logarithmic transformation was used to make 
the data appropriate for use using a GLM. We used Welch’s correction for a one-way ANOVA 
for data which failed to meet the assumption of homogeneity of variance (Moder, 2007, 
2010) to compare motivation across species and rearing history. A Mann Whitney Wilcoxon 
test was again used to compare differences in motivation across sexes. 
All analyses and data-based figures were produced in R (version 3.4.3; R Core Team, 
2013) and R-Studio (version 1.1.423; RStudio Team, 2016). During the analyses/visual 
representation of the results the following packages were utilised: ggplot2 (version 3.1.0), 
ggpubr (version 0.2.0), psych (version 1.8.10), car (version 3.0-2), cowplot (version 0.9.3), 
multicomp (version 1.4-8), ggsignif (version 0.4.0), pastecs (version 1.3.21) Additional 
analyses (see Neadle et al., 2018 registration) were not performed given the null findings 
(again, our method, including our analysis, was preregistered and designed to be result-
dependent). Data were transformed for analyses and then un-transformed for graphical 
representation. 
 Interrater reliability 
Interrater reliability for subjects’ attentiveness to the demonstration was assessed 
during trials. In the case that even a single potential instance of action copying was identified 
during live coding, a naïve second coder would have been required for post hoc coding from 
a naïve coder. However, as no cases of action copying were observed, a second coder was not 
required. There were always four independent witnesses to any given event. As a result, a 
four-way instantaneous interrater reliability was possible, using the paper on which 




Demonstrators did not communicate during the trials and, immediately after the trial, 
completed a coding sheet determining whether or not a behaviour from the predefined 
ethogram had occurred. As there were no cases in which one of the demonstrators suggested 
that any action had been approximated at by any of the tested apes, there was no need for 
further interrater reliability checks, and so none were performed.  
 Ethics 
Per ethical recommendations, all subjects were housed in semi-natural indoor and 
outdoor enclosures containing climbing structures, such as ropes and platforms; and natural 
features, such as vegetation, trees and streams. They received their regularly scheduled 
feedings, primarily consisting of vegetables, had access to enrichment devices including 
shaking boxes and poking bins, and water ad-lib. Subjects were never food or water-deprived 
for this study. All research was conducted in the subjects sleeping rooms. 
The study was ethically approved by an internal committee of the Max Planck 
Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology (director, research coordinator), the Leipzig zoo 
(head keeper, curator, vet) and the University of Birmingham AWERB committee (reference 
no. UOB 31213). No medical, toxicological or neurobiological research of any kind is 
conducted at the WKPRC. The research was non-invasive and strictly adhered to the legal 
requirements of Germany. Animal husbandry and research comply with the "EAZA 
Minimum Standards for the Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria", the 
"WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquariums" 




the Association for the Study of Animal Behavior (ASAB). Institutional Animal Care and Use 
Committee approval was not necessary to conduct this research. 
 
 Results 
We did not find any evidence of action copying or any approximations of action 
copying in any of the apes tested in this study (total N= 33). This finding is reliable, as it was 
confirmed using our four-way independent live coding system (see above). This result held 
even for hand-reared individuals.  
An analysis of the attention paid to demonstrations revealed a substantial degree of 
variation between subjects; with a range = 0 – 14 repeats. An average of 4 repeat 
demonstrations were required across all subjects, 20% of the possible repeats, indicating good 
attention. There were no significant species differences in number of demonstrations required 
(Mbonobo = 6.56, SDbonobo = 4.59, Mchimpanzee = 5.06, SDchimpanzee = 3.44, Mgorilla = 3.17, SDgorilla = 
3.06, Morangutan = 3.38, SDorangutan = 4.30; F(1, 92) = 1.20, p =.28); each species contained 
individual(s) that required no repeat demonstrations for at least one of their trials (Nbonobo = 2, 
Nchimpanzee = 4, Ngorilla = 1, Norangutan = 3). There were also no significant differences in 
attentiveness as a function of rearing history (Mhand = 5.27, SDhand = 3.82, Mparent = 4.60, 
SDparent = 4.04, Munknown = 5.89, SDunknown = 3.41; F(2, 91) = 0.58, p =.57)  or sex (Mmale = 






Figure 5.6. Box plots depicting the data used in the attention paid to demonstrators’ analyses. Number of repeat 
demonstrations required as a function of A) Species B) Rearing History C) Sex. Central bar represents median 
value, upper and lower hinges correspond to 75th and 25th percentiles, upper and lower whiskers extend to 
largest or smallest value (no further than 1.5 times the Inter Quartile Range (IQR) from the hinge, data beyond 
1.5 times IQR are displayed as  and plotted individually. 
Subjects varied substantially in their motivation, with a range = 0 – 100%, i.e. in some 
trials subjects never retrieved the box and in other trials they maintained contact with the box 
until the trial was ended by the experimenters. Across all species, subjects spent 40% of trials 
interacting with the box. Species differed in the time spent interacting with the test box (F(3, 
16.64) = 9.36, p<.001, Ω2 = 0.25). Gorillas (M=2.37, SD=0.86) and chimpanzees (M=3.32, 
SD=0.95) showed the lowest mean interaction followed by orangutans (M=4.01, SD=0.58) 
and bonobos (M=4.19, SD=0.67) see Figure 5.7. In addition, each species, with the exception 
of gorillas, had individual(s) that maintained contact with the box until the trial was ended by 















































































































analyses showed no significant variation in the percentage of interaction time between 
subjects of different rearing histories (Mhand = 3.68, SDhand = 1.25, Mparent = 3.57, SDparent = 
0.85, Munknown = 3.46, SDunknown = 0.99; F(2, 12.02) = 0.09, p =.91) or sexes (Mmale = 3.86, 
SDmale = 0.88, Mfemale = 3.47, SDfemale = 0.97; W=442.5, p =.07).  
 
Figure 5.7. Bar charts depicting the data used in the percentage of trial interaction (“motivation to engage”) 
analyses outlined above, these data are untransformed. Percentage of trial interaction as a function of A) 
Species B) Rearing History C) Sex. Error bars indicate ± 1 SE of the mean. Note, “*” indicates p<.05, “**” 
indicates p<.01 and “***” indicates p<.001. 
 Discussion 
This chapter has presented the results of, to the best of our knowledge, the most 
comprehensive study of spontaneous ape copying to date. Despite testing four species of apes 
and applying a wide variety of social learning biases, in particular majority influence and sex-










































































































copied any of the novel actions. The observed absence of action copying was unlikely due to 
a lack of attentiveness or motivation, as demonstrated by the results of the attention and 
motivation checks. Our conclusion, based on the evidence to date, is that unenculturated apes 
do not spontaneously copy novel actions. 
Not only was ours the most comprehensive study ever performed to test for 
spontaneous action copying in apes (testing four species), but to our knowledge, ours is also 
the first ape action copying study that enlisted a majority influence bias (see van Leeuwen, 
Kendal, Tennie, & Haun, 2015 and Watson et al., 2018 for discussion of terminology) whilst 
also enlisting both demonstrator based sex-biases in a single study. As only the first condition 
in our result dependent design was completed, as per our registration, we only tested the 
conformist transmission aspect of majority influence.  
Despite an apparent motivation to interact with the puzzle-box, no ape spontaneously 
copied any of the demonstrated actions. Due to the new, and fuller array of social learning 
biases that were enlisted in our test (Section 5.1) it is unlikely that we missed the elusive 
‘key’ social learning bias which would finally ‘unlock’ spontaneous action copying in apes. 
However, as in any negative result, the theoretical possibility remains that certain biases or 
other variables we did not include could have produced positive findings.  
The results presented here strongly suggest that two-target tasks do not test for action 
copying but rather emulative copying. Some of the apes tested in this study have previously 
been shown to copy in two-target tasks (Tennie, Greve, et al., 2010); however, when the 
possibility for emulative learning is removed, and only pure action copying leads to success, 




the findings of the three previous pure action copying studies which also found that 
unenculturated apes do not spontaneously copy such actions (Clay & Tennie, 2018; Tennie et 
al., 2012; Tomasello et al., 1997). For the first time, results of true action copying, in 
unenculturated individuals, can extend outside of the Pan genus. Meanwhile, we have shown 
that previous, negative, results of ape action copying were not due to a lack of 
testing/demonstrator majority or sex-based social learning biases. 
It may be argued that these null results were due to using human instead of 
conspecific demonstrators. However, while human demonstrations may be argued to be less 
effective overall than conspecific demonstrations (Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Whiten, 
2015), the overwhelming pattern in previous studies is that human demonstrators are attended 
to and that this translates into social learning (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Whiten, 1998). The 
difference here is therefore simply that the demonstrations were of a type that apes simply 
cannot or do not spontaneously copy. Furthermore, our results are consistent with other tests 
of true action copying even when conspecific demonstrators were used (Tennie et al., 2012; 
Tomasello et al., 1997). Therefore, human demonstrators can be considered a time-effective 
and valid way to test claims for social learning abilities in apes. Our entirely negative results, 
in all four species of apes (N=33), are therefore very unlikely to be the result of using human, 
rather than ape demonstrators, but instead, show a lack of spontaneous action copying in 
apes. 
The demonstrated actions here were novel, i.e., not in the usual behavioural repertoire 
of any of the tested ape species (Clay & Tennie, 2018). Any species capable of action-based 




Reindl et al., 2016; Tomasello, 1999a) must be able to copy such actions. Indeed, humans 
have been shown to copy novel actions in similar conditions (Clay, Over, & Tennie, 2018; 
Clay & Tennie, 2018). It could be argued that the actions we used were too abstract or 
artificial for apes. Even if this claim were accurate it would further substantiate a difference 
between human and animal action copying and resultant cultures (Tomasello, Kruger, et al., 
1993); humans can and do learn from seemingly arbitrary actions.  
However, research has shown that, when unsure of the causality of an action, apes 
will copy arbitrary behaviours (Horner & Whiten, 2005); however, Horner and Whiten lacked 
the necessary controls to ensure that only imitation could be applied. This said, it is important 
to consider, when apes understand which aspects of a behaviour are irrelevant they do not to 
copy these steps (Horner & Whiten, 2005). Our results should be caveated by the fact that it 
is possible that out subjects understood that the demonstrated actions had no causal utility and 
therefore failed to copy them. This represents an important limitation of using an over-
imitation paradigm to test for imitation alone. 
Overall, it can be concluded that unenculturated, and by extension wild, apes are 
unlikely to copy actions. In turn, the idea that wild ape cultures are based on action copying 
should be reconsidered. Indeed, the results of this study are not at odds with what we 
currently know about wild ape behaviour. In wild populations, there is no evidence that any 
part of the ape behavioural repertoires requires action copying for social or technical reasons. 
This claim is affirmed by captive data that documents the spontaneous reappearance of 




Tennie, 2017; Byrne et al., 2017; Motes-Rodrigo et al., 2019; Neadle et al., 2017; Tennie, 
Hedwig, Call, & Tomasello, 2008; Sections 2 and 3).  
Based on the data presented here, the hypothesis that wild ape culture is dependent on 
action copying (e.g., Horner et al., 2006; Whiten et al., 1996, 1999) should be reconsidered; 
along with the notion that the last common ancestor of apes and humans copied actions. 
Given this, it is an open question when (and also why) action copying evolved in our lineage 





 OBJECT MANIPULATION IN BONOBOS: A CASE FOR THE 
IMPORTANCE OF ECOLOGY IN EXPLAINING BEHAVIOURAL PHENOTYPE 
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Conceptualization: DN, ZC 
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Bonobos have been described as ‘particularly poor’ in terms of tool use (Gruber et al., 
2010), it has also been suggested that bonobos might be intrinsically less motivated to 
manipulate objects than chimpanzees (Koops et al., 2015). In spite of these suggested 
differences, captive studies reliably report that captive bonobos are competent tool users 
(Gruber et al., 2010 citing Gold, 2002; Jordan, 1982; Toth, Schick, Savage-Rumbaugh, 
Sevcik, & Rumbaugh, 1993). It is yet unclear as to the exact factors influencing this disparity 
between wild and captive conspecifics. 
The obvious differences between captive and wild subjects are their environmental 
surroundings, social settings and their possible degree of enculturation (Tomasello, Kruger, et 
al., 1993). Some or all of these factors, in combination, lead to what has been described as a 
“captivity effect” (Forss, Schuppli, Haiden, Zweifel, & van Schaik, 2015). This captivity 
effect describes the contrast in the behaviours of wild and captive apes highlighting possible 
effects of reduced neophobia, increased neophilia, and less predation/selection pressures and 
risk in captivity (Forss et al., 2015). This effect is supported by findings in orangutans, which 
show that exploration times between captive and wild subjects are largely equal once wild 
subjects overcome their neophobia. Encounters with novel objects in captivity are almost 
exclusively positive and novel objects are usually “food or playthings” (Forss et al., 2015, p. 
10), thus reducing perceptions of risk, this is potentially not so in wild conspecifics. 
Furthermore, the opportunity to observe human models interacting with anthropomorphic 
artefacts may increase levels of exploration and object manipulation in captivity (van Schaik 




The captivity effect suggests that ‘intrinsic motivation’ may not be the sole 
determinant in the observed differences in Pan and indeed, given the disparity between wild 
and captive bonobo tool use, might explain the within species differences. Captive and wild 
chimpanzees show a similar pattern of behavioural acquisition of the most complex wild 
chimpanzee tool use behaviours (nut cracking). Some captive chimpanzees, as with some 
wild chimpanzees, fail to acquire the nut-cracking behaviour, in spite of repeated 
demonstrations (see Chapter 4). It is plausible to assume, that chimpanzees are already at the 
upper end of the non-human great ape ‘complexity scale’, meaning the captivity effect can do 
little to further bolster their repertoire. Therefore in the ‘naturally’ less tool proficient species 
(bonobos, gorillas and orangutans; Damerius, Graber, Willems, & Schaik, 2017) the captivity 
effect is more noticeable (Boysen, Kuhlmeier, Halliday, & Halliday, 1999; Forss et al., 2015; 
Gruber et al., 2010) than in chimpanzees. This is not to say that full-scale human interference, 
i.e., enculturation or training, cannot push these individuals beyond their ZLS (Tennie, 
2019a).  
Whilst it is most likely that the captivity effect is responsible for differences in the 
behavioural phenotypes of captive and wild bonobos, it is yet to be determined which factors 
directly influence the degree to which captive bonobos manipulate objects. If chimpanzees 
are restricted by their ZLS (a sort of ceiling effect) bonobos susceptibility to the captivity 
effect could be due to variations in the environment. Therefore, it remains a possibility that in 





In one of the most recent and in-depth studies of bonobo tool use, Koops et al. (2015) 
question whether bonobos might have “lost” their capacity for tool use, this seems unlikely 
based on the captive data discussed already. However, it remains possible that on a 
phylogenetic level bonobos remain naturally less motivated to engage with tools and that this 
is overcome over time, as the social learning biases begin to influence the behavioural 
phenotype. If this were true, it could be attributed to social learning of object manipulation 
tendencies within groups, perhaps facilitated by social learning biases, e.g., majority 
influence (see Chapter 5 for discussion of this phenomenon ; see also Luncz et al., 2012 for 
evidence of this phenomenon in wild subjects). In this case, we would expect those 
individuals exposed to the influence of conspecific object manipulation for longer to be more 
likely to engage in such behaviours; thus, the older the individual the more tool use one 
would predict.  
Equally, should the idea of a social model overcoming the claimed genetic 
predisposition against object manipulation be accurate, we would expect those subjects raised 
by their mothers to be more prolific object manipulators. This is because apes have been 
claimed to undergo an intensive period of social learning during formative years with a 
primary social model being the mother (with some even claiming this to be that of a 
mater/apprentice relationship; Matsuzawa et al., 2008), which would go on to shape the 
resulting behavioural phenotype. However, it could be argued that, those individuals reared 
by humans, carers might have served as effective social models (sensu Ross et al., 2010) to 
the extent that they would simulate the mother and might even reduce the learner’s 




we supposed some level of difference between orphaned and mother reared subjects, but the 
direction of this difference is unclear. 
The study that follows is a largely exploratory one, which aimed to uncover potential 
differences between subjects within an object-rich environment. Prior research has assessed 
the rates of manipulation in wild subjects and has resulted in bonobos being considered 
intrinsically less motivated than their sister species, chimpanzees. However, given the captive 
data to date, it appears bonobos are, in fact, highly capable motivators in the ‘right’ 
environment. This study aims to clarify the effect that individual differences in bonobo 
development and rearing might have on their resulting behavioural phenotype. Additionally, 
to compare these data with that collected in a wild population (Koops et al., 2015) in an 
attempt to further demonstrate the importance of environmental considerations in future 
theoretical studies.  
 Methods 
 Study site and subjects 
All data used in this study were collected from Lola ya Bonobo Sanctuary in 
Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo between June and September 2016. The sanctuary 
at Lola ya Bonobo is 30ha in size and consists of three separate enclosures (1: 10ha, 2: 15ha, 
3: 5ha), surrounded by fencing. Each enclosure contains an indoor sleeping area where 
subjects sleep in voluntary subgroups in an attempt to replicate the natural fission-fusion 
system of wild conspecifics (Gruber & Clay, 2016). In the outdoor areas of the enclosure, 




freshwater source (lake, stream or pool) where individuals can drink ad libitum (keepers 
provide additional water, juice or tea). Subjects are fed regularly throughout the day with 
vegetables, fruits, plant protein sources and eggs.    
The total population at Lola ya Bonobo at the time of the study was 65 individuals (24 
adults, 20 adolescents, 15 juveniles and 6 infants; see Table 6.1) these individuals are split 
between three groups; here only data for juveniles and infants across the three groups were 
considered, resulting in a total possible sample size of 21 individuals. Due to sampling 
restrictions, data was not collected from three individuals (BM, GR & SI), resulting in a 
sample of 18 individuals (M age = 4.00; SD = 2.47; nmale = 4; nfemale = 14, norphan = 4). Age 
groups were classified based on a system described by Hashimoto (1997), this system is more 
fine-grained, rather than simply classifying individuals as an infant or juvenile (e.g., Badrian 
& Badrian, 1984) age groups are subdivided into four total groups. Importantly, this system 
has an advantage, in terms of our data, because it distinguishes between young infants (<2) 
and older infants (2-4). Prior to the age of 2 years old infant bonobos generally stay very 
close to their mothers and are often in contact with them (with their hands and feet; de 
Lathouwers & van Elsacker, 2006), as a result the ability of these infants to manipulate 
objects as readily as other immature individuals is drastically impaired. Importantly, for later 
analyses, at Lola ya Bonobo at the time of testing, all orphaned individuals came under the 




Table 6.1.  Individuals at Lola ya Bonobo, during the study period, that were within the sample parameters of 
this study. 
ID Group Age (y)  Age Group Sex 
Rearing 
KIT 1 <1 Infant-I F Mother 
JUU 1 1 Infant-I M Mother 
KM 1 7 Juvenile-II F Mother 
LY 1 6 Juvenile-II F Mother 
KI 1 6 Juvenile-II F Orphan 
NJ 1 6 Juvenile-II F Orphan 
NDO 2 <1 Infant-I F Mother 
MVL 2 2 Infant-II F Mother 
MOS 2 4 Juvenile-I F Mother 
NYO 2 5 Juvenile-I F Mother 
MG 2 6 Juvenile-II F Orphan 
MAY 2 6 Juvenile-II M Mother 
MV 2 <7 Juvenile-II F Orphan 
MOL 3 <1 Infant-I F Mother 
MIN 3 2 Infant-II M Mother 
ELO 3 4 Juvenile-I F Mother 
BOL 3 5 Juvenile-I M Mother 
SZ 3 6 Juvenile-II F Mother 
 
 Data 
 Data collection 
Data were collected using animal focal sampling (Altmann, 1974), where single 
individuals were recorded for 10 minutes at a time. These video recordings were collected by 




(Panasonic HC-V77) mounted on tripods. Videos were collected from outside the enclosures 
and the researchers would move alongside the exterior fence to ensure that the focal 
individual remained in the frame. During the recordings, the researcher would commentate on 
the other individuals within one and five meters of the focal individual at six time points 
(start, two, four, six, eight and ten minutes). The activity and proximity scan data were 
recorded by the primary coder. 
 Coding 
6.2.2.2.1 Full data set 
The coding was divided between three coders (DN=86; SG=55; AS=55), each coder 
was provided with a copy of the ethogram (see Table 6.2) before coding beginning. After 
training, each coder completed a reliability test to ensure that the coding was consistent 
between individuals. Coders were provided with a total of 200 clips, 50% (n=100) of the clips 
contained randomly selected behaviours described in the ethogram (see Table 6.2), the other 
50% were “dummy” clips, as per previous chapters. Provided this reliability test reached an 
acceptable level (κ ≥ 0.6; Cohen, 1988), each coder then independently coded their 




Table 6.2. Ethogram used when coding object manipulation types in BORIS. Note, only object manipulations 
were coded, an ethogram with additional notes, as provided to coders is available in Appendix C 
Behaviour  Definition 
Play Manipulating object with no apparent immediate goal, including repetitive 
movements, alone or together with other individuals (alone/social), may be 
associated with a play face. 
Tool-use Manipulating a detached (?) object as a means to achieve an end (e.g. nut 
crack, branch drag, drink). 
Bite Biting or chewing object without ingestion. 
Break Breaking (off) a substrate; this includes pulling grass up. 
Carry Carrying object in hands, feet or mouth. 
Drag Pulling object along the ground with hands 
Throw Throwing object or intentionally dropping object from an elevated position. 
Support Using an object to partially support the weight of the subject, i.e., holding 
onto a root when sitting on a steep hill.  
Day nest 
building 
Creating a nest out of sticks and leaves (tree or ground). During this 
process, the subject may break or bite several sticks and put them over their 
head or wrap them around the body. 
 
Table 6.3. Ethogram used when coding object types in BORIS 
Object Type Description 
Leaf Non-woody vegetation  
Stick Woody vegetation or branches, with or without leaves 
attached 
Stone A stone, pebble or rock  
Food Fruits or vegetables provided to the subjects by caregivers 
Fruit-shell Shells of foods provided by caregivers – this can include 
nut shells or fruit shells (i.e., passionfruit outer). 
Man-made Any non-natural item within the enclosure 
Grass A leafy vegetation growing from the ground – as opposed 
to from a branch/stick 
Other Any item that does not fit the above categories: e.g., moss, 





The full data set (N=196 focal samplings) was coded using an open-source, event 
logging software designed for behavioural ecology studies (BORIS; v. 5.0.1) developed by 
Friard and Gamba (2016). See Appendix D for details of BORIS settings. Behaviours were 
initially coded as an instance of manipulation separated from its predecessor by a period of 
two or more seconds, wherein the same object type (see Table 6.3) was manipulated in the 
same way; i.e., the same behaviour in the ethogram above. To align this coding system with 
that used by Koops et al (2015) behaviours were nested within bouts, following Koops et al’s 
definition, where a bout consisted of the same behaviour, involving the same object, with a 
break of no more than two minutes between behaviours. R (version 3.4.3; R Core Team, 
2013) and R-Studio (version 1.1.423; RStudio Team, 2016) were used multiply ten-minute 
data by six to give bouts per hour, rendering them comparable with related research (i.e. 
Koops, Furuichi, & Hashimoto, 2015). This was achieved by counting the number of unique 
bouts within each file combining this data with the number of unique files in the entire data 
set to provide the "bouts per focal" measure. These data were then indexed by the focal 
animal in each file and a mean "bouts per focal" measure was aggregated per individual. All 
these data were combined into a single data frame used for further analyses. 
Duration data was used to assess how long subjects engaged in object manipulation 
for, bouts per hour were used as a measure of the frequency (or rate) of object manipulation. 
Both measures, in tandem, provide a richer picture of the data. Simply using duration would 




ignore the importance of extended object manipulation bouts. Thus, the analysis section is 
divided between duration and bouts per hour.  
 Statistical analyses 
 Comparison to previously collected wild data 
Here we harvested data, collected in a wild population (Koops et al., 2015), using data 
visualisation technology (WebPlotDigitiser, V4.0; Rohatgi, 2018) and combined these data 
with our own to present a comparison between wild and sanctuary reared individuals. Our 
data were first plotted against those presented by Koops et al. to present a descriptive level 
comparison. Following this, a Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test was performed on the data, 
which were highly positively skewed, to assess differences between wild and sanctuary 
reared populations in terms of their rates of object manipulation. As Koops et al. do not report 
duration data it is not possible to compare the data sets on this level.  
 Comparison of object manipulation bout duration and frequencies 
6.2.3.2.1 Age 
The data were first compared as a function of age group. This was to determine 
whether there was an effect of development on the duration of object manipulation bouts, 
however, in order to control for the potential effect of rearing history on this comparison the 
orphaned subjects were removed from these analyses. Given that both datasets were subject 
to a substantial positive skew, the decision was made to use non-parametric statistics to 




up with Dunn Tests, as a post-hoc analysis strategy to determine the exact nature of any 
potential differences highlighted by the Kruskal Wallis tests.  
6.2.3.2.2 Rearing 
As any variation in rearing history was restricted to the Juvenile-II sample (see 
Section 6.2.1) specific analyses were conducted with this sample, comparing the mother 
reared individuals with orphaned individuals of the same age group. This meant that the 
dataset was smaller than for the age analyses (Section 6.2.3.2.1), however, the data remained 
heavily positively skewed therefore non-parametric analyses were applied. In order to assess 
the influence of rearing history on the duration and frequency of object manipulations a 
Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test was applied.  
 Results 
 Interrater reliability 
Acceptable interrater reliability was achieved by both AS (κ = 0.73, p<.001; κ = 1.00, 
p<.001) and SG (κ = 0.67, p<.001; κ = 0.63, p<.001) with DN as a primary coder for 
manipulation type and object type respectively. In addition, both AS & SG achieved 
acceptable interrater reliability (κ = 0.85, p<.001; κ = 0.63, p<.001) with one another for 
manipulation type and object type, respectively. 
 Descriptive statistics 
This study provides an account of the object manipulation behavioural phenotype 




bonobos most frequently manipulated objects by playing with them (this included social and 
solitary play) or by carrying them (Figure 6.1A), sticks were the objects most frequently 
manipulated in this study (Figure 6.1B). However, here data are also present for the duration 
of these bouts where the longest bouts were those of nest building and tool use (Figure 6.1C); 
it is worthy of note that the majority of these tool use bouts were nut-cracking, however in 
this study we did not divide tool use and therefore these data are not available in anything 
other than anecdote. The duration of bouts divided by object type did not yield such stark 
differences (Figure 6.1D), however man-made objects and stones were manipulated for the 
longest durations. Worthy of note within these statistics is the ‘throw’ category of object 
manipulation, this was an instantaneous even and therefore cannot have a duration, it is 





Figure 6.1. Descriptive statistics showing the frequency (A & B) and duration (B & C) of object manipulation 
bouts by manipulation type (A & C) and mean duration (B & D). 
In addition to describing the patterns of behaviour in the present sample, it is possible 
to compare the rates of object manipulation with wild conspecifics. However, the wild data 
were collected using data visualisation technology (WebPlotDigitizer, V4.0; Rohatgi, 2018) 
therefore they only contain the data reported in the source paper (bouts per hour; Koops et al., 
2015). Our data were scaled to align them with the data presented in this article (our 10-
minute focals were multiplied by 6 to provide a ‘bouts per hour’ figure). These data can 
therefore be directly compared with those described by Koops et al., accordingly we have 




of this comparison can be seen in Figure 6.2B, where our data (sanctuary reared; Mdn=27.00, 
SD=11.39) present significantly higher (W=270, p<.001, r=.85) bouts per hour than those 
reported by Koops et al. (wild; Mdn=0.43, SD=0.47). 
 
Figure 6.2. (A) Data presented in this study (coral circles) plotted against those collected, using 
WebPlotDigitizer, from Koops et al. (2015; teal squares). (B) Comparison of the median bouts per hour from 
the present data set and Koops et al.’s, the statistical comparison of these data are presented in text. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 Duration data comparisons 
The results of a Kruskal-Wallis test indicated significant differences in object 




























































small effect size (χ2(3) = 48.24, p < 0.001, ε2=.05). Despite the effect size (which implies that 
the results should be interpreted with a degree of caution), post-hoc analyses were conducted 
with these data, in the form of a Dunn test with Bonferroni correction, the results indicate 
significant differences between all age groups apart from Infant-II and Juvenile-I (see Table 
6.5 and Figure 6.3A). 
Table 6.4. Test statistics for post-hoc comparisons using a Dunn test with Bonferroni correction following a 
Kruskal-Wallis test assessing differences in the durations of object manipulation bouts as a function of age 
group 
Pairwise Comparison Z Adjusted p 
Infant-I - Infant-II 2.43 <.001 
Infant-I - Juvenile-I 3.68 <.001 
Infant-II - Juvenile-I 0.90 1.00 
Infant-I - Juvenile-II -1.89 <.001 
Infant-II - Juvenile-II -4.59 <.001 






Figure 6.3. (A) Median duration of object manipulation bouts, divided by age group, all groups are significantly 
different (p>.001) with the exception of the marked groups (Infant II & Juvenile I). Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. (B) Median duration of object manipulation bouts, divided by rearing history, difference is 
significant (p<.01), error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
The results of a Mann Whitney Wilcoxon comparison suggest further differences in 
object manipulation durations as a function of rearing history with a small effect size 
(W=64109, p<.01, r=-.09). Here, orphaned subjects (Mdn=9, SD=28.91) manipulated objects 
for significantly longer than mother reared subjects (Mdn=8, SD=19.88), again these results 





 Frequency data comparisons 
The results of a Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there were significant differences in 
the frequency of object manipulations in the sample of sanctuary housed, mother reared 
bonobos as a function of age; this result had a small-medium effect size (χ2(3) = 11.00, p < 
0.05, ε2=.08). These results were followed-up with post-hoc analyses, in the form of a Dunn 
test, with Bonferroni correction. The results of the Dunn test suggest that the effect was being 
driven by differences between the Infant-I and Infant-II groups along with between the 
Infant-I and Juvenile-I groups (see Table 6.6 and Figure 6.4A). 
Table 6.5. Test statistics for post-hoc comparisons using a Dunn test with Bonferroni correction following a 
Kruskal-Wallis test assessing differences in the frequency of object manipulation bouts as a function of age 
group 
Pairwise Comparison Z Adjusted p 
Infant-I - Infant-II -2.76 <.05 
Infant-I - Juvenile-I -2.81 <.05 
Infant-II - Juvenile-I 0.40 1.00 
Infant-I - Juvenile-II -1.80 0.43 
Infant-II - Juvenile-II 1.12 1.00 






Figure 6.4. (A) Median frequency of object manipulation bouts, divided by age groups, statistically significant 
results are marked (*=p<.05). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. (B) Median frequency of object 
manipulation bouts, divided by rearing history, difference is not significant, error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals.  
The results of a Mann Whitney Wilcoxon comparison suggest that there are no 
differences in the frequency of object manipulation rates as a function of rearing history 
(W=2444, p=.051). However, it is worth noting that these results do approach significance, 
given the small effect sizes reported here it is possible that a larger sample could tip these 
results towards significance. This said, throughout the remainder of this chapter and this 





























































































The results of this study show, in a semi-natural captive environment, bonobos display 
a rate of object manipulation over 50x greater than wild conspecifics. When the data were 
considered as a function of age we found that manipulation durations were lowest in the 
middle stages of development, whereas the frequency of object manipulations appeared 
lowest whilst the bonobos were youngest – with little change across the course of 
development. Our data also present an interesting dichotomy between duration and frequency 
as a function of rearing history, mother reared individuals appear to manipulate objects for 
shorter periods, but more frequently. Thus, it is unclear as to the relationship between rearing, 
development and object manipulation though it appears one does exist. These results are 
discussed here in relation to prior research and in the context of this thesis.  
One of the clearer findings is the disconnect between duration and frequency as a 
measure of object manipulation. From our data it can be seen that each of these constructs 
measures a very different aspect of behaviour, therefore both were influenced differently by 
our predictors. This result has a bearing on future comparative studies, which should be clear 
on the measure used and the reasons for choosing this measure. Our count measure may 
relate more closely to the level of motivation that an individual has to initially approach, 
touch and first manipulate an object (sensu Koops, Furuichi, & Hashimoto, 2015), whereas, 
duration most likely codes for a more sustained level of attention (or perseverance). Indeed, 
both measures, considered together, may also allow researchers to consider reactions to 
novelty; a highly neophillic individual would presumably approach more objects in a given 




those objects and therefore a greater likelihood of innovation, sometimes considered a proxy 
for "intelligence" (Reader, Morand-Ferron, & Flynn, 2016). However, as the subjects in our 
study were familiar with the objects concerned we suggest that a future endeavour is to 
introduce a novel object to both captive and wild bonobo populations and contrast the 
responses (sensu Forss et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, it is also possible that individuals with a high count of bouts 
possess both high neophilia and neophobia. As Reader (2015) suggests in his discussion of 
innovation, individuals who have both high neophobia and high neophilia are more likely to 
engage, disengage and re-engage with an object. This is because an initial neophilia results in 
the individual engaging with the object; once engaged the individual is influenced by their 
neophobia, resulting in them disengaging. The cycle continues, however each time the 
novelty of the stimuli reduces and so does the neophobia; as the cycle progresses, individuals 
may be more likely to notice, appraise, or attend to the various characteristics and parts of the 
object at hand. Therefore, giving them a better opportunity to consider the functional aspects 
of an object or how it can be manipulated. Considering bouts per hour and bout duration 
together allows for a more complete picture of a species’ behavioural phenotype, the 
remainder of this chapter will compare and contrast the results from both perspectives. 
When considering the age level comparisons, it becomes important to be mindful of 
the different utilities of duration and frequency in terms on object manipulation. In the 
duration dataset the lowest rates of duration were within the Infant-II and Juvenile-I groups. 
In terms of the frequency measures, the Infant-II and Juvenile-I groups exhibited the highest 




pattern of the duration data was not mirrored as clearly. After an initial low (during early 
infancy, when infants are still attached to their mothers and nursing) the frequency of object 
manipulation appeared to stabilise; though, given the high degree of variability in the 
Juvenile-II data these finding require further data to confirm. This could be explained as the 
youngest infants have no obvious need to explore alternate sources of food whilst their 
mothers are providing nourishment, therefore, as the necessity hypothesis (Fox et al., 1999) 
predicts and has demonstrated recently (Grund, Neumann, Zuberbühler, & Gruber, 2019) it 
occurs less. Through a normal period of development, as the need for food arises, exploratory 
play behaviour would be expected to rise also.  
However, from other data presented here, the effect of rearing history becomes clear, 
within the Juvenile-II group there is a clear divide between orphans and mother reared 
individuals, it appears that orphans behave like the youngest mother reared infants; despite 
obvious age differences. Perhaps because humans have acted as a mother figure for these 
orphans, constantly providing nourishment; this provider has never left, so orphans may 
never need to begin to explore in the same way as mother reared conspecifics.   
Though many explanations are possible for the above patterns, outside of human 
interference, two seem most likely. It has been suggested that mother/infant interactions are 
integral in the development of certain aspects of chimpanzee object manipulation, i.e., nut 
cracking (Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000). Perhaps the orphans in this study lacked a 
social model and therefore, rather than expressing multiple behaviours, they apply a more 
select repertoire of behaviours than their mother reared counterparts. However, it has been 




(Hirata & Celli, 2003; Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa, 1997). This suggestion would, 
therefore, lean towards an explanation of a ‘sensitive learning period’, i.e., motherly 
interactions (before social models shift) are important in the development of a full group 
typical repertoire (Biro et al., 2003; Section 4.4.3). This hypothesis would explain the low 
number of bouts recorded in mother reared individuals whilst also accounting for their higher 
durations of object manipulation.  
A second potential explanation for these results is that orphaned individuals are not 
gaining the same access to objects as mother reared individuals, it is plausible that other 
group members are gaining preferential access to objects. Some studies have suggested that 
apes that have suffered an early maternal loss might be characterised by social deficits 
throughout their lifespan (Kalcher-Sommersguter et al., 2015). This lack of sociality and 
resultant lack of alliances may hinder individuals ability to access and therefore learn the 
physical properties of objects (Flemming, Rattermann, & Thompson, 2007). 
This said, the aim of the present study was not only to explain the behaviours of our 
sample, but to test the hypothesis put forward by Koops et al. (2015) that lower intrinsic 
motivation in bonobos is responsible for their characteristic lack of tool use, compared to 
their closes extant relatives (Gruber & Clay, 2016). One particularly striking feature of our 
data is the substantially higher number of bouts of object manipulation observed in our study 
using captive bonobos when compared to wild bonobos studied by Koops et al. (2015). 
Koops et al., report data which suggest a maximum bouts per hour rate of ~1.4 in wild 





One potential explanation for the disconnect between wild and captive object 
manipulation in bonobos is the differing ecologies of the conspecific groups, in this sense, the 
term ecologies refers to physical and social ecologies. Clearly, the social ecologies and 
cultures between captive and wild individual are different; our data show tool use in various 
forms often for foraging (i.e., nut-cracking), whereas reports from wild bonobos suggest that 
"bonobos at Wamba use tools only in a non-feeding context, e.g. twig as a rain hat or branch 
drag in display" (Koops et al., 2015, p. 2). Therefore, it is highly likely that the bonobos in 
our sample had substantially greater access to social models of tool use behaviours, these 
models would likely facilitate the use of tools within the community, harmonising behaviours 
between individuals (Tennie et al., 2009). This study cannot distinguish between the various 
social learning variants, therefore we would only suggest that these ‘cultures’ can be 
classified in a minimal sense (sensu Neadle et al., 2017).  
However, outside of the social domain, it appears wild bonobos and chimpanzees are 
comparable in ecological opportunities for object manipulation (Koops et al., 2015). The 
natural materials required for tool use are comparable between the species; most, if not all, 
wild chimpanzee tool use concerns stones, sticks or leaves (Whiten et al., 1999), all of which 
are freely available across the bonobo range. Indeed, as our sample of bonobos were housed 
in a semi-natural environment, a fence erected around an area of Congolese forest (their 
natural habitat), they have similar access to materials. Equally, the density of invertebrate 
prey (often accessed by chimpanzees through tool use (Nishie, 2011; Whiten et al., 1999) is 
largely equal between the species in the wild (Koops et al., 2015). Invertebrate tool use was 




as to the density of army ants; as a result, we would consider this absence an ecologically 
explained one (sensu Whiten et al., 1999).   
Equally, regarding the captivity effect (Forss et al., 2015), the bonobos’ survival needs 
are met by their caregivers. There is little to no risk for the bonobos at Lola ya Bonobo: food 
availability is consistent; their predation pressures are substantially reduced and there is no 
risk of poaching. These individuals have a decreased need for survival-related activities that 
require substantial vigilance, time, and energy in the wild, like gathering food, travelling and 
hiding from predators (Inogwabini & Matungila, 2009). Regardless of the season, bonobos at 
Lola ya Bonobo are fed a balanced diet at similar times with little variation in location. The 
abundance of food and relative safety afforded by captivity may leave individuals with more 
neural resources (due to the "lower cognitive load") and energy more generally, allowing for 
enhanced curiosity, creativity, and exploration (Damerius et al., 2017; van Schaik et al., 
2016).  
Captive individuals are more likely to spend prolonged periods exploring their 
surroundings, manipulating objects, and playing. Kahrs and Lockman’s (2014) claim that tool 
use development in human infants is based on two factors; the ability to explore objects and 
the ability to learn how objects change the properties and capabilities of the limbs. By 
exploring objects through manipulation and play, individuals understand how objects enhance 
or change the actions and motions that they are capable of and can subsequently tune their 
motor behaviours (Kahrs & Lockman, 2014, p. 90). The heightened levels of these activities 
at Lola ya Bonobo, in addition to the observation of human models, may help to explain the 




suggests that, while Koops et al. (2015) speculate that intrinsic motivation is the factor 
separating chimpanzees from bonobos; in fact, bonobos are capable of engaging in 
chimpanzee type tool use behaviours, given the required environment and ecological 
circumstances. Whilst this remains a plausible explanation, the possibility remains that a true 
captive replication of Koops et al’s findings, which compares age and environment matched 
captive chimpanzees and bonobos, may yield results in favour of intrinsic differences. Future 
research should consider a comparison of the object manipulation rates in young, captive, 
bonobos and chimpanzees with the view to detect intrinsic differences whilst controlling for 
the ecological and rearing conditions between species. 
From the data presented here, it can be seen that age is a factor which influences the 
length of time that captive bonobos engage in object manipulation for, it is possible that age 
also influences the frequency of that object manipulation, however, due to the tentative nature 
of this result replications in other populations would be required before any such claim could 
be asserted. Our data also show that the effect of age in our models may be confounded by 
rearing history, suggesting additional importance for the effect of ontogeny on behavioural 
phenotype. Also, the data presented here provide a much-needed view into the object 
manipulation tendencies (outside of cognitive experimental tasks) of sanctuary living 
bonobos; taken alone, the data from the wild or our data are incomplete, taken together, they 
present an interesting dichotomy of bonobo object manipulation. 
To dismiss all differences between chimpanzee and bonobo object manipulation and 
tool use as a function of intrinsic motivation would be overly reductionist. Although wild 




types of ‘cultural’ behaviours, the same cannot be found in captive populations. We suggest 
that differences in the social (the availability of models) and physical ecology (a reduction in 
risk and an abundance of resources) may interact with differences in motivation (increased 
neophilia, play, and exploration) and genetic predispositions. Therefore rendering the picture 
of bonobo object manipulation altogether more complex (see Call, 2017) than simply 
genetically determined intrinsic motivation (Koops et al., 2015), sensu triple inheritance 
theory (Tennie et al., 2016). These findings highlight the need for future collaboration 
between researchers studying wild and captive populations, to gain a better understanding of 
how and why individuals use and manipulate objects, and which internal and external factors 





 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Overview 
Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to explore the genetic predispositions, social 
learning capacities and ecological sensitivities of unenculturated apes and their 
interdependent, combined relation to ape material culture. This final chapter will serve as a 
summary of the results and conclusions of the previous chapters; meanwhile, setting these 
findings in the context of the relevant literature and acknowledging the theoretical and 
methodological limitations. Finally, I will outline some future research directions based on 
these findings. 
 Chapter summaries 
 Chapters 2 and 3: culture without copying 
In the ape tool use literature there are two prevailing hypotheses (referred to here as 
the CDT and ZLS hypotheses: Whiten et al., 1999, 2001; Tennie et al., 2009). These 
hypotheses differ in the extent to which they assume copying is necessary for the emergence 
of ape culture. However, both acknowledge the importance and existence of some social 
learning in ape cultures. Chapters 2 and 3 asked the question: can supposed cultural traits 
exist without copying variants of social learning? 
Chapter 2 focused on a relatively simple, yet unconfirmed, putative cultural trait: food 
cleaning in gorillas. The results of this chapter show that food cleaning is not reliant on 




restricting ‘culture’ to those species capable of CDTs would be remiss. Therefore, we 
published a new classification of culture: minimal culture (Neadle et al., 2017). In minimal 
culture, one only need assume that social learning mediates the frequency of a behavioural 
form, caveated by the fact that the form could also occur in full in absence of any social 
learning (as evidenced in Chapter 2). I proposed in this chapter that many aspects of ape 
culture fall under the minimal classification and that this should be a first stage in attributing 
cultural status to a behaviour, only ‘increasing’ the claim when appropriate evidence is found. 
In Chapter 3, I used LS tests to determine the presence of chimpanzee behaviours in 
genetically similar species, to test the ‘shared ZLS’ hypothesis. The results of a previous 
study (Bandini, 2018) confirmed that the behavioural form ‘picking’ (Whiten et al., 1999) is 
unlikely to be an example of a CDT, as it was spontaneously expressed in full in two samples 
of culturally unconnected chimpanzees. With the addition of data presented in Chapter 3 (and 
data from Reindl et al., 2016 showing picking in human children), it is possible to conclude 
that the behavioural form of ‘picking’ is a likely a shared Latent Solution throughout the 
Hominid clade, thus lending support to the suggestion that the last common ancestor of all 
extant Hominids was also capable of tool use to some degree. By extension, this chapter lends 
support to the ZLS hypothesis and contributes evidence contrary to the CDT hypothesis.  
 Chapter 4: the outer limits of the ZLS 
This chapter utilised the ‘extended’ LS testing methodology (using incremental social 
information to attempt to facilitate the expression of a behaviour), suggested by Bandini and 
Tennie (2018), and applied it to chimpanzee nut-cracking. Chapter 4 showed that captive 




explanations, each perhaps contributing to the somewhat contradictory findings in 
chimpanzee nut-cracking in the literature.  
It was proposed that chimpanzees have a ‘sensitive learning period’ in which they 
must learn certain material properties or even behaviours integral to the subsequent 
development of nut-cracking, assuming they are ever to develop it. Previous wild reports 
have suggested that chimpanzees begin to acquire the skills needed for nut-cracking from the 
age of around 1.5 years (Inoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa, 1997). These skills are continually 
refined (and/or mature; Corp & Byrne, 2002) until the age of approximately 5 years old, after 
which point it appears difficult (if not impossible) for chimpanzees to express the behavioural 
form (Biro et al., 2003). Our results showed that in adult chimpanzees, >10 years old, social 
information (including full action demonstrations from a human) are not sufficient to catalyse 
the expression of nut-cracking.  
The possibility remains that nut-cracking is within chimpanzees’ ZLS and therefore 
should not be classed as a CDT. However, if copying forms of social learning were 
responsible for the expression of nut-cracking it would be plausible to expect some 
‘ratcheting’ of the behaviour over time (Tennie et al., 2016), contrary to archaeological 
evidence (Mercader et al., 2007). Furthermore, if nut-cracking were truly culture dependent it 
seems unlikely that it would be expressed in two culturally unconnected wild communities 
(Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000; Sanz & Morgan, 2007), given its low relative 
probability of occurrence (Tennie et al., 2009). Although nut-cracking ‘failed’ this application 
of the LS method, it can be seen to have passed the ‘natural’ LS test by virtue of these facts 




fulfilled the “single case standard” (Bandini & Tennie, 2017), but this standard may need 
further expansion to consider the effects of ontogeny on an individual’s ZLS (Tennie et al., in 
press). Accordingly, this chapter provides somewhat equivocal evidence concerning the ZLS 
and CDT hypothesis, thus requiring further investigation. 
 Chapter 5: apes really don’t ape 
This chapter focused on the social learning capacity of unenculturated apes. The 
empirical chapters up until this point demonstrated that social learning (of any variant) is not 
required for at least some aspects of ape culture to develop; though, social learning is likely 
to catalyse the expression of many behaviours and harmonise these behaviours within 
communities. Chapter 5 though was concerned with what is possible, in the ‘perfect storm’ of 
social learning conditions. Here, we adapted a task, previously used in bonobos and children 
to attempt to elicit ‘true’ action copying. Previous studies have shown that apes consistently 
fail to imitate the actions of single conspecific or allospecific demonstrators (Clay & Tennie, 
2018; Tennie et al., 2012; Tomasello et al., 1997). 
This study used a design whereby four demonstrators provided action models, thus 
providing a behavioural majority over the naïve subject (in terms of frequency of behaviours 
and demonstrators). Previous studies have indicated that primates, including apes, are 
susceptible to this form of social learning bias (e.g., Luncz & Boesch, 2014; van de Waal, 
Borgeaud, & Whiten, 2013) but these earlier studies were unable to pinpoint action copying. 
Therefore, it was considered plausible that apes would show a hitherto supressed capacity for 




that apes, even in these arguably optimal conditions, fail to spontaneously imitate pure action 
forms.  
 Chapter 6: the importance of the environment 
The focus of this chapter is how the three factors in the so-called ‘triple inheritance 
theory’ interact. The three ‘engines’ of this theory (Tennie et al., 2016) are genes (e.g., 
genetic predispositions), culture (cultural or social factors) and environment (the ecology of 
the individual). Only the former two are included in the theory’s predecessor ‘dual 
inheritance theory’ (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), which was, therefore, lacking an important 
factor. To consider the importance of all three factors together it was important to address the 
question of how, by changing one of these factors, it was possible to demonstrate the 
phenotypical potential of a species. 
Recently, it was claimed that two species of Pan differ on a key fact, this being their 
intrinsic motivation to engage in object manipulation (Koops et al., 2015); this claim 
suggested that genetic (i.e., intrinsic) predispositions were able to ‘trump’ the other two 
engines, thus having a more prominent influence on the behaviour of the individual. 
Considering the apparent effect of ecological opportunity (demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3) 
it was thought possible that intrinsic factors could be overcome or mitigated by ecological 
variation, thereby supporting triple inheritance theory highlighting the importance of ecology 
in a species’ expression of their latent capacities. 
One clear finding from this study is the difference in behavioural phenotype between 
the sanctuary housed individuals in our sample and the wild individuals in Koops et al.’s 




subjects showed a maximum rate of object manipulation bouts of 59 bouts per hour, the wild 
data yielded 1.4. The effect of captivity was sufficient to overcome any genetic 
predispositions that may have held up wild bonobo tool use. Therefore, the results of this 
study speak to the importance of the social and ecological environment of an individual and 
the influence that the captivity effect can have on the behaviour of affected individuals. With 
the data collected here, it is not possible to determine whether social or ecological influences 
were the primary driving force behind this difference; however, both are important (alongside 
genetic predispositions), when considering the behavioural phenotype of subjects.    
 Support for the ZLS hypothesis 
 On the relationship between the CDT and ZLS hypotheses 
Historically, the ZLS hypothesis (Tennie et al., 2009) has been considered as a 
somewhat extreme explanation of ape culture, one that highlights the importance of 
individual learning, to the exclusion of social learning. However, in recent years and indeed 
partially through the works presented in this thesis, the ZLS account can now be seen as 
somewhat less extreme and more inclusive of the importance of social learning. Rather than 
considering all behaviours as the products of pure individual reinnovation, as has been 
assumed by various researcher, more recent literature on the ZLS hypothesis considers the 
importance of socially mediated serial reinnovations (Bandini & Tennie, 2017). This becomes 
important as an example of how the ZLS approach is beginning to make clear the importance 




observed within and between wild communities. In this sense, the two theoretical 
perspectives begin to merge, moving towards the ever elusive ‘academic middle ground’.  
However, the absence of social learning within the ZLS account is more the result of 
misinterpretations than a theoretical difference; from its formulation the ZLS hypothesis was 
clear in acknowledging that social learning, though the variant is undefined, is important in 
explaining the ‘spread’ of behaviours within communities (Tennie et al., 2009). A clear 
difference between the two hypotheses is the perceived probability of copying, in particular 
action copying. This appears to be a somewhat irreconcilable difference between the two 
hypotheses; though, it is sometimes painted as a straw-man argument put forward by ZLS 
theorists. Classically (Whiten et al., 1999), and even in very recent pieces (Boesch et al., 
2019), advocates of the CDT hypothesis have considered that copying variants of social 
learning are potentially responsible for the observed behavioural patterns. This difference 
then represents one of theoretical capacity, under a pure ZLS framework, apes are considered 
incapable of action copying, instead relying on non-copying variants of social learning (with 
the possible exception of some emulative capacity; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2010; Tennie 
et al., in press).  
This thesis presents data that generally favour the ZLS hypothesis: evidence of 
behaviours being reinnovated by naïve individuals, individuals failing to socially learn 
behaviours within their species’ behavioural repertoire and a demonstration of apes failing to 
copy action-level information, in the absence of results. However, here I have also presented 
some importance caveats to the ZLS account: not all individuals appear to have the same 




the importance of the ‘right’ conditions. The way in which this thesis, in particular, supports 
the ZLS hypothesis is discussed at length below. 
The results presented in this thesis generally support the ZLS hypothesis (Tennie et 
al., 2009), including its latest iteration (Tennie et al., in press). In particular, they provided 
further examples of independent reinnovations (Chapters 2 and 3; where reinnovation is 
inconsistent with the CDT hypothesis). They also provided further evidence that no matter 
the circumstances and motivations, apes do not appear to copy actions (Chapter 5; where the 
supposed presence of action copying in apes instead is an important aspect of the CDT 
hypothesis). Finally, the results also show the importance of ecology in influencing the 
degree to which a species will express their potential behavioural repertoire, which is most 
likely the result of socially mediated reinnovations. 
The conclusions drawn here suggest that the method of exclusion is a useful first stage 
in identifying putative cases of culture; however, in contrast to some applications of the 
method of exclusion (Whiten et al., 1999), I hesitate to assume that copying is necessary for 
ape culture. Instead, one should assume (upon identifying a putative case of culture) that this 
is an example of minimal culture (Chapter 2), facilitated and harmonised within communities 
(i.e., increased in frequency) via non-copying social learning variants (Chapter 3). The 
expression of particular cultural behaviours is predicted by the individual (Chapter 4), social 
(Chapters 4 and 6) or ecological (Chapter 6) factors influencing the individual. It seems 
unlikely, based on the findings from Chapter 5, that copying, especially imitation (action 
copying) is the social learning variant underpinning ape cultures; instead, non-copying 




picture of ape culture compared to human culture; these differences may also represent one of 
the key differences in the behavioural phenotypes between our species and other extant 
species of apes. Simply, the data presented here are inconsistent with the CDT hypothesis, 
leaving one to assume that the ZLS hypothesis is the more accurate and therefore satisfactory 
account of ape culture. 
 Reinventing the wheel 
Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that the majority of ape cultural behaviours can be explained 
through socially mediated serial reinnovations (Bandini & Tennie, 2017), i.e., each individual 
can and does ‘reinvent the wheel’. A common critique of the ZLS hypothesis is that its 
seeming devotion to individual learning ignores the importance of social learning in ape 
cultures (e.g., Gruber et al., 2012). Works since the initial formulation of the ZLS (Tennie et 
al., 2009) have attempted to address this claim by making clear that social learning is 
consistent with the ZLS account and plays a large role in explaining the cultural patterns 
observed in the wild (e.g., Bandini & Tennie, 2017; Neadle, Allritz, & Tennie, 2017; Tennie 
et al., in press). A key difference between the ZLS and CDT accounts is that the former 
assumes that this social learning constitutes only non-copying variants. These non-copying 
social learning mechanisms act to harmonise frequencies of individual reinnovations across 
subjects within affected communities. The likelihood of being affected in this way also 
correlates stochastically with the environment the population is in (Tennie et al., 2009; in 
press).  
Through this, it becomes possible to explain the geographic variations observed in 




2003; Whiten et al., 1999). As a concrete example, if a given individual were to reinnovate a 
behaviour (within their ZLS), for example the sponging of water using leaves (e.g., Hobaiter, 
Poisot, Zuberbühler, Hoppitt, & Gruber, 2014), the expression of this behaviour would be 
made more likely in further individuals within the community (e.g., through enhancement; 
see Chapter 1). However, where there are multiple methods by which a problem can be 
solved, such as in the case of sponging (where moss can also be used as a sponge), the first 
method to be innovated would gain an advantage, therefore reducing the relative probability 
of the second method’s occurrence (Bandini & Tennie, 2018; Tennie et al., in press), this was 
referred to by Tennie et al. (2009) as the ‘cultural founder effect’. This is likely influenced by 
non-copying social learning mechanisms biased by social learning strategies (Laland, 2004); 
together these factors would lead to a harmonisation of the first behaviour (leaf sponging) 
within the community. This would lead to patterns of behaviour where the relative probability 
of leaf sponging is increased in certain populations whilst remaining at baseline in others. 
This could lead to the sorts of geographic variations shown by the method of exclusion, 
without needing to rely on social learning as an explanatory tool; thus, conforming to the 
findings of this thesis. 
It is possible that later reinnovations of the alternative behaviour may occur, provided 
that the alternative behaviour is also within the species ZLS (which we can assume here 
given that moss sponging has been reported in chimpanzees and bonobos; Hobaiter et al., 
2014; Hohmann & Fruth, 2003). Whether these later reinnovations are maintained within the 
community is likely to depend on the individual that innovates them (rank, sex or even 




For example, older individuals may be inhibited in their ability to reinnovate a behaviour 
within their species repertoire due to behavioural inflexibility/conservativism (as may have 
occurred in Chapter 4).  
 Waiting for the ‘right’ time 
In its initial formulation, the ZLS hypothesis states: 
Our claim is thus that the behaviours one sees as part of chimpanzee 
culture are all things that individual chimpanzees could invent on their own 
fairly readily if all of the external and internal conditions are right. While 
some such behaviours will be highly likely for all groups (like making 
nests), others will need more environmental input (which sometimes can 
take an indirect route via physiology) in order to develop—perhaps even in 
the right order and at the right time—and these will then necessarily be 
relatively rare behaviours or ‘inventions’. (Tennie et al., 2009, p. 2407) 
Some have claimed that the ZLS hypothesis lacked some degree of operationalisation 
(Schofield et al., 2018), one of the issues with the initial formulation was the use of the term 
“right”. Here I will operationalise the “right” conditions into individual, social and ecological 
factors, relating to the studies presented. Each of these may influence the probability of 




 Individual factors 
Both double (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) and triple (F. J. Odling-Smee, Laland, & 
Feldman, 2003; Tennie et al., 2016) inheritance theory acknowledge the importance of 
genetic influences on the expression of behavioural phenotypes. I would include these genetic 
predispositions under the banner of individual factors, as they influence each individual 
within a species. However, across this section, I aim to discuss ontogenetic factors, as they 
influence the capacity of an individual within the species as a whole, rather than phylogenetic 
ones. Therefore, whilst I acknowledge the importance of genetic, therefore bio-evolutionary 
effects, here I will focus mainly on those factors influencing specific individuals. 
An individual lacking the required incentives to engage with a particular task may not 
follow through with the required amount of individual, trial and error learning to reinnovate 
the task. For example, during Chapter 3, Study 1, individuals were provided with the 
simulated bones, required for the picking behaviour, alongside other food sources, i.e., their 
regular scatter feed. There was a successful reinnovation in all species, however, the 
orangutan reinnovation did not occur for over 10 minutes, bonobos did not reinnovate until 
the second trial and gorillas did not reinnovate until the third. In this sense, the “right” 
condition refers to a subject that desires food or whatever reward available upon task 
completion; this said, food desire can be further subdivided into desires for specific aspects. 
Even then, desire for food reward is subject to the Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes & Dodson, 
1908), whereby too much desire might lead to a lack of inhibition, resulting in the behaviour 




inhibit initial desires, e.g., putting nuts in the mouth to crack them, rather than using tools, 
which might be more efficient.  
Another individual factor is that of enculturation. Human interference (even with 
positive intent) may alter the behavioural phenotype (even physiology and perhaps resultant 
cognition; Pope, Taglialatela, Skiba, & Hopkins, 2018) of a subject substantially. It was for 
this very reason that, in Chapter 5, I excluded “Alex” from the main data set, as he is a hand 
reared male that was even trained in the “do-as-I-do” paradigm (Custance et al., 1995) 
according to Hribar, Sonesson and Call (2014). Alex was raised by humans before the 
training, this may have influenced him in later years. In the case of Alex and Chapter five, 
this exclusion proved an unnecessary precaution as Alex also failed to copy the action 
demonstration. Within the scientific literature there are cases of apes going well beyond their 
species’ natural behaviour to demonstrate language-like abilities; e.g., Kanzi (Savage-
Rumbaugh, McDonald, Sevcik, Hopkins, & Rupert, 1986), Chantek (Call, 2001; Miles, 1994) 
and Koko (Patterson, 1978). These individuals are not representative of their respective 
species, in their natural, i.e., unenculturated (sensu Henrich & Tennie, 2017) states. It is for 
this reason that Henrich and Tennie (2017) consider experiments with enculturated, trained or 
deprived subjects to lack ecological validity and therefore dismiss them. Note, Chapter 6 
contains data from potentially deprived subjects, orphaned bonobos deprived of their 
mothers; however, this study is directly concerned with the potential influence of the 
captivity effect and not the wild-type behaviours of these individuals, these data are provided 




individuals only applies to those studies that seek to answer questions of wild-type behaviour, 
not those concerned with directly comparing captive vs. wild subjects. 
Outside of full enculturation, one must consider the other effects of human 
interference; for example, by removing ‘risk’ and adding ‘time’, captive individuals can go 
far beyond their wild conspecifics; this is, in essence, the factor underlying the so-called 
captivity effect (sensu Forss, Schuppli, Haiden, Zweifel, & van Schaik, 2015). Through this, 
the probability of behavioural reinnovation is substantially higher in captive populations 
compared to wild conspecifics. The results of this effect are clear from studies of captive 
bonobos (Gruber & Clay, 2016; Chapter 6), which have been demonstrated to use tools and 
manipulate objects in a way far removed from wild conspecifics (Koops et al., 2015). In this 
sense, the effects of human enculturation can greatly contribute towards the “right” 
conditions, however, the question of how valid it is to generalise from these subjects to entire 
populations from is questionable. Equally, some might suggest that captive apes are 
insufficient models for wild apes, this will be discussed in greater detail in section 7.4.  
The "right" individual conditions can, consequently, be summarised as the subject 
who feels motivated, not distracted (instead: attracted) nor at risk. These conditions can be 
influenced by factors external to the individual, e.g., food scarcity may increase motivation 
for extractive foraging through increased need (Fox et al., 1999) thus resulting in a 
physiological change. According to the assumptions of the ZLS, the "right" conditions 
shouldn’t need to include any human interference, however, this may mediate and catalyse 
the expression of some behaviours. There may also be behaviour specific conditions; for 




within the ‘sensitive learning period’ when first discovering the material and physical 
properties of nut cracking. The lack of these "right" conditions may have also contributed to 
the fact that gorillas and bonobos didn’t successfully reinnovate scooping in Chapter 3. 
 Social factors 
In addition to those factors only influencing the subjects themselves, individual 
factors may also influence the subject’s behavioural phenotype, which may, in turn, affect 
their social relationships. In a novel approach, Ferdowsian et al. (2011) applied the diagnostic 
criteria for human depression and anxiety to chimpanzees that have suffered deprivation; the 
results suggested that these individuals suffered from a phenomenon similar to human post-
traumatic stress disorder, resulting in distinct behavioural phenotypes. Thus, any trauma may 
hamper the ability of an individual to express their full potential behavioural repertoire. 
Therefore, at the very least, subjects should not have suffered any mistreatment or trauma, 
e.g., as a result of human intervention. Note that trauma can occur independent of human 
captivity (e.g., Leendertz et al., 2004), therefore these effects are likely to influence wild and 
captive populations alike. 
Chapter 6 provided evidence for the captivity effect bolstering the rate of object 
manipulation in captive bonobos compared to wild conspecifics. However, these individuals 
were exposed to both allsospecific and conspecific models throughout their tenure at the 
sanctuary. Prior research suggests that apes reared in social isolation, e.g., in medical research 
laboratories, are neophobic (Menzel, 1962), thus suggesting a sort of ‘anti-captivity effect’. It 
is possible that our subjects in Chapter 6 were also party to this effect; however, other studies 




Schwarzenberger, & Preuschoft, 2007), this may explain why we failed to note a difference 
between mother reared and orphaned individuals. Apes are social beings that socially learn 
via their mothers in the early years of life. Being without a model in these early years is likely 
to influence later behaviour, rendering the affected individuals not representative of their 
species as a whole. 
In this sense, it is possible to level critique toward the ZLS hypothesis; it has long 
been an example that individuals raised on a ‘desert island’ would develop their entire species 
repertoire, given the ‘right’ conditions (sensu Tennie et al., 2016; see Section 1.2.4.2.2). This 
is not a suggestion and is only a metaphor; however, the data presented in this thesis do not 
support this supposition, instead, I suggest that the metaphor be restructured. In addition to 
taking an infant and placing them on an island, where their nutritional and individual needs 
are met, their social needs must be also met, this may involve the presence of a mother figure, 
and potentially even other social agents. The necessity of this caveat to the ZLS account 
suggests an interesting interplay between the ZLS and CDT hypotheses, which may be the 
root of the assumption that certain behaviours are CDTs. This thesis suggests that the 
behaviours themselves are unlikely to be CDTs. However, apes (at the very least) can be 
considered as ‘socially dependent beings’ that require social interactions to function in a way 
representative of their species. Thus, it is impossible to separate apes and sociality. 
 Ecological factors 
As is to be expected within a ‘triple inheritance’ framework (F. J. Odling-Smee et al., 
2003; Tennie et al., 2016), all three of the factors influencing the ‘right’ conditions for a 




of the subject may be predicted by their environment. A subject’s motivation may be directly 
influenced by food availability in their ecology (an individual factor), but also the ecology of 
the subject may influence their ability or propensity for engaging in certain behaviours. For 
example, in Chapter 2 it was suggested that it is unlikely that the absence of food cleaning in 
mountain gorillas but its presence in lowland gorillas (Robbins et al., 2016) is a result of 
genetic differences between the subspecies. Instead, it was predicted that mountain gorillas, 
placed within the same ecological situation as lowland gorillas would behave similarly, as a 
result of the phylogenetic similarities and resultant shared ZLS (Chapter 3). This suggests 
that the ecology of the individual has a large influence on the final behavioural phenotype. 
This is essentially the logic underlying the LS testing methodology (sensu Tennie & Hedwig, 
2009), that, provided the ecological opportunity, and ‘right’ motivations, a typically 
developing and naïve subject would express the same behaviours as a wild conspecific, 
whose behaviours were facilitated by social learning. 
Whilst ecological variations can be sufficient to facilitate the expression of behaviour 
within a species specific ZLS, they can also be sufficient to alter the expressed behavioural 
repertoire of a population (Chapters 3 and 6). Wild bonobos have rarely been observed to 
spontaneously use tools (Gruber & Clay, 2016; Gruber et al., 2010); however, in Chapter 6 it 
was shown that in a stimulus rich and risk devoid environment, where the individual’s 
nutritional needs are met, object manipulations (even tool use) are frequent and occur at a rate 





Therefore, through the use of captive experiments (where some ecological conditions 
are optimal; i.e., nutritional needs are catered for, there is no risk of predation or poaching 
and subjects are rarely exposed to aversive stimuli), it is possible to explore the outer limits 
of a species’ ZLS. However, it should be noted that these ‘optimal’ conditions might not, and 
often do not, represent the conditions that wild populations exist under. Despite this, through 
captive studies it is possible to discover the extent to which ‘cognitive cladistics’ (sensu 
Haun, Rapold, Call, Janzen, & Levinson, 2006) are responsible for behavioural similarities 
between genetically similar species. From this information, it is possible to infer the 
behavioural phenotypes of extinct species, i.e., the last common ancestor between humans 
and apes.   
 The ‘right’ conditions 
In sum, although the terminology used by Tennie et al. (2009) may appear imprecise 
or lacking operationalisation (according to Schofield et al., 2017; but see Tennie et al., in 
press for a more precise version) it highlights the somewhat fluid nature of the required 
conditions for behavioural expression. Although there is no ‘recipe’ for a species ZLS, it is 
plausible that by providing something approaching the ‘right’ conditions a given individual 
would express their full potential. However, as Ferdowsian et al. (2011, p. 9) make clear 
“Chimpanzees cannot clearly articulate their thoughts, feelings, and experiences to humans”, 
therefore to attempt to fully quantify the ‘right’ conditions is futile. Instead, researchers 
should take into account the individual, social and ecological conditions outlined and 
evidenced throughout this thesis when considering some of the factors influencing great ape 




 Limitations of this work 
Although every effort was made throughout this work to ensure that it maintained the 
utmost scientific integrity, limitations do exist. In this section, I will acknowledge some of 
these and reflect on how they could have been addressed, with the benefit of hindsight. 
 Theoretical 
The Zone of Latent Solutions hypothesis offers one of the more elegant accounts of 
ape cultures, assuming very little of ape capabilities whilst acknowledging their ability to 
acquire behaviours through trial and error (individual) and even insight learning and for these 
behaviours to be harmonised within communities through non-copying social learning 
mechanisms. However, the ZLS hypothesis (Tennie et al., 2009) has been argued to be overly 
conservative in its attribution of CDTs. Stout et al. (2019) argue that in its conservativism the 
ZLS may begin to reject cases of CDTs that are yet to ‘ratchet up’ beyond the capacity of any 
one individual with their lifetime.  It is following this logic that Stout et al. argue that the ZLS 
is asking the “wrong question” (2019, p. 312); rather than considering whether social learning 
is necessary, they argue research should focus on whether it occurs. In this sense, they hope to 
demonstrate that more behaviours are ‘cultural’ by the presence of social learning. However, 
Stout et al. fail to acknowledge some of the more recent contributions to the ZLS theoretical 
standpoint (Bandini & Tennie, 2017, 2018; Tennie et al., in press) including my work (Neadle 
et al., 2017). These papers demonstrate that, for the ZLS, the presence of social learning in 
the facilitation of many behaviours, in a social species such as apes, is beyond question. This 




(Boyd & Richerson, 1996) and therefore, its absence in apes would be surprising in any 
account, including the ZLS. Stout et al.’s criticism, therefore, misses its target. It is to address 
these very objections that the term ‘tradition’ (sensu Galef, 1976) was abandoned (Neadle et 
al., 2017; Chapter 2) in favour of a more minimal classification of culture, with the hope that 
this term is more palatable across fields (Neadle & Tennie, 2019). 
Theoretically then, the very questions that this thesis asks could be challenged, such a 
challenge would follow the rhetoric of: “why would we be interested in what is possible? It is 
far more important to know what is happening". There is little or no question that all aspects 
of ape culture involve social learning, this is no longer an ‘open question’. Rather, the 
important (and open) question is: which of these resultant behaviours require it? Even 
‘hardwired’ behaviours such as yawning, which require no social learning for "reinnovation" 
across subjects (Tennie, 2019b; Yoon & Tennie, 2010), are facilitated in their frequency by 
social learning; i.e., if individual A yawns around individual B then B is more likely to yawn. 
Thus, the yawn was socially mediated by A’s actions (yawn contagion; Provine, 1986, 2005). 
If it is accepted that social learning mediates behavioural frequencies as genetically fixed as a 
yawn, then the open question is which behavioural forms require social learning; i.e., which 
behaviours cannot occur in the absence of social learning, this then logically excludes 
yawning. If evidence of these behaviours (CDTs) were found in extant ape species, outside 
our own, it would be necessary to reconsider the assumption that cumulative material culture 
is unique to humans. The data presented in this thesis, and that reported elsewhere suggest 
that ape culture, as we know it today, is better explained through socially mediated 




Fowler, Tennie, & Call, 2013; Motes-Rodrigo et al., 2019; Sherry & Galef, 1984; Tennie, 
Hedwig, Call, & Tomasello, 2008). Therefore, at present, CDTs and the process of 
cumulative cultural evolution can continue to be considered “uniquely human” (Tomasello, 
1998b) owing to our reliance on copying and ability to ‘ratchet’ beyond the capacity of any 
single individual. 
 Methodological 
 The LS methodology 
The LS methodology has undergone two major revolutions since its initial 
formulation (Bandini & Tennie, 2017, 2018). The first saw the introduction of two 
“standards”: the single or double case (Bandini & Tennie, 2017) and the second involved the 
introduction of incremental levels of social learning information (Bandini and Tennie, 2018; 
Chapter 4). The double case standard went against the initial "one size fits all" logic of the LS 
test, which assumed the reinnovation (or reinvention as it was then termed) of a behaviour in 
a single individual within a population is sufficient to assume that the entire species was 
capable of such a reinnovation. Instead, the double case standard requires two independent 
reinnovations (Bandini & Tennie, 2017), i.e., a reinnovation in two separate populations. The 
introduction of this standard was in response to critiques that single reinnovations are 
insufficient to assume species wide patterns of behaviour. 
However, even with the addition of this double case standard, some behaviours 
demonstrated using the LS methodology can still be considered as latent solutions following 




from the stipulations of the double case standard if they are relatively complex, though this 
definition lacks universal qualification. This means that, based on the current framework, it is 
not possible to empirically predict which behaviours would be exempt from these standards, 
they instead need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. These authors cite nut-cracking as a 
sole example of where the double case standard would not be applicable as the behaviour 
"requires a specific technique performed in a predetermined order and several objects in 
conjunction" (Bandini & Tennie, 2017, p. 5). Based on this, in the currently known 
chimpanzee tool use repertoire (Whiten et al., 2001), only nut-cracking would qualify for 
exemption from the double case standard. Thus, a universal qualification of what is needed 
before a trait is exempt from the double case standard is required; however, this would need a 
universal definition of complexity, such a feat is far beyond the scope of this thesis. 
As there appeared to be no universal qualification of when practitioners should 
withhold the double case standard, throughout this thesis I took each behaviour on a case-by-
case basis. Despite the assumption of naivety inherent in the LS method (Tennie & Hedwig, 
2009), Chapter 2 tested for a behaviour which was already likely to be present within the 
target population (indeed all populations given its simplicity see Chapter 2 for further 
discussion; Neadle et al., 2017). As the populations were culturally independent and there 
were reinnovations of the target behaviour in our captive population and the wild, it can be 
seen that the double case standard was upheld. It is likely, according to Tennie et al. (2009), 
that the three wild populations documented to show this behaviour did so via individual 
learning, perhaps mediated by non-copying social learning, however, the data provided by 




the fact that no tool use needed, and its behavioural form requires only one step) and its 
seeming universality in the wild, we applied the double case standard.  
However, the double case standard was not upheld throughout this thesis, Chapter 3 
looked outside of the tested species’ naturally occurring repertoires. It was therefore assumed 
that the behaviours might represent a relatively complex solution in these species, the wild 
conspecifics of which express little to no foraging related tool use (Hohmann & Fruth, 2003; 
Robbins et al., 2016; van Schaik et al., 2003). Thus, the double case standards were 
suspended. Finally, in Chapter 4 we also suspended the double case standard, as nut-cracking 
in chimpanzees is considered a behaviour with a low relative probability of occurrence 
(Bandini & Tennie, 2017; Tennie et al., 2009). 
Therefore, as with many findings in science, the results presented here should be 
replicated before they are assumed to be ‘fact’. However, when replicating such results, it is 
necessary to recall the factors influencing cultural behaviours outlined in Section 7.3.2.4. 
Should a population fail to reinnovate a behaviour, it is possible that they are not exposed to 
the "right" conditions.  Equally, it is possible that the populations that I have reported here, 
for example, the chimpanzee sample in Chapter 4, were not exposed to these "right" 
conditions and/or in the right state (age) and this can explain the results. The LS methodology 
has limitations, primarily its reliance on the assumption that a small number of individuals 
can be generalised to an entire species. However, to date, it is the only method by which we 
can test for the ability of a species to reinnovate a behaviour whilst excluding the confound of 




double case standard where appropriate, it is possible to mitigate the effects of this limitation 
on the resulting data. 
 Allospecific demonstrators 
Chapters 4 and 5 considered the social learning capacities of the great apes; this was 
achieved by using demonstrations to attempt to facilitate the expression of a novel behaviour 
in captive apes. Chapter 4 began the demonstrations with ‘ghost conditions’, which allow the 
subjects social information about the results of a behaviour, even the pathways that the 
objects must follow to result in this end state but not the bodily actions (Heyes, 1994; 
Hopper, 2010). In this sense, the ‘ghost condition’ uses many social learning mechanisms 
(Whiten et al., 2004) to the exclusion of imitation. The final condition of Chapter 4 used a 
full action demonstration from a human demonstrator; similarly, Chapter 5 used a full action 
demonstration from a group of demonstrators (N=4). It could be argued that it would have 
been better to utilise conspecific demonstrators; i.e., train a conspecific to perform the target 
actions and have this individual complete these actions in front of conspecifics. This 
suggestion has some validity, indeed Hopper et al. (2015) showed that apes are more likely to 
copy other apes than humans. However, studies of ‘true’ action copying, i.e., those without 
the confound of other social learning mechanisms, suggest that no matter the demonstrator 
species, apes appear to fail in imitating novel bodily actions (e.g., Clay & Tennie, 2018; 
Tennie et al., 2012; Tomasello et al., 1997). Additionally, in practice, it would have been 
nearly impossible to recreate the conditions of this study (multiple serial demonstrations 




 Measures by proxy 
Throughout this thesis, I have had to use indirect measures to assess phenomena that I 
cannot be sure to have occurred, i.e., measures by proxy. This was necessary either because to 
measure the actual phenomenon required specialist equipment or would have required me to 
use techniques that, whilst valid, were tangential to the aims of the particular study. 
Firstly, I considered that when performing demonstrations to subjects, e.g., in 
Chapters 4 and 5, it was necessary to ascertain the attention paid by subjects to the 
demonstrations, to eliminate the possibility that subjects did not imitate because they simply 
did not pay attention. In these chapters, I attempted this using body-mounted cameras on the 
demonstrator(s), along with another camera on a tripod behind the demonstrator(s). It was 
soon clear that ascertaining eye-gaze was next to impossible at such a distance, to do so 
would require much higher definition and close up footage. Therefore, it became necessary to 
measure, by proxy, those individuals who were oriented towards and in clear view of the 
demonstrator, therefore, were deemed to have observed the demonstration. 
This measure was far from perfect and in hindsight might have been better 
accomplished using eye-tracking techniques such as those employed by Myowa-Yamakoshi, 
Scola and Hirata (2012). Such a technique was considered; however, it has two important 
limitations itself. Firstly, using this methodology only video demonstrations can be provided, 
thus falling short of ‘full’ demonstration as previous LS studies (Bandini & Tennie, 2018) 
have shown that primates pay limited attention to these demonstrations. Equally, it could be 
argued that the captive subjects are ‘used to’ observing humans interacting with objects and, 




would thus copy the live human action demonstration, if sufficiently motivated. Therefore, 
the second limitation of eye-tracking tools becomes relevant, in that the cost-benefit ratio of 
using this technology becomes highly weighted towards forgoing the more expensive option. 
Undoubtedly, if the research question is centred on where an ape is attending, there is no 
substitute for eye-tracking. However, in the case of this research, the costs far outweighed the 
benefits. As a result, the results of this measure should be interpreted with caution. I 
attempted to improve on this measure in Chapter 5 by designing a four-way ‘on the spot’ 
reliability measure that required a majority of demonstrators (i.e., at least three out of four) 
agreed the subject had observed an action demonstration. I believe this measure presents a 
good balance between cost and utility, in a study that does not focus on the locations 
observed, whilst attempting to mitigate some of the limitations 
This leads to the second major measure by proxy: attempting to unravel subjects’ 
motivations. In Chapter 5, I attempted to quantify subjects’ motivation to engage with the 
apparatus by measuring, as a percentage of available testing time, the time subjects spent in 
contact with the ‘test box’. This measure is limited by the fact the subject could simply hold 
the box for the entire trial without attempting to open it once and would receive 100% 
‘motivation’. Equally, a subject could spend the entire trial throwing the box at a wall in an 
attempt to open it and they would receive <100% ‘motivation’. This said, to quantify 
subjects’ motivations when psychometric assessments are limited, is always going to leave 
some degree of validity to be desired. Thus, I simply acknowledge that this remains a 




 Captive subjects  
Throughout this thesis the data presented have been collected from captive 
individuals, or, at the least, those in the care of humans. The captive environment offers some 
important advantages over a wild one; however, this also leads to limitations, which must be 
acknowledged before drawing conclusions from the data. This section will consider these 
limitations and therefore set the context for the later conclusions, which need to be somewhat 
tempered in the light of them. Also in this section justifications will be made to consider why, 
in spite of the limitations, captive populations were used throughout this thesis.  
Wild and captive apes react differently to novel stimuli (Forss et al., 2015); potentially 
as a result of this, research often observes substantive differences in the behavioural 
repertoires of these conspecific groups (e.g., Gruber & Clay, 2016). It could be considered 
that this ‘captivity effect’ may have influenced the likelihood of the apes in Chapters 3 and 4 
to initially approach or engage with the novel apparatus/food sources. It is possible that, due 
to increased neophobia (Forss, Motes-Rodrigo, Hrubesch, & Tennie, 2019; Forss et al., 2015), 
wild populations may be less likely to reinnovate behaviours outside their population’s 
repertoire. This would mean that some of the results reported in this thesis might not be as 
likely to occur, had I chosen to use wild subjects in data collection. This might have resulted 
in, for example, not all species of apes reinnovating ‘picking’.  
Furthermore, other research has found that captive baboons (Papio anubis; Laidre, 
2008) and spotted hyenas (Crocuta crocuta; Benson-Amram, Weldele, & Holekamp, 2013) 
are more proficient problem solvers than their wild conspecifics. It is possible that this would 




However, these results were not replicated in either the gorilla or bonobo samples, therefore it 
is possible that other, group specific factors (see Section 7.3.2) are also involved. As 
discussed at length in Chapter 6, the captivity effect is a likely explanation for the disparity 
between wild and captive bonobo populations’ differences in object manipulation rates. 
Though, given that Chapter 6 directly investigated these differences, the collection of data 
from captive subjects is not a limitation of this study. 
However, it is also possible that the data reported here underrepresent the capacities 
of the species investigated. Wild apes undergo a substantive period of maturation and 
learning, through interactions with their environment, conspecifics and exploration; this is a 
function of the elongated juvenile period of this clade (even compared to other organisms of 
similar body size; Russon & Begun, 2004). Russon and Begun also suggest that the 
consistent provisioning of apes with the required nutritional sources might delay the 
development of their innovative abilities. However, they go on to express that, in the wild, 
mothers begin to withdraw the crutch of provisioning as the juvenile develops, through a 
weaning process; thus, developing a necessity for innovative means to access food sources 
(Fox et al., 1999; Laland & Reader, 1999). However, in captive populations, this necessity 
never arises, subjects are consistently provisioned with sufficient food sources that require 
little to no processing, though enrichment devices are often given in modern captivity. In 
spite of this, the apes, from which these data are collected, have likely only experienced an 
approximation of the maturation process that wild conspecifics undergo; accordingly, they 
should be treated as approximations of their wild conspecifics. However, more recent 




predictive utility, in terms of apes falling back on ‘difficult to access foods’ during staple food 
scarcity (Koops et al., 2013). Regardless, findings from captivity should be replicated in wild 
populations before strong conclusions are drawn from them.   
In spite of the clear limitations, described above, inherent to a captive sample, this 
thesis presents a case for the potential capacities of the concerned species. Accordingly, at 
times the data presented might go beyond what would be expected, or even is typical, of wild 
populations; for example, wild gorilla and bonobo tool use does occur on occasion (Breuer, 
Ndoundou-Hockemba, & Fishlock, 2005; Ingmanson, 1996), but this thesis presents these 
species as comparable, at times, to chimpanzees and orangutans (Chapter 3). Contrastingly, 
the chimpanzees in Chapter 4 were outside of their sensitive learning period for nut cracking, 
this chapter concluded that this, in combination with a lack of behavioural flexibility, was 
responsible for the sample failing to reinnovate or learn the behavioural form. However, wild 
data suggest that migrant females might be able to adapt their behavioural repertoires to more 
closely resemble that of the new group (Luncz et al., 2012). The data presented here have 
allowed me to isolate specific social learning variants, something that would have been 
exceptionally challenging in a wild population; as well as assume, with very little doubt, that 
subjects are naïve to behavioural processes of interest prior to conducting research of their 
acquisition. For these reasons, the data presented here have benefited from collection in a 
captive population. However, as always, they should be complimented by wild data yet to be 
collected; therefore being postfaced by the notion that captive apes are simply models of wild 




 Future research directions 
 Resetting the null 
Based on the results presented in the earlier chapters, I suggest here that future 
research takes this opportunity to ‘reset the null’ hypothesis of ape culture in a way similar to 
that suggested in early human stone tool cultures (Tennie et al., 2017). That is, research 
following this thesis should consider that socially mediated reinnovations may be sufficient to 
explain the patterns of behaviour observed in wild populations. In so doing researchers 
should reconsider the anthropomorphised assumption that action copying is integral to ape 
culture. This should be upheld at least until a time that spontaneous ‘true’ imitation (such as 
that described in Chapter 6) is documented outside our lineage. This is not to suggest that the 
‘search for imitation’ should stop here, but rather the search should begin anew, setting aside 
data from enculturated individuals and restricting studies of imitation to those that exclude 
the possibility of other social learning variants. Following this, experimental studies with 
wild apes should be conducted, those that exclude the possibility of social learning 
mechanisms other that imitation, in order to assess whether any potential for imitation is a 
product of captivity and/or enculturation.  
 Stringent imitation studies 
Accordingly, research should develop on the studies presented here in using 
conspecific demonstrators, to assess the claim that conspecifics are better demonstrators than 
allospecifics (Hopper et al., 2015). By using conspecific demonstrators, it can be made clear 




action copying. Importantly, these demonstrations should be of behaviours that are outside of 
the individual’s ZLS, thereby ensuring that the behaviour constitutes a CDT thereby 
excluding individual learning. It is for this reason that I suggest a result dependent design in 
studies of ‘true’ action copying, such as that used in Chapter 5. However, based on the 
findings of Tennie et al., (2012) it appears unlikely that such results would yield anything 
different from those presented here.  
 The ZLS project 
An ongoing project should also be to subject each putative case of culture to an LS 
test. This would ensure that claims of ‘culture’ are given the most accurate cultural label. 
Those cases which ‘pass’ the LS test, i.e., are shown to be CDTs through several, valid, 
populations failing to reinnovate the behaviour, should be further subjected to the extended 
LS method (as applied in Chapter 4) to ascertain which social learning variant is necessary 
for the emergence of the trait. Those behaviours which ‘fail’ the LS test should be considered 
as cultural in the minimal sense (outlined in Chapter 2) and can be placed within the species’ 
ZLS. Through testing behaviours in this way, it will be possible to build up species-specific 
repertoires and infer the degree to which the resulting ZLSs overlap. I suggest that such an 
endeavour would be better placed using a more large-scale collaboration similar to the 
"ManyPrimates" project (Bohn et al., 2019), rather than the single methods used in this thesis, 





This thesis contains a new classification of culture (minimal culture), based on the 
results of captive experiments (Chapter 2), the first application of the LS testing methodology 
outside of the behaviour’s intended species (Chapter 3), the first attempt to classify 
chimpanzee nut-cracking as a CDT or a latent solution (Chapter 4), the first test of ‘true’ 
imitation to make use of majority influence (Chapter 5) and a report of the capabilities of 
bonobos in the domain of object manipulation (Chapter 6). A recurring theme throughout this 
entire thesis is that the assumptions of the ZLS hypothesis appear largely accurate; 
specifically, the emergence of, at least some, ape cultural variants can be explained through 
socially mediated reinnovations. Furthermore, apes appear unable to demonstrate convincing 
evidence of ‘true’ imitation, even under optimal conditions.  
However, there are some instances where the basic predictions of the ZLS hypothesis 
appear to not correspond with observed data. In these cases, it is important to consider the 
external factors that may have influenced this outcome. Consistent with the ZLS hypothesis, 
these factors should be eclectic, therefore considering individual, social, environmental and 
biological influences. Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to find common ground 
between the ZLS and CDT hypotheses, whilst also testing the assumptions that cannot be 
reconciled between the two. Overall, I find support in favour of the ZLS hypothesis, with the 
caveat that potentially even more emphasis should be placed on the factors influencing the 
expression of great ape cultural behaviours in future applications of this theory.  
A clear undertone throughout this thesis is, whilst individual reinnovations can 




culture are pervasive in the lives of all great ape species. These species should be considered 
as ‘cultural’, however the degree of this ‘culture’ requires further investigation. Evidence of 
culture should be identified before behaviours are assumed to not be the product of individual 
learning; however, absence of appropriate cultural evidence is not evidence of its absence. 
Thus, both the ZLS and CDT hypotheses remain in contention as explanations for the 
observed behavioural patterns in wild great apes.  
Ape cultures are complex, we are still uncovering evidence of new behaviours and 
capabilities of our closest extant relatives. However, researchers should consider their own 
biases when interpreting these data and avoid anthropomorphising where possible. By 
assuming nothing about the requirements of a behaviour, it is possible to discover the true 
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APPENDIX A: GORILLA SLEEPING AREAS.  
Used to illustrate that UM & OZ could not have seen one another, owing to an 
obstruction in the form of the scales. Container was placed into the walkway. Note, although 
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B.1 Background 
Action copying3 has been argued to be the bedrock on which human (Homo sapien) 
cumulative culture rests (Boyd & Richerson, 1996)4. To date, no convincing evidence exists 
suggesting that action copying – “Learning to do an act from seeing it done” (Whiten & Ham, 
1992) – is present in non-human animals. Furthermore, many would agree that action 
copying is a ‘special’ form of social learning that makes cumulative culture easier to access – 
if not, allowing it to develop in the first place (Tennie et al., 2009). Therefore, one would 
expect chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; and other social animals) to have produced obvious 
forms of cumulative culture (similar to humans), if they were able to copy actions. As 
chimpanzees are, genetically, the most similar species to humans (along with bonobos; Pan 
paniscus) it is reasonable to expect that they would have similar abilities to humans 
(cognitive cladistics). The question then is, can chimpanzees spontaneously engage in action 
copying? 
Earlier studies on action copying have neglected the potential for social learning 
biases. These can be defined as a factor that varies the likelihood of an individual to express a 
given trait after seeing it in others (Henrich, 2001). Henrich (ibid) identified three forms of 
social learning (or “transmission”) biases: direct, prestige and conformist biases, argued 
                                                 
3 Action copying, defined here, is similar to imitation. However, crucially, here we do not assume that 
action copying requires the copier to understand the goals of the demonstrator, simply, they must show the same 
actions, hence the distinction. Otherwise, the terms are interchangeable. 
4 This is a contentious conclusion, with some studies suggesting that action copying is in fact not 




likely to give social learning, and culture, an adaptive direction (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). 
Conformist biases (or “conformist transmission”) should not be confused with conformity 
(Watson et al., 2018). Conformity is defined as abandoning an existing behaviour in favour of 
that of the majority (Acerbi, van Leeuwen, Haun, & Tennie, 2016; Haun et al., 2014; Haun & 
Tomasello, 2011). Whereas, conformist transmission is defined as an individual adopting the 
behaviour of the majority (this definition makes no stipulations about prior behaviours; 
Watson et al., 2018); conformist transmission has also previously been termed “majority-
biased transmission” (Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2012). Both conformity and conformist 
transmission will be discussed below, however, conformist transmission is the main focus of 
this empirical work.  
The common factor in any operationalised definition of conformity or conformist 
transmission is that the learner must adopt the behaviour of the “majority of individuals” 
(Haun & Tomasello, 2011; van Leeuwen & Haun, 2013). However, it is important to note that 
it is often difficult for an external observer to determine which demonstrator(s) an observer is 
learning from (van Leeuwen, Acerbi, Kendal, Tennie, & Haun, 2016). It is important – for the 
question of conformity or conformist transmission – to determine whether a behaviour has 
been socially learned, through simple social learning (in any form) or whether a learning bias 
has acted. For example, van de Waal et al. (2013) argued that their study with wild Vervet 
monkeys (Chlorocebus pygerythrus) showed evidence of conformity, however, it was not 
possible to confirm that observers were not simply copying a dominant individual, which was 
a key argument in a later rebuttal (van Leeuwen et al., 2016). Indeed, Galef & Whiskin 
(2008) showed that it is possible to replicate behavioural patterns, similar to those caused by 
conformity/conformist transmission, in rats with only a single demonstrator. These cases, 
where only a single demonstrator is implicated, do not constitute conformity or conformist 
transmission and are simply caused by social learning. However, more recent research in 
great apes has shown that chimpanzees and humans (but not orangutans) are more likely to 
take on the behaviour of a majority – even when the number of demonstrations is matched 
across a majority and minority condition (Haun et al., 2012); therefore suggesting that the 




There have been claims that conformity is present in several species5, one of the most 
commonly cited examples are humans: in human psychology one classical example is Asch’s 
(1956) study. This study showed that participants would adopt a demonstrated viewpoint, that 
they clearly knew to be (or previously believed to be) false, in order to fit with a majority. 
Conformity has also been inferred in wild chimpanzees (Luncz, Wittig, & Boesch, 2015), 
where immigrant females’ tool use patterns become more similar to their new group 
compared to their original group. Immigrant females from one group increased their 
proportion of stone hammer use – for nut cracking – upon moving to a new group that used 
stone hammers more often than their previous group. It was shown that the immigrant 
females were indistinguishable from others in the new group, after just one season of 
observation6.  
This said, claims of conformity have not been without criticism; with critics often 
stating that it is difficult (if not impossible) to identify conformity simply from observing 
behaviour, as it cannot be certain that the behaviour shown by a majority is copied (as 
opposed to, for example, one salient7 individual; Acerbi et al., 2016; van Leeuwen et al., 
2016; van Leeuwen, Kendal, Tennie, & Haun, 2015). Nevertheless, given that the first 
evidence for conformity from controlled captive work has been shown in chimpanzees (Haun 
et al., 2012, 2014), it is possible that chimpanzees indeed conform – to some degree.  
Given that there is so far no convincing evidence for true behavioural action copying 
in untrained and unenculturated great apes (Clay & Tennie, 2018; Tennie et al., 2012), 
research should aim to test for the possibility that true action copying is within the 
capabilities of these species after all, using all possible means to do so – in this case we 
                                                 
5 Chimpanzees (Whiten, Horner, & de Waal, 2005), orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus & Pongo abelii; Whiten & 
van Schaik, 2007), rats (Rattus norvegicus; Galef & Whiskin, 2008), Vervet monkeys (E. van de Waal et al., 
2013), sticklebacks (Pungitius pungitius; Pike & Laland, 2010) & humans (Haun et al., 2014). Note, that each 
study represents just one example in each species, and this list is not exhaustive, to produce such a list would be 
beyond the scope of this empirical work.   
6 It is worthy of note that there are no direct observations from the previous groups. Therefore, artifacts 
left behind at nut cracking sites were used as a proxy, to determine the tool use proportions in previous groups 
and therefore infer prior behaviour patterns. These inferences separate the conformity claim from one of 
conformist transmission. 




intend to implement social learning biases, i.e., conformist transmission/conformity. We have 
noticed that, so far, studies aiming to elicit true action copying in these animals have failed to 
make use of social learning biases, such as conformist transmission, which have been shown 
to have an effect over and above that of single demonstrator social learning alone (Watson et 
al., 2018). However, the introduction of social learning biases (and especially conformist 
transmission) may be key, it may allow the discovery of true action copying in a sample of 
untrained, unenculturated, non-human great apes. Here we will fill this knowledge gap. We 
will adapt parts of the methods of Haun et al’s (2012, 2014) studies on conformist 
transmission and conformity (respectively) in ape’s general social learning (Haun et al’s 
studies were not designed to determine or isolate underlying social learning mechanisms; so, 
local enhancement, for example, might have been implemented). Haun et al. (2014) used an 
experimental design that exposed three species of great ape (two year-old human children, 
adult chimpanzees and adult orangutans; all exposed to the same task) to a group of three 
demonstrators who exhibited a different location strategy (placing an item in one of three 
locations) from the strategy individually learned by the participant. The results showed that 
human children were significantly more likely to conform to the demonstrators’ location 
strategy than the other species of great ape tested (which did not significantly differ when 
compared to one another; however, only one chimpanzee ever switched strategy, and no 
orangutan ever did). This was interpreted to be evidence of conformity in humans, but not in 
other species of great ape.   
Haun et al.’s general method of using a majority of demonstrators to induce social 
learning (similar to Asch’s (1956) original) will be used in the present study. However, as it 
remains unknown whether the introduction of conformist transmission will be sufficient to 
stimulate action copying in a sample of non-human primates, we will also test this here. We 
combine Haun et al’s (2012, 2014) method of social conformist transmission/conformity 
demonstrations with a task that has been shown to result in true action copying in humans. 
This task was taken from Clay and Tennie’s (2018) comparative study of human children and 
bonobos. It involves the demonstration of novel actions with a novel object that is baited and 
is opened after demonstrations. As no previous studies have attempted to use social learning 




However, if social learning biases, in this case conformist transmission, can lead to action 
copying in our task, then this will be evidence that non-human primates are capable of action 
copying, even if this may not occur in other situations.  
B.2 Method 
B.2.1 Subjects 
We will aim to test all species of great ape at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research 
Center, Leipzig, Germany; however, owing to time constraints it is likely that testing only 
chimpanzees and bonobos will be possible. In case of this, we would aim to use the Sumatran 
orangutan and Western lowland gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) samples at the Wolfgang Köhler 
Primate Research Center as a “pilot” and their data would be added to supplementary 
material for reference. This study will operate on a volunteer basis, it is possible therefore 
that subjects choose not to participate in the study (either by not entering testing rooms or by 
wanting to leave the room before the test). Individuals will need to be tested separately 
(mothers and their offspring are acceptable, however, testing dyads will be avoided where 
possible). Due to the strong dominance hierarchies in many ape species8, if only one puzzle 
box is used per demonstration it is possible that only dominant individuals would gain 
possession. Most importantly, we need to establish a majority influence of demonstrations, in 
both sexes (see below) and this can only be practically be achieved for single observer 
subjects (and only partly for testing dyads). If testing dyads the demonstrators can merely 
achieve a smaller (2:4 as opposed to 1:4) overall numerical majority. Establishing an effective 
majority (most effective being 1:3 or greater; Bond & Smith, 1996) is essential for testing 
conformity/conformist transmission. We aim for a minimum of three trials for each 
individual. Subjects will be randomly allocated to experimental and baseline conditions 
(though note that a baseline condition would only be necessary if evidence of action copying 
                                                 
8 Chimpanzee, gorilla and orangutan dominance hierarchies are patriarchal (Goodall, 2005), i.e., a male 
is usually at the top of the hierarchy, whereas, bonobos exist within a matriarchal society (Gruber & Clay, 
2016). Note, that the finer details of bonobo hierarchies are more complex than this, however for the purpose of 




is found, so we follow a study design that flexibly adjusts to outcomes; details below). Each 
subject will be assigned a randomly generated number, subjects will then be tested in 
ascending numerical order in order to randomly assign subjects to conditions.  Each trial 
should take no longer than 15 minutes from the beginning of the demonstration to the end of 
testing (see below); thus, a total of 45 minutes testing time would be required with each 
subject across all trials. 
In accordance with the recommendations of the Weatherall report “The use of non-
human primates in research” all subjects will be housed in semi-natural indoor and outdoor 
enclosures containing climbing structures, such as ropes and platforms; and natural features, 
such as vegetation, trees and streams. They will receive their regularly scheduled feedings, 
primarily consisting of vegetables, have access to enrichment devices including shaking 
boxes and poking bins, and water ad lib. Subjects will never be food or water deprived for the 
purposes of this study. All research will be conducted in the observation rooms.  
No medical, toxicological or neurobiological research of any kind is conducted at the 
Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center. This research will be non-invasive and strictly 
adhered to the legal requirements of Germany, where the study will take place. The study has 
been ethically approved by the University of Birmingham AWERB committee (reference no. 
UOB 31213) and by Dr. Daniel Hanus, lab coordinator at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate 
Research Center, following SSSMZP, EAZA and WAZA protocols on animal research and 
welfare. 
Animal husbandry and research comply with the “European Associations of Zoos and 
Aquaria Minimum Standards for the Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and 
Aquaria”, the “World Association of Zoos and Aquariums Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct 
of Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquariums” and the “Guidelines for the Treatment of 
Animals in Behavioral Research and Teaching” of the Association for the Study of Animal 
Behavior. IRB approval is not necessary because no special permission for the use of animals 





All trials will centre around a ‘puzzle box’ previously used in an action copying non-
majority demonstrator experiment (see Figure 1; Clay & Tennie, 2017). We will use two 
variants: the “demo” box and the “test” box. In order to remain consistent with the previous 
study, the demo puzzle box would be made from a piece of non-toxic wood, cut in half, with 
a small depression (shown in red) cut into the centre of the bottom half (shown in blue in this 
figure, and indicated by a double headed arrow), and cut horizontally as shown by line A. 
This demo box (used by the demonstrator humans) would never be provided to any animal. 
The test box (that will be handed to the apes) would be a cylindrical piece of wood, visually, 
identical to the demo box. Although this version of the box would be a visual replica of the 
demo box, in reality the test box cannot be opened, as it is simply a piece of wood (matched 
in dimensions to the puzzle box) with a line scored horizontally (see right hand image in 
Figure 1) around the edge. The use of a dummy box for the test box is aimed to imply to the 
subjects that an additional step may be needed to open the box, therefore potentially acting as 
a further catalyst for action copying (note a similar setup was used also for children and 
bonobos by Clay and Tennie (2018)). 
B.2.3 Procedure 
B.2.3.1 Actions 
Demonstrators will be trained on the below demonstration procedure prior to testing. 
Human training on how to perform the demonstration will last for 1 hour each – with each 





demonstrator having previously been provided a video of DN modelling the demonstration 
once (S1), demonstrators will be required to copy DN’s actions and speed of performing 
those actions during demonstrations. DN and CT will observe each demonstrator prior to 
testing beginning, to determine whether their demonstrations are proficient; videos of each 
demonstrator (after training) will be published along with the final paper. Demonstrator 
action consistency checks will also be performed after each week on testing, allowing a 
retraining procedure to be implemented if necessary.  
B.2.3.2 Demonstrators 
Half of the human demonstrators (N=4) will be male (n=2) and half will be female 
(n=2). Demonstrators will also be of roughly similar age (all adults between the ages of 25-
30). None of the demonstrators will be zoo staff. In order to reduce possible order effects, 
subjects will be randomly allocated to each possible iteration of demonstrator order or 
randomised to one demonstrator of the original four (in the single demonstrator condition, see 
below).  
B.2.3.3 Actions to copy 
Human demonstrators will perform two actions with/above the demo box whilst 
standing outside the enclosure; two actions will be demonstrated (based on Clay & Tennie, 
2017). Both actions will be preceded by demonstrators extending their arms away from their 
bodies, holding the box, and performing the following actions with their arms extended. The 
first action is “Rub”, the demonstrator rubbing the back of the right hand in a consistent, but 
slow, circular, clockwise, motion across the top of the box, four times (Rub lasts 1 second per 
circle – 4 seconds total). The second action is “Rotate”, the demonstrator raises the right hand 
and rotating it, at the wrist, in a clockwise motion, four times (Rotate lasts 1 second per 
rotation – 4 seconds total). The demonstrator will then open the box, show the contents of the 
box (a grape) to the subject and give the grape from inside to the subject through secure 




Action for conformity condition 
In order to demonstrate conformity, as opposed to conformist transmission, it is 
necessary to demonstrate that the subjects are able to abandon a previously adopted 
behaviour in favour of that displayed by the majority. Therefore, should the subjects adopt the 
Rub-Rotate behaviour in the conformist transmission condition, human demonstrators will 
demonstrate, to them, a second action “head touch” – with all other aspects of the 
demonstration remaining the same9: the conformity condition (see Figure 3). The action 
involves the demonstrator holding the box (top side up) in both hands and raising it to their 
forehead twice (the action takes 8 seconds total – 4 seconds for each iteration). This is done, 
before opening the box and providing the subject with the grape, through the “food chutes”. 
Human demonstrators will be trained in the head touch action to the same degree as they 
were with the Rub-Rotate actions, and in the same way.  
This action will also be used in the final 33% of the subjects, if the data shows that the 
naïve subjects spontaneously express the Rub-Rotate action in the baseline condition (see 
below). This would then require a test with a novel action (namely head touch). 
B.2.3.4 Logistics of testing 
To ensure that the subjects have been given the best chance to witness the 
demonstrations, demonstrators will face subjects (with their head and body) throughout. In 
addition, two further measures will be put in place. First, each demonstrator will wear a 
GoPro™ camera10, mounted to their chest. Prior to performing their demonstration 
procedure, described above, the demonstrators will ensure that the subject is attending to 
them – here we define this as having gazed in the general direction of the box (and therefore, 
the demonstrator) for one second or more. If not, demonstrators will gain the subject’s 
attention by calling their given name – the subject’s name may be used to gain their attention 
                                                 
9 The difference between the conditions will be the Rub-Rotate action will be substituted for the head 
touch action. 




as often as is required. Once the subject is attending to the demonstrator (defined as head 
positioned towards them), each will begin their demonstration. All demonstrators will code 
inwardly whether the subject was attentive during the demonstration of each individual action 
(i.e., whether they observed each action for at least one second – which directly relates to one 
repetition of each action). After the demonstration, all demonstrators will say out loud (in 
order of demonstration; by simply saying yes/no to each action) whether the subject observed 
the whole demonstration11. If the subject did not observe the whole demonstration (to the 
satisfaction of the majority – i.e. at least ¾ of the demonstrators), then that demonstrator will 
repeat their demonstration (up to a maximum of five times), the next demonstrator will 
follow the same procedure, and so on until the subject has had the chance to observe the full 
demonstration. After the trial, parts of the demonstrations observed (i.e., which actions: 
Rub/Rotate/Both), along with which demonstrators were successfully observed, will be 
noted12.  
The second measure will be achieved through post-hoc data analysis, whereby each of 
the demonstrator’s GoPro footage will be analysed and a percentage of the total 
demonstration time that the subject attended to the demonstrator will be calculated. This will 
be measured by the amount of time that the subject spends with their head inclined towards 
each respective demonstrator (regardless of where the body is facing). 
All trials would also be additionally video recorded, using two cameras mounted on 
small tripods (positioned at either end of the line of demonstrators). These recordings would 
be stored redundantly on several hard drives and later backed up to Max Plank Institute and 
University of Birmingham servers at the first opportunity.   
                                                 
11 For example, a subject having seen both actions would lead to a call out of “yes, yes”, only seeing 
the “Rub” demonstration would lead to “yes, no”, etc.  
12 This will be achieved by demonstrators noting inwardly during the trial and then reporting the 




B.2.4 Trial  
B.2.4.1 Timings 
The subject will have, after the demonstration, three minutes to complete the task 
(defined as at least attempting to reproduce the demonstrated action – see conditions section 
below). If they complete the task, the trial will end immediately. If they fail to complete the 
task within three minutes, and were not touching the box in the last 30 seconds, then the trial 
would end (Clay & Tennie, 2018). Should the subject be touching the box (with any body 
part) in the last 30 seconds of the initial three minutes, then a further one minute of testing 
time would be added, and a further one minute would also be added at the end of this minute 
if the subject was still in recent contact with the box (i.e. within the last 30 seconds of the 
previous, i.e. fourth minute). This would result in a maximum testing time of five minutes 
(see Figure 4). If the subject successfully demonstrated the behaviour, at any point during the 





Figure 2. Decision tree for each stage of testing, green arrows relate to testing continuing, red arrows relate to 
testing ceasing. 
B.2.4.2 Retrieval of test box  
Whenever the trial stops (regardless of whether this is due to action copying being 
identified or the allotted time running out) the box will be retrieved. It is possible that the box 
will be given back to the researchers at the end of the trial (or before this) in which case the 
box will be accepted and the trial will end. If not, and the trial ends, the ape will be offered 
half a grape (or 50% of whatever food is used as a reward; in trade) in order to retrieve the 
box. The addition of a smaller piece of food in trade, even following an unsuccessful trial, is 
to reduce the chance that subjects do not become trained to assume an equal reward for non-
success. Some subjects may hold on to the test box, but the box would need to be retrieved 
before the subject is allowed to re-join the rest of the group. This would be by way of the 
subject having to place the test box in the Futterklappe13. This might prove difficult and we 
might need the experienced keepers’ help for this. Should a subject refuse to give back the 
box for a half grape (or half of whatever reward is used in the study), we would increase the 
                                                 
13 This is a two way system that allows researchers and subjects at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate 




quantity/quality of food offered to the subject in order to get the box back, at the rate of half a 
grape per minute, this would continue until the box is traded for the food. Any time that the 
subject requires the food trade to be increased in order to retrieve the box the trial will be 
flagged for potential later analyses14.  
A typical trial should last no longer than 15 minutes from start to finish and would 
require the demonstrators to all stay throughout the trial (to ensure that that the effect of the 
aimed social learning bias (if any) is constant throughout the trial (see Haun et al., 2014). We 
aim to use the same human demonstrators for all individuals, to ensure reliability. During the 
conformity trials, the demonstrators will remain in their line and during the testing time will 
stand with their hands clasped at their waist, no less than 1m from the enclosure (or out of 
arms reach of the subjects; see Figure 5) ; this is to attempt to control for any distractions that 
the demonstrators may cause.  
                                                 
14 This is because there is a possibility that the subjects will become conditioned to doing nothing with 





B.2.5.1 Flexible design 
 
Figure 3. Green arrows represent successful display of the behaviour at that stage, and red arrows represent 
failure to display the behaviour. Note that at each stage the additional subjects are still naïve to the behaviour, as 
this is a between subjects design. The pathway through the decision tree that allows for each condition to be 
implemented is displayed in bold. See below for coding.  
Throughout this study we are using a flexible, result-dependent design. This means 
that unless the relevant behaviour is expressed (see below for criteria) in the previous 
condition, the next test condition will not be completed. For example, if group A do not 
express the Rub-Rotate behaviour15 in the conformist transmission condition (to do so would 
be considered evidence of action copying) then group B (that would have taken part in the 
baseline condition had action copying occurred) will be absorbed into the conformist 
transmission condition (see Figure 3). This is to give the best chance that at least one subject 
                                                 




within the sample is likely to express evidence of action copying, with the assistance of 
conformist transmission. 
The only way that all test conditions can be completed is for evidence of action 
copying to be identified in the first conformist transmission condition (1st 33% of subjects); 
then, for no evidence of the Rub-Rotate behaviour to be expressed in the baseline condition 
(2nd 33% of subjects), which would lead to the final 33% of subjects participating in the 
single demonstrator condition. Each of these conditions is described below.  
During testing, behaviours will be live coded to inform the next step based on Figure 
3, behaviours will be live coded16. This will follow the criteria of Clay and Tennie (2017), 
being a simple binomial decision, i.e., did the subject sufficiently copy the actions that were 
demonstrated to them or not? This uses the coarse-grained system described below. However, 
to ensure reliable live coding, after each trial each demonstrator will independently write 
down whether they considered the subject’s actions to constitute action copying (i.e., were 
they, according to their view, the same as the demonstrated action; see Table 1). The paper on 
which the live coders have written their decision will be folded in half and placed into a 
box17. These will then be counted, after the trial, if more half (i.e., 3 or 4) of the 
demonstrators agree that the subject displayed action copying then it will be considered that 
action copying has been found in that trial (and thus, that condition) and the appropriate path 
on the decision chart above will be followed.  
Given that there are at least two distinct actions in this study (i.e., Rub and Rotate) 
approximations (i.e., just one of the two actions) at the demonstration will be live coded as 
attempts at action copying; these will be treated as action copying for the purpose of the 
decision tree. Demonstrators will be trained on, and provided with a copy of the ethogram 
(see Table 1), and videos of DN performing each of the behaviours in the ethogram prior to 
any testing occurring, this is to ensure that all demonstrators are clear on what behaviours 
                                                 
16 Meaning that the researchers present will make instantaneous (i.e., in the moment) decisions as to 
whether the behaviours expressed constitute the behaviours described in the ethogram, and therefore action 
copying.  
17 This is done independently to avoid the effect of majority influence altering the perception of the 




count as approximations. This means that any behaviour that is defined in the ethogram (see 
Table 1) will be considered as “successful”, which would allow the study to progress to the 
next condition in the decision tree. These attempts will be further analysed, from video 
footage with a reliability coder, after testing is completed to determine to what extent action 
copying occurred.  
Table 1. Ethogram, given to coders, detailing the exact action behaviours. This will be accompanied by videos 
of DN performing the actions. Note that approximations of these behaviours will also be coded, for example a 
single “Rub” with the left hand will be considered as an attempt at action copying (this attempt will be qualified 
in the post-hoc video analyses but will be classified as a “yes” in the binomial code).  
Behaviour Description 
Rub The subject places the back of their hand (either hand), on top of 
(or close above) the box and rubs it in a circular motion 
(regardless of direction). 
Rotate The subject raises their hand (either hand) and rotates – for a 
minimum of 180˚ it at the wrist (regardless of direction). 
Rub-Rotate The subjects performs the “Rub” behaviour, and this is followed 
by the “Rotate” behaviour 
Rotate-Rub The subjects performs the “Rotate” behaviour, and this is 
followed by the “Rub” behaviour 






B.2.6 Social learning bias 
B.2.6.1 Conformist transmission 
 
Figure 4. Flow chart of social learning bias transmission conditions (conformist transmission and conformity), 




Figure 5. Experimental set up for the conformist transmission condition. 
This condition will involve testing at least the first 33% of subjects.  
Demonstrators will stand in a line, facing the enclosure, no less than 1m (or out of 
arms reach of the subjects) from the enclosure prior to the subjects entering the enclosure. 
Once the subject is inside the enclosure the demonstration phase of the trial will begin. In the 
conformist transmission condition subjects will have the opportunity to observe eight, full, 
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demonstrations of the actions (see above). Demonstrators will proceed to perform the Rub-
Rotate actions (see above) individually, from the demonstrator’s left to the demonstrator’s 
right (e.g., in the case of Figure 5, A, B, C, D); the order of the demonstrators will be 
randomly assigned across subjects with each subject being assigned a random number 
between 1 and 24, which relates to demonstrator order in Figure 6. Once each demonstrator 
has individually demonstrated the actions, all four demonstrators will perform a group 
demonstration. Each subject will then have the initial 3 minutes in order to complete the 
actions, followed by two additional minutes should they remain in contact with the box (see 
Figure 2).  
 
Figure 6. Demonstrator orders, each trial will begin with a random number (between 1-24) being generated, 
which relates to the order of demonstrators to be used in the group demonstration conditions (conformist 
transmission & conformity). 
B.2.6.2 Conformity condition 
This condition will involve testing only the subjects that displayed evidence of action 
copying in the conformist transmission condition; as a result, the number of subjects in this 




condition. This will essentially be a “side condition” where the subjects are retested, the next 
33% of the sample will be tested in the baseline condition should action copying arise.  
This condition is provisional on evidence of action copying in one group. Should 
evidence of action copying be found, then we will use this condition to determine whether 
subjects abandon a previously adopted method in favour of that displayed by the majority 
(thus fulfilling the definition of conformity described above). In order to test this, a different 
action will be implemented (head touch, see above). This condition will be exactly the same 
as the conformist transmission condition, with the only variation being that a different action 
will be demonstrated.  
B.2.6.3 Baseline condition 
 
Figure 7. Flow chart of baseline condition, note that although the same demonstrators are present during this 
condition they do not demonstrate any of the actions described above. This condition is therefore likely to be 
shorter than the social learning bias conditions. 
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Figure 8. Experimental set up for the baseline condition (after provisioning the ape with the box), note that 
demonstrator boxes are not present in this condition, this is designed only to test the baseline behaviours, i.e., 
with no demonstrations. 
This condition would involve the next – randomly selected – 33% of the sample (this 
could be either the second 33% or the final 33% depending on the result of the previous 
conditions), thus, the subjects in this condition would be different to those in the conformity 
condition18. For the baseline condition we would not provide subjects with any 
demonstrations. They would still be tested individually. After a sham baiting (same as in the 
test condition above) subjects would be handed the test box by a demonstrator. Testing times 
would remain the same as before (i.e. maximum of five minutes, including two possible time 
extensions). During the baseline trial the same four demonstrators (from the conformity 
condition) will be present and standing in the same way, but not performing any 
demonstration; this is to control for a possible effect of social presence. The order of the 
demonstrators will once again be decided by way of generating a random number and 
matching it to the chart in Figure 6; the demonstrator closest to the “Futterklappe” will pass 
the box and rewards to the subject.  
                                                 
18 This assumes that evidence for action copying is found in the conformist transmission condition, 
with the previous group. Should this not be found at all, then this condition would not ever be used. Please see 
Figure 3 for a decision chart depicting the process of which condition will follow depending on the outcome of 





B.2.6.4 Single demonstrator condition 
 
Figure 9. Flow chart of the single demonstrator condition, note that this condition contains the same number of 
demonstrations as the social learning bias condition, however, all demonstrations will be performed by a single 
(randomly selected, demonstrator – from the original four.  
 
Figure 10. Experimental set up for single demonstrator condition (here with a female experimenter) 
This condition would involve the final 33% of the sample. These subjects would not 
have taken part in either the conformity condition or the single demonstrator condition. In the 
single demonstrator condition the procedure would be mostly identical to the conformity 
condition, however a single demonstrator (subjects will be randomly assigned to a 
demonstrator using a random number generator at the start of each trial) would perform the 
same demonstration (i.e. Rub-Rotate) for eight successful times to control for the number of 
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demonstrations in the conformity condition (described above). Repeat demonstrations would 
happen according to the same rule as described in the conformity condition.  
Note, bonobos have already been tested in a single demonstrator condition with these 
very actions and type of box in Clay and Tennie (2018), which demonstrated that bonobos did 
not display evidence of action copying. As a result the bonobos in our sample will never be 
tested in this condition, and instead the bonobos will be split 50-50 across the conformist 
transmission (and conformity if the Rub-Rotate behaviour is found) and baseline conditions. 
Should evidence of action copying not be found in the first 50% in the conformist 
transmission condition the final 50% (initially assigned to baseline) will be absorbed into the 
conformist transmission condition to determine whether the social learning bias of conformist 
transmission is sufficient to result in action copying, where a single demonstrator has 
previously failed (Clay & Tennie, 2018).  
B.2.7 Analyses 
All analyses will be performed in R and R Studio (most recent versions available). 
Behaviours will be coded in “attempts”, where if the subject relinquishes contact with the box 
(for more than 1 second), the attempt is considered to end, the next “attempt” begins when 
contact is re-established. An attempt will consist of any behaviour that meets any of the 
criteria in Table 1. 
B.2.8 Coding 
All videos will be viewed by DN prior to any coding, the video that DN perceives to 
have the best view of the subjects will be used. Only one video type and angle will be used 
for coding and later analyses per trial.  
B.2.8.1 Interrater reliability 
Prior to DN coding the entire data set, an independent naïve (to the conditions and 




videos using a “fine grained” and “coarse grained” style. This will distinguish between 
attempts at action copying (coarse grained) and degrees of action copying (fine grained).  
Coarse grained 
Coarse grained, attempts at action copying, will be described in the most basic terms, 
this is simply any attempt that relates to any part of the ethogram in Table 1. This will be 
completed on the first viewing of each video, coders will be required to state (binomially) 
whether or not the subjects made an approximation at the behaviour(s) demonstrated to them. 
This will be done using the ethogram above (see Table 1). The observations of DN and the 
second coder (i.e., which, if any, actions were performed) in the coarse grained coding will be 
compared to one another using Cohen’s Kappa, a minimum Kappa value of 0.6 (Cohen, 
1960; McHugh, 2012) will be required before coding will be considered reliable.  
Fine grained 
This will be completed after the coarse grained coding, coders will be required to 
state, in detail, how similar the behaviours, considered at least as “attempts” at action 
copying, are to the behaviours that were demonstrated. This will include, the order of the 
behaviours expressed (one behaviour, Rub-Rotate or Rotate-Rub) the hand that is used to 
perform the action (Left or Right) and the number of iterations of the behaviour(s) expressed 
(this will be coded separately for Rub and Rotate); see Table 2. Cohen’s Kappa values will be 
calculated for each of the above coding categories (N=4; Order, Hand, Rub Iterations and 
Rotate Iterations). A minimum Kappa value of 0.6 will be required for each category, to 
ascertain reliability (Cohen, 1960; McHugh, 2012) before full coding is considered reliable.  
Full dataset 
The coding of the complete data set will be performed by DN. This will combine 
coarse and fine grained coding methods (i.e., was an attempt made and how similar was that 




demonstrated, and will be coded using a points system (see Table 2). Attaining even the 
minimum number of points possible (3; only one action, performed once with the left hand) 
will be evidence of some degree of action copying – provided that the corresponding action is 
not identified in a baseline condition. However, the degree of action copying that is expressed 
by each successful attempt will be scored on a scale of 3-15; where 15 is full, high fidelity, 
action copying (both actions performed, with 4 iterations each, in the Rub-Rotate order, 
using the right hand).  Anything less than full action copying will be considered an 
approximation, the fidelity of which can be measured by the percentage of similarity to the 





Table 2. Points system to be used during the video coding, this will determine the degree of action copying – 
even a minimum score (3) will be considered as weak evidence of action copying (which remains a novel 
finding) where a higher score (to a maximum of 15) indicates proportionally greater degrees of action copying 
fidelity. Note, values in bold signify those that were demonstrated and therefore the “correct” actions. 
Fine grained variable Description “Score” 
Number of Rub iterations The number of times the individual replicated the Rub action performed 
4 times by the demonstrator 
0 = 0 points 
1 = 1 point 
2 = 2 points 
3 = 3 points 
4 = 4 points 
5 = 3 points 
6 = 2 points  
7+ = 1 point 
 
Number of  Rotate iterations The number of times the individual replicated the Rotate action 
performed  4 times by the demonstrator 
0 = 0 points 
1 = 1 point 
2 = 2 points 
3 = 3 points 
4 = 4 points 
5 = 3 points 
6 = 2 points  
7+ = 1 point 
 
Hand used for Rub action The hand that the individual used when replicating the Rub action 
performed by the demonstrator using the right hand. 
Neither = 0 points 
Left = 1 point 
Right = 2 points 
 
Hand used for Rotate action The hand that the individual used when replicating the Rotate action 
performed by the demonstrator using the right hand. 
Neither = 0 points 
Left = 1 point 
Right = 2 points 
 
Actions replicated Which of the actions were replicated by the subject and in which order; 
demonstrator used Rub-Rotate 
Rotate = 1 point 
Rub = 1 point 
Rotate-Rub = 2 points 
Other order = 2 points 
Rub-Rotate = 3 points 
 
Number of  Head Touch iterations1 The number of times the individual replicated the Head Touch action 
performed by the demonstrator 
1 = 1 point 
2 = 2 points 
3 = 3 points 
4 = 4 points 
5 = 3 points 
6 = 2 points  
7+ = 1 point 
 
1 Note, this variable will only be coded for in the case that the conformity condition is completed. This will not be added to any of the calculations for degree 





B.2.8.2 Statistical analyses 
The possibility for statistical analyses is limited by the success of the conditions. It is 
possible that only one individual (or even none) will show any evidence of action copying19, 
in which case statistical analyses would not be possible. However, the plan below assumes 
that all conditions are completed (following the highlighted line in the decision tree) and that 
sufficient individuals have displayed evidence of action copying in order to perform 
statistical analyses.  
It is possible that no statistical analyses will be appropriate, due to small sample sizes. 
In which case, we will aim to describe any “attempts” and full replications of actions in detail 
using photograph and video evidence. Also, we will use descriptive statistics and frequencies 
to provide an overview of the data.  
Degree of action copying 
Action copying fidelity 
A GLMM, with a binomial error structure20, will be constructed, with an outcome 
variable of action copying fidelity (converted to a decimal from percentage; using fine 
grained coding). Predictors will be condition (conformist transmission or single 
demonstrator), sex, age, and rearing history (mother reared or human reared – this includes 
human training outside of that required for normal animal husbandry21). Random intercepts 
will include, the individual ID, as it is likely that each individual will contributed more than 
one data point per trial. Also included as a random intercept will be trial, because each 
individual will take part in three trials within each condition. The results of the model will 
                                                 
19 To date there is no evidence of action copying in non-human great apes, as a result it is not possible 
to predict how effective the use of a social learning bias will be in stimulating action copying.  
20 Binomial error structure was chosen as the outcome variable, action copying fidelity, has a minimum 
of 0 and maximum of 1 (when percentage scores are displayed as decimals).  




determine the factors that significantly influenced the fidelity of action copying. The structure 
of the model is summarised in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Structure of planned model predicting degree of action copying fidelity (operationalised as % of score 
of possible 15).  
Model DV Predictors Random Intercepts 





Latency to attempt to copy actions 
A further GLMM, with a Gaussian error structure22, will be constructed with an 
outcome variable of latency to copy actions (in seconds; this will be the time from the onset 
of the trial to the first evidence of action copying approximation – coded using the coarse 
grained coding).  Predictors will be condition (conformist transmission or single 
demonstrator), sex, age, and rearing history (mother reared or human reared – this includes 
human training outside of that required for normal animal husbandry). Random intercepts 
will be individual ID and trial number, for the same reasons explained above. The results of 
this model will be used to determine which predictors influence speed at which an individual 
begins to approximate action copying, the structure of the model is described in Table X.  
 
                                                 
22 This assumes that the outcome variable does conform to a normal distribution. Should this not be the 




Table 4. Structure of model predicting latency to begin action copying (here using the coarse grained coding 
structure, therefore a very minimal definition of what constitutes action copying).  
Model DV Predictors Random Intercepts 
Latency Time taken to approximate 
action copying (s) 





B.3 Outcomes and interpretation 
Should action copying be reliably identified in the conformity condition (without 
being identified in the baseline condition) this would be the first evidence, to date, of 
spontaneous, true action copying in non-human great apes. This finding would be a ground-
breaking discovery for the fields of animal behaviour and cultural evolution and would 
support the supposition that great ape cultures may well be founded on mechanisms of 
copying social learning after all (e.g., action copying; Whiten et al., 1999). Moreover, this 
would dismiss any claims that great apes are generally unable to imitate novel actions 
spontaneously (Tennie et al., 2012). The findings of Tennie et al. (2012) when considered 
alongside that of Clay and Tennie (2017) and this new potential finding, would also make 
possible the claim: conformity biases are necessary for non-human primates to display action 
copying. This could then explain the geographical pattern of behaviours that have been 
shown in three of the four species of non-human great apes (Gorillas, Robbins et al., 2016; 
Orangutans, van Schaik et al., 2003; Chimpanzees, Whiten et al., 2001) using a similar logic 
to that used in human cases (e.g., in the anthropology of dance culture; Kaeppler, 1978). 
However, note that none of these conclusions hold if action copying will only be found 
weakly and or rarely. In that case, only some of the above assumptions will be negated (it 
would still not be parsimonious to explain whole population wide behaviours in apes by way 
of action copying). 
However, should action copying not be identified in the conformity condition, to any 




conformist transmission does not act as a “catalyst” for action copying. This finding would 
lend support to the notion that great ape cultures are built on a foundation of individual 
learning, the results of which are facilitated within cultures by non-copying social learning 
(e.g., stimulus enhancement). In this case, the idea that these cultures are based on socially 
mediated serial reinnovation, as is suggested by the Zone of Latent Solutions hypothesis, 
would have gotten further support (Tennie et al., 2009).  
If action copying were to be identified, during the social learning bias conditions, then 
a baseline condition would follow. This condition is to ascertain whether the behaviour can 
occur by individual learning alone (thus, action copying is not parsimonious). Based on the 
results of Clay and Tennie (2017) this is unlikely, as their sample of bonobos failed to display 
this behaviour, even when demonstrations were used; however, given that this study uses 
bonobos and chimpanzees further verification is required. If evidence were identified during 
the baseline condition then it would be concluded that the Rub-Rotate behaviour can occur 
without action copying; thus the study will retest the conformist transmission condition with 
the head touch demonstration in the final 33% of subjects. Undemonstrated target actions in 
baseline would raise questions about the validity of the study by Clay and Tennie (ibid) as a 
study of copying novel actions, however, the main conclusion of the study would not change 
much: it would mean that bonobos do not even copy familiar actions (at least not in a non-
conformity demonstration condition).  
Should evidence of the demonstrated behaviour not occur at baseline, then (given that 
subjects were counterbalanced between conditions) it is unlikely that individual learning is 
sufficient for non-human great apes to express this behaviour. This would imply that either, 
great apes cannot perform the target behaviour (i.e., they are physiologically limited, this is 
grossly unlikely but remains a possibility), and/or they are insufficiently motivated (this is 
also a possibility, however, the provision of a high value food reward is usually sufficient for 
apes to perform most tasks, even those well outside of their species-typical repertoire; Biro & 
Matsuzawa, 1999). Should the demonstrated behaviour not be identified during the 
conformity condition, and again not at baseline then we would conclude that it is not within 
the capabilities of non-human great apes to imitate the behaviours of humans – even under a 




hypothesis and the notion that spontaneous action copying of novel behaviours is a uniquely 
human trait (Tennie et al., 2009; Tomasello, 1998b). 
Following this result, with the remaining 33% of the sample, we would seek to use the 
Clay and Tennie (2017) study design (single demonstrator, see above), in a sample of other 
species of great ape (i.e., gorillas, chimpanzees or orangutans; dependent on time 
constraints). In this case, we would simply follow the same protocols as the conformist 
transmission condition, however only use one demonstrator. Should the behaviour still not be 
identified then the above conclusion would be further strengthened and we would also lend 
support to the findings of Clay and Tennie (ibid). If the behaviour were to be identified in this 
condition then this would still serve as evidence of action copying in non-human great apes, 
and would have equal, if not more, impact to a finding in the conformity condition. The 
variation being simply that whichever species completed the task seem able to imitate 
(without the crutch of a social learning bias), whereas bonobos are not (see Clay and Tennie, 
ibid).  
Depending on outcome, this study could substantially help to reset the default 
assumption in the animal culture literature that social learning is responsible for the 
emergence of many cultural behaviours, thus equating them with human culture dependent 
traits (Reindl et al., 2017).   
This study may also show that not all social learning is alike: if one finds evidence, 
e.g. for conformity using one social learning mechanism (e.g. local enhancement in Haun et 
al.) then this does not mean that this particular social learning bias is equally sufficient to 
induce other social learning mechanisms in the species in question. Social learning biases are 
clearly important in the evolution of culture, but so are social learning mechanisms. We need 
to understand both aspects if we are to make progress in understanding the evolution of 






APPENDIX C: FULL DETAILS OF EACH OF THE DEMONSTRATORS, THESE 
DEMONSTRATORS WERE KEPT CONSISTENT THROUGHOUT TESTING.  
 
Demonstrator 1 was Anna Pietschmann. Anna was, at the time of testing, a student in 
the psychology department at Leipzig University. Anna, prior to the onset of the study, had no 
contact with the apes in this study. Anna had no prior experience in testing great apes. 
Demonstrator 2 was James Cook, James was, at the time of testing a student in the 
psychology department at Aston University doing a research internship at the University of 
Birmingham’s psychology department. James, prior to the onset of the study, had no contact 
with the apes in this study. James had no prior experience in testing great apes. 
Demonstrator 3 was Madita Zetzsche, Madita was, at the time of testing, a master’s 
student in the biology department at Leipzig University. Madita, prior to the onset of the 
study had some contact with the apes used in this study. This was during a placement was the 
Max-Plank-Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, this contact included behavioral 
observations, assisting in cognitive test and animal husbandry. Madita had not been involved 
in any training of subjects to copy the behaviour of a demonstrator. Madita had prior 
experience (outlined here) testing great apes. Madita had, at some points, worked with all of 
the apes at the WKPRC. 
Demonstrator 4 was Damien Neadle, Damien was, at the time of testing, a Doctoral 
Researcher in the psychology department at the University of Birmingham. Damien, prior to 
the onset of the study had no contact with the apes in this study. Damien had prior experience 




included in the various chapters of this thesis. Ethogram from Chapter 6, as provided to 
coders, including notes.  
Behaviour  Definition Notes 
Play Manipulating object with no apparent immediate 
goal, including repetitive movements, alone or 
together with other individuals (alone/social), may 
be associated with a play face. 
Play is only coded as “social” if 
two individuals are 
simultaneously manipulating 
the same object.  
 
Tool-use Manipulating a detached (?) object as a means to 
achieve an end (e.g. nut crack, branch drag, 
drink). 
- 
Bite Biting or chewing object without ingestion. Only coded if the object is not 
ingested and leaves the 
individual’s mouth. 
Break Breaking (off) a substrate; this includes pulling 
grass up. 
Only coded if the object is not 
ingested within 30 seconds of 
breaking it. This was chosen to 
create a certain, if arbitrary, cut 
off between manually breaking 
foods pre-ingestion, as a part of 
the feeding process, and 
independent object 
manipulation. 
Carry Carrying object in hands, feet or mouth. Only coded if the individual is 
not feeding on the object and 
has moved at least their own 
body length away from their 
starting position. 
Drag Pulling object along the ground with hands - 
Throw Throwing object or intentionally dropping object 
from an elevated position. 
- 
Support Using an object to partially support the weight of 
the subject, i.e., holding onto a root when sitting 
on a steep hill.  
Not coded if the object is 
holding the entirety of the 
individual’s weight.  
Day nest 
building 
Creating a nest out of sticks and leaves (tree or 
ground). During this process the subject may 
break or bite several sticks and put them over their 
head or wrap them around the body. 
For further description see: St 
Amant & Horton (2008); 







APPENDIX D: SETTINGS USED FOR BORIS FOR CODING IN CHAPTER 6. 
 
In BORIS, videos can be opened as raw files, and users simply code to a predefined 
ethogram (see Table 2). Using the BORIS coding scheme, all behaviour types were set as 
“state events” with the exception of “throw” which was a “point” event (as throw behaviours 
were assumed to be instantaneous); each point behaviour was given a default duration of 1 
second (the minimum time period our data were accurate to). Independent variables were set 
as Group (i.e. the enclosure within the sanctuary) and subject ID. Using BORIS, a “coding 
map” was used to code behaviours (allowing a button press to relate to a single behaviour) 
with the time format set to seconds only. This allowed the duration of each behaviour (in 
seconds) to be exported along with the data file. The data file was exported from BORIS as 
a .csv file and additional demographic information about each subject was added in Microsoft 
Excel (sex, rearing history, actual age of subject and age group; see Table 1; also see S1 File 
for raw data in .csv format). This demographic information was added to each focal in turn to 











This is the collective term for the steps required for an individual to be said to have 
performed a behaviour. The form of a behaviour is independent of antecedent 
behaviours that may alter peripheral aspects of the behaviour. For example, the 
behavioural form of nut-cracking is independent of material choice, in that the 
behavioural pathways of nut-cracking are comparable between stone and wooden 
hammers.  
Complexity A full discussion of complexity is beyond the scope of this thesis, instead readers 
should consult a recent review by Vaesen and Houkes (2017). In the context of this 
thesis complexity is broadly defined as an increase in the number of parts 
(technounits; be they objects or actions; Oswalt, 1976), goals (Read & Andersson, 
2019), or ‘rules’ (Sirianni et al., 2015). In addition, those behaviours that require a 
higher level of manual dexterity might be considered more complex than those with 
relatively simple behavioural forms (Foucart et al., 2005). 
Culturally 
Unconnected 
Used to describe populations, both captive and wild, that have not had the chance 
to socially learn from one another. This can be determined through the Method of 
Exclusion or individual reports in the literature, corroborated with ‘stud-book’ 
entries or keeper testimony. In wild populations, to describe subjects/populations as 
culturally unconnected, substantive ‘information’ barriers must exist between the 




A culture dependent traits, or CDT, (sensu Reindl et al., 2017) is a behaviour 
and/or artefact (trait) that has been shown to be reliant on a copying variant of 
social learning (see below) in order for it to occur. These traits should not emerge 
and/or be maintained within culturally unconnected communities and/or within 
communities (and species) that lack copying variants of social learning.  
Cumulative 
Culture 
Cumulative culture is the variant of culture that a species capable of copying can 
develop. The human species has cumulative culture (in addition to our ZLS). 
Cumulative culture requires several conditions to be met: 
The ability to ‘ratchet up’ traits (Tomasello et al., 1993). The behaviour should 
show some evidence of cumulated, culturally inherited change (e.g., in complexity 
and/or in efficiency) across generations with limited ‘slippage’ across these 
generations. 
Cumulative culture must be underlain by copying variants of social learning (see 
Table 1.1). There is still debate as for the concrete possibilities here, but most 
discussed are action and environmental results copying – including teaching of 
these types of information (Caldwell & Millen, 2008; Reindl et al., 2017; Tennie et 
al. 2009; in press).  
Traits, which are the product of cumulative culture, should be beyond the capacity 
of a naïve individual to innovate within a single lifetime (Boyd & Richerson, 




Enculturated Refers to non-human individuals that have been saturated within human culture to 
the extent that their behavioural phenotype has markedly changed from 
‘unenculturated’ conspecifics. For example, Kanzi, a bonobo that was raised by 
researchers (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986) has been demonstrated to be able to 
‘produce’ and use stone tools (Toth et al., 1993), communicate using a ‘lexi-gram’ 
(Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986), understand morality and even express feelings 
(Savage-Rumbaugh, Fields, Segerdahl, & Rumbaugh, 2005). Kanzi can be 
considered enculturated, to the extreme, thus, should not be assumed to represent 
his species.  
Facilitated/ 
catalysed 
Behaviours that are facilitated or catalysed are those that did not necessarily require 
social learning (i.e., were not CDTs), however through non-copying social learning 
variants were increased in frequency within a population. This is distinct from 
behaviours that are acquired or transmitted between individuals, these terms have 
connotations of copying. 
Ghost 
Condition 
A type of demonstration that shows the movement pathways of an object, without 
providing information of the bodily actions of a demonstrator/agent. These 
conditions were first suggested by Heyes et al., (1994) as a mechanism by which 
researchers can isolate imitative and emulative capacities in subjects.  
Hominid The term used to describe the family of primates, within this is included modern 
and extinct humans and all extinct and extant non-human great apes. 
Hominin The term used to describe modern and extinct humans, i.e., those of the genus 
Homo, excluded from this definition are the non-human great apes. 
Innovation This term lacks universal qualification to date (see Bandini & Harrison, under 
review; for an overview of relevant literature though). Despite this, the term can be 
defined as a behaviour that is expressed for the first time, i.e., is novel, within a 




These are traits within a species’ ZLS (Tennie et al., 2009), i.e., those traits that 
every member of that species has the capacity to reinnovate in the absence of social 
learning and enculturation by another species (Tennie et al. 2009; in press). 
However, it is important to note that outside of controlled testing conditions (e.g., 
LS tests) the vast majority (if not all) of these traits are socially influenced in their 






This is the methodology used to test the claim that a trait should be considered a 
CDT – where the alternative is that the behaviour is within the species’ Zone of 
Latent Solutions (ZLS; see below). This methodology involves exposing naïve, 
motivated subjects at the correct ontogenetic stage to the ecological conditions (i.e., 
raw materials) required to express the target trait and observing them for a given 
time period to determine if the trait reappears “from scratch” (Hedwig & Tennie, 
2008).  
Recent versions of the LS methodology differentiate between two ‘standards’, 
which allow researchers to include behaviours with a low relative probability of 








Also known as the ‘ethnographic technique/method’ (e.g., Laland & Janik, 2006). 
This is a method of determining putative cultural traits by taking reports of 
behaviours observed at various locations across time and classifying them as in 
Table 1.2. It is possible to attempt to control for the effect of genetic and ecological 
variation using this technique, practitioners claim it results in cultural variations.  
Minimal 
Culture 
Those behaviours that are facilitated or catalysed by social learning, but do not 
require social learning, in any form, for the behavioural form to be reinnovated 
(Neadle et al., 2017); compare with CDTs. These behaviours are ‘cultural’ in the 
most minimal sense and are distinct from examples of cumulative culture or CDTs. 
This term is largely similar to ‘tradition’ sensu Galef (1976). 
Putative 
cultural trait 
Those traits that have been identified to be potentially culturally dependent (CDT; 
see below), often through the method of exclusion (sensu Whiten et al., 1999). 
These traits have been shown to be customary or habitual in one geographically 
distinct community but absent in another.  
Reinnovation Also known as ‘reinvention’ (e.g., Tennie et al., 2009). These are behaviours that 
may not be innovations on a species level, but constitutes an innovation for a 
particular individual within the population. It is therefore possible for multiple 
individuals within a species, or even population, to engage in innovations. Those 
innovations facilitated or catalysed by social learning are termed ‘socially mediated 




This a range of years or developmental stage, during which an individual must 
learn the skills required for or full behavioural form of a behaviour in order for 
them to go on to express the behaviour later in development (Biro et al., 2003). It is 
possible that individuals do not require copying abilities (see Table 1.1) in order to 
acquire a behaviour during their sensitive learning period, Tomasello (1998a) 
suggested that this might occur even though environmental happenstance.  
Social 
Learning 
Social learning can be largely defined as the process of an individual being 
influenced by its perception of traits produced by others. This influence must alter 
the traits produced by the observer – the observer may then show a decrease or an 
increase in the frequency of a trait (non-copying variants of social learning) and/or 
the form of the trait (copying variants of social learning; compare Tennie et al. in 
press). There are myriads of ways in which social learning mechanisms are 
currently divided. Whiten et al. (2004) provide an overview of currently used terms 





This is the potential repertoire of traits that any typically developing individual 
within a species has the potential ability to develop ‘from scratch’. It is influenced 
by a range of factors, including genetic predispositions and evolved cognitive skills 
(Tennie et al., 2009; Section 7.3.2.4). The ZLS of one individual may be ‘smaller’ 
than another of the same species and the same is true for single populations of the 
species (their realised mix of LS is often smaller than the full species ZLS). This is 
not to say that all species are restricted by their ZLS: a species that can copy traits 
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